Problems of constitutional interpretation have many faces, but much of the contemporary discussion has focused on what has come to be called "originalism." The core of originalism is the belief that fidelity to the original understanding of the Constitution should constrain contemporary judges. As originalist thinking has evolved, it has become clear that there is a family of originalist theories, some emphasizing the intent of the framers, while others focus on the original public meaning of the constitutional text. This idea has enjoyed a modern resurgence, in good part in reaction to the assumption of more sweeping power by the judiciary, operating in the name of constitutional interpretation. Those arguing for a "living Constitution" that keeps up with a changing world and changing values have resisted originalism. This difference in legal philosophy and jurisprudence has, since the 1970s, spilled over into party politics and the partisan wrangling over court appointments from appellate courts to the Supreme Court.

In Constitutional Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum elucidate the two sides of this debate and mediate between them in order to separate differences that are real from those that are only apparent. In a thorough exploration of the range of contemporary views on originalism, the authors articulate and defend sharply contrasting positions. Solum brings learning from the philosophy of language to his argument in favor of originalism, and Bennett highlights interpretational problems in the dispute-resolution context, describing instances in which a living Constitution is a more feasible and productive position. The book explores those contrasting positions, to be sure, but also uncovers important points of agreement for the interpretational enterprise. This provocative and absorbing book ends with a bibliographic essay that points to landmark works in the field and helps lay readers and students orient themselves within the literature of the debate.

Problems of constitutional interpretation have many faces, but much of the contemporary discussion has focused on what has come to be called "originalism." The core of originalism is the belief that fidelity to the original understanding of the Constitution should constrain contemporary judges. As originalist thinking has evolved, it has become clear that there is a family of originalist theories, some emphasizing the intent of the framers, while others focus on the original public meaning of the constitutional text. This idea has enjoyed a modern resurgence, in good part in reaction to the assumption of more sweeping power by the judiciary, operating in the name of constitutional interpretation. Those arguing for a "living Constitution" that keeps up with a changing world and changing values have resisted originalism. This difference in legal philosophy and jurisprudence has, since the 1970s, spilled over into party politics and the partisan wrangling over court appointments from appellate courts to the Supreme Court. In Constitutional Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum elucidate the two sides of this debate and mediate between them in order to separate differences that are real from those that are only apparent. In a thorough exploration of the range of contemporary views on originalism, the authors articulate and defend sharply contrasting positions. Solum brings learning from the philosophy of language to his argument in favor of originalism, and Bennett highlights interpretational problems in the dispute-resolution context, describing instances in which a living Constitution is a more feasible and productive position. The book explores those contrasting positions, to be sure, but also uncovers important points of agreement for the interpretational enterprise. This provocative and absorbing book ends with a bibliographic essay that points to landmark works in the field and helps lay readers and students orient themselves within the literature of the debate.

A practice manual as well as an authoritative resource, Destruction of Evidence analyzes issues from the standpoints of civil litigation, criminal litigation, and the laws of professional responsibility. Destruction of Evidence also discusses in-depth such areas as: the spoliation inferencethe tort of spoliationdiscovery sanctionsethics, androutine destruction Also included is an expanded discussion of discovery sanctions, including procedural issues, choice-of-law considerations, the requirements for preserving sanctions issues for appellate review, burdens of proof, and appellate review. The supplement keeps you up to date on the continuing development of the controversial torts of both first- and third party spoliation of evidence: Massachusetts has declined to recognize a cause of action in tort for intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence The Supreme Court of Mississippi did not recognize an independent cause of action for the intentional spoliation of evidence against first or third party spoliators Nevada declined to recognize an independent tort spoliation of evidence when weighed against the andquot;potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss, and by the cost to society of promoting onerous record and evidence retention policiesandquot; Constitutional implications in the realm of criminal law. Many states within the last year have been addressing the potential for due process violations when evidence is destroyed and are continuing to adopt and expand the rules dictated by Brady, Trombetta, and Youngblood. While each of these new jurisdictions refused to find due process violation, this trend recognizes the increased potential for constitutional violations when evidence is destroyed: Hawaii refused to find a constitutional violation where a police officer failed to save her completed police report, citing Brady The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that a defendant was not denied due process by spoliation of crime scene evidence, citing Trombetta Nevada, using a bad faith standard, ruled that an independent laboratory's failure to refrigerate a defendant's blood sample did not violate due process A New Jersey court did not find a due process violation where the police had lost a videotape of the administration of breath tests for a DUI charge Oklahoma ruled that a defendant's due process rights were not violated when the police destroyed latent crime scene fingerprints, citing Youngblood Using an exculpatory evidence standard, the Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled that the State's release of a rape victim's vehicle without notice to the defendant did not violate the defendant's due process rights.