The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

This book contains articles on the theory of conflict. Conflict appears in many forms, from a dictator terrorizing his country to organized crime demanding protection money. Among the questions addressed are the conditions which make conflict severe (for example, is class conflict worse than ethnic conflict?), whether voluntary agreements can avoid future conflict, how the outcome of one war will affect the incentives of countries to wage war in the future, how dictators hold power, and why revolutions appear. The book provides an overview of existing literature, applies the theory of conflict to new situations, and gives foundations for future work. It should interest both researchers and students studying political economy, public choice, international relations, and comparative politics.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appUcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earUer surveys. Volume I contains previously pubhshed research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included."

The taxation of multinational corporate groups has become a major concern in the academic and political debate on the future of international taxation. In particular the arm's length standard for the determination of transfer prices is under increasing pressure.
Many countries and international bodies are now taking a closer look at the use of transfer prices for profit shifting and are exploring alternative mechanisms such as formulary apportionment for the allocation of taxing rights.
With regard to this topic, this volume is the first to offer a concise analysis of transfer pricing in the international tax arena from an interdisciplinary legal and economic point of view. Fundamentals such as the efficient allocation of resources within multi-unit firms and distortions between different goals of transfer pricing as well as different aspects of it in tax and corporate law, the traditional OECD approach and practical aspects concerning intangibles, capital and risk allocation are covered by outstanding authors.

The taxation of multinational corporate groups has become a major concern in the academic and political debate on the future of international taxation. In particular the arm's length standard for the determination of transfer prices is under increasing pressure.
Many countries and international bodies are now taking a closer look at the use of transfer prices for profit shifting and are exploring alternative mechanisms such as formulary apportionment for the allocation of taxing rights.
With regard to this topic, this volume is the first to offer a concise analysis of transfer pricing in the international tax arena from an interdisciplinary legal and economic point of view. Fundamentals such as the efficient allocation of resources within multi-unit firms and distortions between different goals of transfer pricing as well as different aspects of it in tax and corporate law, the traditional OECD approach and practical aspects concerning intangibles, capital and risk allocation are covered by outstanding authors.

Conflict appears in many forms, from a dictator terrorizing his country to organized crime demanding protection money. Questions and issues addressed in this text include: the conditions which make conflict severe; whether voluntary agreements can avoid future conflict; how the outcome of one war will affect the incentives of countries to wage war in the future; and how dictators hold power. The book provides an overview of existing literature, applies the theory of conflict to new situations, and gives foundations for future work. It should interest both researchers and students studying political economy, public choice, international relations, and comparative politics.

This book describes the theory structure underlying contests, in which players expend effort and/or spend money in trying to get ahead of one another. Uniquely, this effort is sunk and cannot be recovered, regardless of whether a player wins or loses in the competition. Such interactions include diverse phenomena such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation, relative reward schemes in firms, political competition, patent races, sports, military combat, war and civil war. These have been studied in the field of contest theory both within these specific contexts and at a higher level of abstraction.
The purpose of this book is to describe the fundamental common properties of these types of interactions and to uncover some common properties or laws that govern them. The book begins by describing the properties of static contests and tournaments. Aspects such as timing, entry, sabotage and delegation are added and contest design issues such as the admission or exclusion of players and the structure of prizes are discussed. Further, structures are analysed in which players interact repeatedly in the same or different contest environments. Examples are inter-group conflict followed by intra-group rivalry, elimination tournaments and other dynamic contest structures.

This book describes the theory structure underlying contests, in which players expend effort and/or spend money in trying to get ahead of one another. Uniquely, this effort is sunk and cannot be recovered, regardless of whether a player wins or loses in the competition. Such interactions include diverse phenomena such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation, relative reward schemes in firms, political competition, patent races, sports, military combat, war and civil war. These have been studied in the field of contest theory both within these specific contexts and at a higher level of abstraction.
The purpose of this book is to describe the fundamental common properties of these types of interactions and to uncover some common properties or laws that govern them. The book begins by describing the properties of static contests and tournaments. Aspects such as timing, entry, sabotage and delegation are added and contest design issues such as the admission or exclusion of players and the structure of prizes are discussed. Further, structures are analysed in which players interact repeatedly in the same or different contest environments. Examples are inter-group conflict followed by intra-group rivalry, elimination tournaments and other dynamic contest structures.

Risiko wird von -konomischen Entscheidungstr{gern nicht um jeden Preis vermieden, sondern unterliegt als "Ungut" dem gleichen -konomischen Arbitragekalk}l wie andere G}ter. Im Zentrum der vorliegenden Arbeit stehen die Fragen danach, inwiefern dieser Zusammenhang Risiko bzw. dessen ]bernahme zu einem Produktionsfaktor macht, welche Eigenschaften Risiko als Produktionsfaktor unter verschiedenen Rahmenbedingungen hat, wie sich die Grenzproduktivit{t von Risiko bei unterschiedlich vollst{ndigen Systemenvon Risikom{rkten bestimmt, auf welchem Weg eine wie hohe Risikoentlohnung erfolgt. Besonders aber wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie sich Risikoertragsteuern auf die Risikoallokation auswirken. Im Unterschied zur traditionellen Portfolio- und Kapitalmarkttheorie steht die realwirtschaftliche Risikoentscheidung des Unternehmers im Zentrum der modelltheoretischen Analyse. Ziel dieser Analyse ist es zum einen, die aktivit{tsanalytische Begr}ndung f}r die Faktoreigentschaft von Risiko in formalem Kontext zu eruieren, zum anderen die Wirkung von Steuern auf die Entlohnung von Risiko}bernahme neuzubewerten.

Recent decades have seen almost unprecedented economic growth in income per capita around the world. Yet this extraordinary overall performance masks a wide variation in growth rates across different countries, with persistent underdevelopment in some parts of the world. This disparity constitutes "the development puzzle," and it is exemplified by growth spurts in China and India that contrast markedly with disturbingly low growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. In this volume, economists address issues of inequality and growth, going beyond narrowly defined "economic" factors to consider the effect on growth of the structure of governance, the quality of a country's governing bodies, and the social norms that govern collective decision-making. The contributors use both formal modeling and empirical analyses to examine how the "soft factors" of institutions and norms interact with growth performance, natural resource endowments, and economic performance. They consider such topics as the effects of decentralization in Africa, fiscal discipline in Indian states, natural resource wealth as a cause of corruption, social violence during the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, and the effect of strong national identity on redistributive politics. Some of their findings suggest that not only do institutions and norms affect economic performance, economic performance itself is a key factor in explaining such governance failures as corruption and the frequency and intensity of economic conflict. Mark Gradstein is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics at Ben Gurion University in Israel. Kai A. Konrad is Professor of Economics at Free University of Berlin and Director at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).