Selected papers from many leading Australian, American, Asian, British and European economists of an international conference at Monash University sparked by the first Australian visit by Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel Laureate in Economics. Part 1 extends the recently emerged New Classical Economics which uses inframarginal analysis to formally examine classical economic problems of specialization with insights on trade, growth, and many other issues. Part 2 analyses the implications of increasing returns and the associated non-perfect competition on some macro problems like the effects of nominal aggregate demand on output and the price level. Part 3 analyses the relationships of information, returns to scale, and issues of resources and trade.

This book, with an overview introduction by Kenneth J.Arrow, is the first volume of the proceedings of the World Economic Congress held in Athens, Greece, in August/September 1989 under the auspices of the International Economic Association. It contains in Part 1 lectures from the plenary session by distinguished world economists. Part 2 contains surveys and reflections on various aspects of markets in equilibrium. Part 3 is concerned with normative criteria for economic policy within the framework of welfare and social choice theory.

Selected papers from many leading Australian, American, Asian, British and European economists of an international conference at Monash University sparked by the first Australian visit by Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel Laureate in Economics. Part 1 extends the recently emerged New Classical Economics which uses inframarginal analysis to formally examine classical economic problems of specialization with insights on trade, growth, and many other issues. Part 2 analyses the implications of increasing returns and the associated non-perfect competition on some macro problems like the effects of nominal aggregate demand on output and the price level. Part 3 analyses the relationships of information, returns to scale, and issues of resources and trade.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002. 

This collection of essays presents new insights into the analyses of public debt theory, recent historical episodes, econometric analyses of public debt and policy dilemmas and options. The subjects covered include optimal debt policy, the role of deficits as a temporary stimulus in the course of disinflation, the intergenerational equity aspects of public debt, public debt problems in developing countries, indexing public debt for inflation and various conceptual, accounting and measurement issues in obtaining accurate information on deficits and public debt as well as their impact on aggregate economic activity. The studies document the explosion of public debt, the potential benefits and costs associated with this explosion and the perceptions of the debt problems from the viewpoints of various national economies as well as the world economy. Professor Arrow was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1972.

The papers collected here deal with various topics in economic theory, ranging from preference and consumption, duality and production, equilibrium, capital, and growth, to the theory of social overhead capital. They all have a common theme: to try to formulate the working of economic forces in a capitalist economy in terms of mathematical models and to explore their static, dynamic, and welfare implications. Most of the papers were originally published during the 1960s and early 1970s.

This is a collection of theoretical papers, including contributions by Partha Dasgupta and three Nobel prize-winning economists: Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Joseph Stiglitz. Originally published in 1982.

This book, co-authored by the Nobel-prized economist, Kenneth Arrow, considers public expenditures in the context of modern growth theory. It analyzes optimal growth with public capital. A theory of 'controllability' is developed and injected into public economics and growth models.Originally published in 1970

Part intellectual autobiography and part exposition of complex yet contemporary economic ideas, this lively conversation with renowned scholar and public intellectual Kenneth J. Arrow focuses on economics and politics in light of history, current events, and philosophy as well. Reminding readers that economics is about redistribution and thus about how we treat each other, Arrow shows that the intersection of economics and ethics is of concern not just to economists but for the public more broadly. With a foreword by Amartya Sen, this book highlights the belief that government can be a powerful force for good, and is particularly relevant in the current political climate and to the lay reader as well as the economist.

One of the central questions of economics relates to the coordination of individual units within a large organization to achieve the central objectives of that organization. This book examines the problems involved in allocating resources in an economic system where decision-making is decentralized into the hands of individuals and individual enterprises. The decisions made by these economic agents must be coordinated because the input decisions of some must eventually equal the output decisions of others. Coordination arises naturally out of the mathematical theory of optimization but there is still the question of how it can be achieved in practice with dispersed knowledge. The essays here explore the many facets of this problem. Nine papers are grouped under the title 'Economies with a single maximand'. They include papers on static and dynamic optimization, decentralization within firms, and nonconvexities in optimizing problems. Fourteen papers are concerned with 'Economies with multiple objectives'. Among the topics covered here are stability of competitive equilibrium, stability in oligopology, and dynamic shortages. The final part of the book includes three papers on informational efficiency and informationally decentralized systems. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the effectiveness of markets.

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory
Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation
Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making
Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes

As long as there have been financial markets, there have been bubbles-those moments in which asset prices inflate far beyond their intrinsic value, often with ruinous results. Yet economists are slow to agree on the underlying forces behind these events. In this book Jose A. Scheinkman offers new insight into the mystery of bubbles. Noting some general characteristics of bubbles-such as the rise in trading volume and the coincidence between increases in supply and bubble implosions-Scheinkman offers a model, based on differences in beliefs among investors, that explains these observations. Other top economists also offer their own thoughts on the issue: Sanford J. Grossman and Patrick Bolton expand on Scheinkman's discussion by looking at factors that contribute to bubbles-such as excessive leverage, overconfidence, mania, and panic in speculative markets-and Kenneth J. Arrow and Joseph E. Stiglitz contextualize Scheinkman's findings.

Nonprofit organizations are changing dramatically in the ways they are financed. They are becoming increasingly commercial, operating more like private firms. Far more is involved than the generation of revenue. As donations decline in importance and user fees and money-raising ancillary activities come to dominate, they bring side-effects on the social missions that justify public support. This book examines these little-recognized relationships for the overall nonprofit charitable sector and then focuses on each of six industries; important differences are found among hospitals, universities, social service providers, zoos, museums, and public broadcasting.

The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's "Social Choice and Individual Values," the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making.

*Advances economists understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare

*Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues

*Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship

*Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis. "

One of the central questions of economics relates to the coordination of individual units within a large organization to achieve the central objectives of that organization. This book examines the problems involved in allocating resources in an economic system where decision-making is decentralized into the hands of individuals and individual enterprises. The decisions made by these economic agents must be coordinated because the input decisions of some must eventually equal the output decisions of others. Coordination arises naturally out of the mathematical theory of optimization but there is still the question of how it can be achieved in practice with dispersed knowledge. The essays here explore the many facets of this problem. Nine papers are grouped under the title 'Economies with a single maximand'. They include papers on static and dynamic optimization, decentralization within firms, and nonconvexities in optimizing problems. Fourteen papers are concerned with 'Economies with multiple objectives'. Among the topics covered here are stability of competitive equilibrium, stability in oligopology, and dynamic shortages. The final part of the book includes three papers on informational efficiency and informationally decentralized systems. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the effectiveness of markets.

A collection of essays presenting new insights into the analysis of public debt theory, recent historical episodes, econometric analyses and policy dilemmas and options. It also documents the perceptions of debt problems from viewpoints of national economies as well as the world economy.

Part intellectual autobiography and part exposition of complex yet contemporary economic ideas, this lively conversation with renowned scholar and public intellectual Kenneth J. Arrow focuses on economics and politics in light of history, current events, and philosophy as well. Reminding readers that economics is about redistribution and thus about how we treat each other, Arrow shows that the intersection of economics and ethics is of concern not just to economists but for the public more broadly. With a foreword by Amartya Sen, this book highlights the belief that government can be a powerful force for good, and is particularly relevant in the current political climate and to the lay reader as well as the economist.

Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu have throughout their careers continuously produced ideas at the very frontier of economics. Together, they have made unparalleled contributions on the properties of general equilibrium systems in economics, the study of collective choice and welfare economics. The editors have shown their usual rigor in selecting those papers which, in their view, have made the most important contributions in their particular areas of expertise. This volume will be an essential source of reference for students, researchers and practitioners alike.

This volume contains a selection of Professor Uzawa's important contributions to mathematical economics. Subjects covered by these nineteen essays include consumption, production, equilibrium, capital, growth, planning, international trade, and the theory of social overhead capital. Written in the 1960s and early 1970s, the papers form a basis upon which economic theory has developed over the last twenty years. The collection includes some of Uzawa's classic contributions, such as 'Preference and Rational Choice in the Theory of Consumption' (presented at the First Stanford Symposium), 'Time Preference, the Consumption Function, and Optimum Asset Holdings', 'Neutral Inventions and the Stability of Growth Equilibrium', 'On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth', 'Time Preference and the Penrose Effect in a Two-Class Model of Economic Growth', and 'On the Economics of Social Overhead Capital'. The collection will be useful not only in understanding the nature of the development in economic theory today, but also in reflecting upon the direction toward which economic theory will be advancing in the future.

Nonprofit organizations are changing dramatically in the ways they are financed. They are becoming increasingly commercial, operating more like private firms. Far more is involved than the generation of revenue. As donations decline in importance and user fees and money-raising ancillary activities come to dominate, they bring side-effects on the social missions that justify public support. This book examines these little-recognized relationships for the overall nonprofit charitable sector and then focuses on each of six industries; important differences are found among hospitals, universities, social service providers, zoos, museums, and public broadcasting.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

The Handbook of Mathematical Economics aims to provide a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for the field of mathematical economics. It surveys, as of the late 1970's the state of the art of mathematical economics. This is a constantly developing field and all authors were invited to review and to appraise the current status and recent developments in their presentations. In addition to its use as a reference, it is intended that this Handbook will assist researchers and students working in one branch of mathematical economics to become acquainted with other branches of this field. Volume I deals with Mathematical Methods in Economics, including reviews of the concepts and techniques that have been most useful for the mathematical development of economic theory. Volume II elaborates on Mathematical Approaches to Microeconomic Theory, including consumer, producer, oligopoly, and duality theory, as well as Mathematical Approaches to Competitive Equilibrium including such aspects of competitive equilibrium as existence, stability, uncertainty, the computation of equilibrium prices, and the core of an economy.

The Handbook of Mathematical Economics aims to provide a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for the field of mathematical economics. It surveys, as of the late 1970's the state of the art of mathematical economics. This is a constantly developing field and all authors were invited to review and to appraise the current status and recent developments in their presentations. In addition to its use as a reference, it is intended that this Handbook will assist researchers and students working in one branch of mathematical economics to become acquainted with other branches of this field. Volume 1 deals with "Mathematical Methods in Economics," including reviews of the concepts and techniques that have been most useful for the mathematical development of economic theory.

For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http: //www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

The Handbook of Mathematical Economics aims to provide a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for the field of mathematical economics. It surveys, as of the late 1970's the state of the art of mathematical economics. This is a constantly developing field and all authors were invited to review and to appraise the current status and recent developments in their presentations. In addition to its use as a reference, it is intended that this Handbook will assist researchers and students working in one branch of mathematical economics to become acquainted with other branches of this field. Volume 2 elaborates on "Mathematical Approaches to Microeconomic Theory," including consumer, producer, oligopoly, and duality theory, as well as "Mathematical Approaches to Competitive Equilibrium" including such aspects of competitive equilibrium as existence, stability, uncertainty, the computation of equilibrium prices, and the core of an economy.

For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http: //www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes