It took two hundred years to implement democracy within the nation-state, from the emergence of democratic theories during the Enlightenment to the introduction of popular government after World War I. If the same process were to follow at the international level, and the treaty of Versailles was taken as the baseline for the calculation, a democratic world order could be expected to emerge by 2119 - hence the title of this book. The point is the long perspective. Most scholars in mainstream political science and international relations are skeptical of the prospect of global democracy and believe that in the short run the fight against corruption and abuse of power is a more pressing task. This is true and very much an important mission; as such, corruption is treated in a special chapter of the book.

The tension between culture, politics and economy has become one the dominant anxieties of modern society. On the one hand people endeavour to maintain and develop their cultural identity; on the other there are many forces for international integration. How to understand and explain this fundamental issue is illuminated in nine essays by eminent scholars.

The tension between culture, politics and economy has become one of the dominant anxieties of modern society. On the one hand people endeavor to maintain and develop their distinct cultural identity; on the other there are many forces for greater international integration, driven by free trade and political cooperation. How to understand and explain this fundamental issue is illuminated in this collection of nine essays by scholars from various countries and disciplines.

Ideology and Strategy is an analysis of issues in Swedish parliamentary history over the past 100 years. Leif Lewin has chosen eight issues and scrutinized them using traditional analysis and, importantly, game-theoretic reasoning. For each, he presents the outcome and its history and the strategic behaviour of the actors. He gives special attention to the strategy used by the potential loser. The first chapter presents the methodology to be employed in the analysis and introduces concepts and strategies such as voter's paradox, prisoners' dilemma, the Condorcet method, logrolling and others. The final chapter includes a review of the concept of politics as rational action. Lewin's analysis begins with the tariff dispute of the 1880s and ranges from suffrage reform, parliamentary government, the crisis programme of the 1930s, economic planning, the pension system, nuclear energy, to employee investment funds. Ideology and Strategy blends history, substantive issues and potential analysis, and is an important contribution to rational choice theory.

Ideology and Strategy is an analysis of issues in Swedish parliamentary history over the past 100 years. Leif Lewin has chosen eight issues and scrutinized them using traditional analysis and, importantly, game-theoretic reasoning. For each, he presents the outcome and its history and the strategic behaviour of the actors. He gives special attention to the strategy used by the potential loser. The first chapter presents the methodology to be employed in the analysis and introduces concepts and strategies such as voter's paradox, prisoners' dilemma, the Condorcet method, logrolling and others. The final chapter includes a review of the concept of politics as rational action. Lewin's analysis begins with the tariff dispute of the 1880s and ranges from suffrage reform, parliamentary government, the crisis programme of the 1930s, economic planning, the pension system, nuclear energy, to employee investment funds. Ideology and Strategy blends history, substantive issues and potential analysis, and is an important contribution to rational choice theory.

Is it self-interest or public interest that dominates Western politics? This question has been debated in many fields, and through the 1980s a consensus developed, supported by extensive research, that in their political decisions and actions people are largely motivated by self-interest, and not by the common good. In this book the author examines more than 200 studies of democracy in action from 17 countries, combining insights from different fields such as rational choice theory, political philosophy and electoral research, and argues that the theory that egoism rules simply does not match the facts. He looks at the behaviour and attitudes of voters, bureaucrats and politicians to challenge this accepted wisdom. In his review of the literature he attempts to show that people are in fact actuated by broader considerations than their own short-sighted interests, that they act politically "in the shadow of the future" and that they find there are overwhelming reasons to try to contribute to the long-term common good. The work is aimed at teachers and students of comparative politics, West European politics, political science, political theory, and economics.

It is common for political leaders to claim they have no control over bad outcomes. Indeed, they often cite the arguments of political theorists and public intellectuals as to why: history rushes onward oblivious of human will; force and violence overcome political aims; globalization undermines the actions of national leaders; the bureaucracy sabotages their intentions; bad outcomes are often the unintended result of actions.

In "Democratic Accountability," Leif Lewin examines these reasons and argues that they are unconvincing. He makes his case by describing and analyzing counterexamples in seven cases, including the prevention of a communist takeover in Europe after World War II, the European Union's preventing another European war, and Margaret Thatcher's taming of the bureaucracy in Britain. In a staunch defense of the possibility for meaningful and profound democratic decision making, Lewin finds that, in fact, not only do political leaders exert a good measure of control and therefore can be assigned responsibility, but the meaning of the functioning democracy is that the people hold their leaders accountable.