Most experts would agree that the current medical malpractice system in the United States does not work effectively either to compensate victims fairly or prevent injuries caused by medical errors. Policy responses to a series of medical malpractice crises have not resulted in effective reform and have not altered the fundamental incentives of the stakeholders. In Medical Malpractice, economist Frank Sloan and lawyer Lindsey Chepke examine the U.S. medical malpractice process from legal, medical, economic, and insurance perspectives, analyze past efforts at reform, and offer realistic, achievable policy recommendations. They review the considerable empirical evidence in a balanced fashion and assess objectively what works in the current system and what does not. Sloan and Chepke argue that the complexity of medical malpractice stems largely from the interaction of the four discrete markets that determine outcomes--legal, medical malpractice insurance, medical care, and government activity. After describing what the evidence shows about the functioning of medical malpractice, types of defensive medicine, and the effects of past reforms, they examine such topics as scheduling damages as an alternative to flat caps, jury behavior, health courts, incentives to prevent medical errors, insurance regulation, reinsurance, no-fault insurance, and suggestions for future reforms. Medical Malpractice is the most comprehensive treatment of malpractice available, integrating findings from several different areas of research and describing them accessibly in nontechnical language. It will be an essential reference for anyone interested in medical malpractice.Frank A. Sloan is J. Alexander McMahon Professor of Health Policy and Management and Professor of Economics at Duke University. He is the coauthor of The Price of Smoking (MIT Press, 2004) and author or editor of many other books on health economics. Lindsey M. Chepke, an attorney, is a Research Associate at the Center for Health Policy at Duke University.

The Law and Economics of Public Health synthesizes the empirical research findings on the relationship between law and the public's health that are found scattered in different literature ranging from economic journals to medical journals, journals on addictive behaviors, law reviews, and books. This is the only study to date that has assembled the empirical evidence from many areas ranging from motor vehicle liability and dram shop liability to medical malpractice, products liability as it applies to pharmaceutical products, and medical devices. The Law and Economics of Public Health addresses the fundamental question as to whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Does the threat of litigation on potential injurers make them exercise more caution? Does insurance coverage counter incentives to be careful? Does the tort system operate as perfectly as the theory would have it? This monograph answers these questions on the basis of empirical evidence. The Law and Economics of Public Health discusses both theory and empirical evidence in several areas of personal injury to which tort liability has been applied. The monograph starts by describing the general law and economics framework used to assess both positive and normative issues relating to tort liability. It then presents the rationale for and empirical evidence on particular applications of tort liability as it applies to personal injury.