Purpose ofthe Workshop In the spirit of enhancing developments in science and technology by facilitating international scientific cooperation, the Science Committee of NATO is sponsoring AR W's in several selected priority areas. The objective of this workshop was to discuss what microbial mediated problems have been experienced in the area of nuclear waste management and spent fuel storage. Long term storage of high-level wastes in repositories is just starting in some countries. However, low and medium level wastes have been stored for several decades. In the area of spent fuel interim, storage has been extended at many locations far beyond the intended time. It was a priority of the workshop to examine and discuss what deleterious effects have been observed under these storage conditions or under conditions used in simulated trial tests for predicting material performance under the storage conditions. For example, one chronic problem that was discussed was possibility that microbial influenced corrosion (MIC) could be taking place in the wet storage of spent fuel thereby initiating or accelerating the process of corrosion. Another discussion in the area of waste forms, focused on the presence ofbiofilms which may be breaking down the structure of the waste form and thereby jeopardizing its integrity. The meeting focused on discussing the observations and data collected relating to problems encountered in the storage of these types of wastes, and sharing this information with others that have not monitored their facilities for similar problems.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons are prohibited by international law. Although not explicitly stated, the two treaties outlawing such activities, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibit the continuation of activities previously performed in Biological and Toxin Weapons facilities not justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Because conversion and other means of cessation of former BTW facilities are not explicitly addressed in the treaties mentioned above the problems involved in conversion ofBTW facilities have thus far only been discussed marginally in the open literature. In times of increased awareness of the danger of biological and toxin warfare (including the increased danger of terrorist use of biological and toxin weapons) it seemed necessary to us to invite experts from different parts of the world to discuss the pros and cons of conversion and the problems involved. It also became obvious to us that the conversion of former BTW facilities should be discussed with respect to the necessity of peaceful internatioual cooperation in areas related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. An additional reason to discuss matters of peaceful cooperation is that cooperation is explictly requested by Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Purpose ofthe Workshop In the spirit of enhancing developments in science and technology by facilitating international scientific cooperation, the Science Committee of NATO is sponsoring AR W's in several selected priority areas. The objective of this workshop was to discuss what microbial mediated problems have been experienced in the area of nuclear waste management and spent fuel storage. Long term storage of high-level wastes in repositories is just starting in some countries. However, low and medium level wastes have been stored for several decades. In the area of spent fuel interim, storage has been extended at many locations far beyond the intended time. It was a priority of the workshop to examine and discuss what deleterious effects have been observed under these storage conditions or under conditions used in simulated trial tests for predicting material performance under the storage conditions. For example, one chronic problem that was discussed was possibility that microbial influenced corrosion (MIC) could be taking place in the wet storage of spent fuel thereby initiating or accelerating the process of corrosion. Another discussion in the area of waste forms, focused on the presence ofbiofilms which may be breaking down the structure of the waste form and thereby jeopardizing its integrity. The meeting focused on discussing the observations and data collected relating to problems encountered in the storage of these types of wastes, and sharing this information with others that have not monitored their facilities for similar problems.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons are prohibited by international law. Although not explicitly stated, the two treaties outlawing such activities, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibit the continuation of activities previously performed in Biological and Toxin Weapons facilities not justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Because conversion and other means of cessation of former BTW facilities are not explicitly addressed in the treaties mentioned above the problems involved in conversion ofBTW facilities have thus far only been discussed marginally in the open literature. In times of increased awareness of the danger of biological and toxin warfare (including the increased danger of terrorist use of biological and toxin weapons) it seemed necessary to us to invite experts from different parts of the world to discuss the pros and cons of conversion and the problems involved. It also became obvious to us that the conversion of former BTW facilities should be discussed with respect to the necessity of peaceful internatioual cooperation in areas related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. An additional reason to discuss matters of peaceful cooperation is that cooperation is explictly requested by Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.