Kollman presents students with a simple framework-politics is about collective dilemmas and the institutions that solve them-and applies it consistently throughout. How can 535 members of Congress get anything done? What is the committee system? How can the president change the immigration policy? Can it be done through executive orders? Instead of burying concepts in history or minutiae, Kollman's concise text gets right to the heart of political science.

Unlike texts that overwhelm with irrelevant details, Kollman gives students a simple framework, consistently applied: politics is about collective dilemmas and the institutions that solve them. How can 535 members of Congress get anything done? The committee system. How can the president change immigration policy? Executive orders. How do we get people to the polls? Voter mobilization strategies. Kollman's concise text gets to the conceptual heart of political science.

In this provocative and wide-ranging book, Ken Kollman examines the histories of the U.S. government, the Catholic Church, General Motors, and the European Union as examples of federated systems that centralized power over time. He shows how their institutions became locked-in to intensive power in the executive. The problem with these and other federated systems is that they often cannot decentralize even if it makes sense. The analysis leads Kollman to suggest some surprising changes in institutional design for these four cases and for federated institutions everywhere.

Unlike texts that overwhelm with irrelevant details, Kollman gives students a simple framework, consistently applied: politics is about collective dilemmas and the institutions that solve them. How can 535 members of Congress get anything done? The committee system. How can the president change immigration policy? Executive orders. How do we get people to the polls? Voter mobilization strategies. Kollman's concise text gets to the conceptual heart of political science.

In this provocative and wide-ranging book, Ken Kollman examines the histories of the U.S. government, the Catholic Church, General Motors, and the European Union as examples of federated systems that centralized power over time. He shows how their institutions became locked-in to intensive power in the executive. The problem with these and other federated systems is that they often cannot decentralize even if it makes sense. The analysis leads Kollman to suggest some surprising changes in institutional design for these four cases and for federated institutions everywhere.

Why do people identify with political parties? How stable are those identifications? Stable party systems, with a limited number of parties and mostly stable voter identification with a party, are normally considered significant signals of a steady democracy. In Dynamic Partisanship, Ken Kollman and John E. Jackson study changing patterns of partisanship in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia over the last fifty years in order to disentangle possible reasons for shifting partisanship and party identification. The authors argue that changes in partisanship can be explained by adjustments in voters' attitudes toward issues or parties; the success or failure of policies advocated by parties; or alterations in parties' positions on key issues. They contend that, while all three factors contribute, it is the latter, a party changing positions on a chief concern, that most consistently leads voters to or from a particular party. Their approach provides a deeper knowledge of the critical moving parts in democratic politics.

Why do people identify with political parties? How stable are those identifications? Stable party systems, with a limited number of parties and mostly stable voter identification with a party, are normally considered significant signals of a steady democracy. In Dynamic Partisanship, Ken Kollman and John E. Jackson study changing patterns of partisanship in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia over the last fifty years in order to disentangle possible reasons for shifting partisanship and party identification. The authors argue that changes in partisanship can be explained by adjustments in voters' attitudes toward issues or parties; the success or failure of policies advocated by parties; or alterations in parties' positions on key issues. They contend that, while all three factors contribute, it is the latter, a party changing positions on a chief concern, that most consistently leads voters to or from a particular party. Their approach provides a deeper knowledge of the critical moving parts in democratic politics.

Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman rely on historical data spanning back to the eighteenth century from Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States to revise our understanding of why a country's party system consists of national or regional parties. They demonstrate that the party systems in these four countries have been shaped by the authority granted to different levels of government. Departing from the conventional focus on social divisions or electoral rules in determining whether a party system will consist of national or regional parties, they argue instead that national party systems emerge when economic and political power resides with the national government. Regional parties thrive when authority in a nation-state rests with provincial or state governments. The success of political parties therefore depends on which level of government voters credit for policy outcomes. National political parties win votes during periods when political and economic authority rests with the national government, and lose votes to regional and provincial parties when political or economic authority gravitates to lower levels of government.

This is the first book to establish a link between federalism and the formation of national or regional party systems in a comparative context. It places contemporary party politics in the four examined countries in historical and comparative perspectives, and provides a compelling account of long-term changes in these countries. For example, the authors discover a surprising level of voting for minor parties in the United States before the 1930s. This calls into question the widespread notion that the United States has always had a two-party system. In fact, only recently has the two-party system become predominant.

In "Outside Lobbying," Ken Kollman explores why and when interest group leaders in Washington seek to mobilize the public in order to influence policy decisions in Congress. In the past, political scientists have argued that lobbying groups make outside appeals primarily because of their own internal dynamics--to recruit new members, for example. Kollman, however, grants a more important role to the need for interest group leaders to demonstrate popular support on particular issues. He interviewed more than ninety interest group leaders and policy makers active on issues ranging from NAFTA to housing for the poor. While he concludes that group leaders most often appeal to the public when they perceive that their stand has widespread popular support, he also shows that there are many important and revealing exceptions to this pattern.

Kollman develops his theory of outside lobbying through a combination of rational choice modeling and statistical tests that compare public opinion data with data from his interviews about interest groups' policy positions and activities. The tests reveal that group leaders use outside lobbying to take advantage of pre-existing public preferences, not to recruit members or to try to generate the mere appearance of grass-roots support. Kollman's innovative book will clarify the complex relationship among lobbying, public opinion, and public policy, and will set a new standard for interest group research.