In 1958, 1976, and 1985, Argentina experienced severe imbalances of its external accounts, which led to attempts at economic stabilization through an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. This book examines these IMF-supported programs and their success in alleviating Argentina's economic problems. Luigi Manzetti explores three aspects of the issue: the programs' impact on the Argentine economy from a policy management perspective; the methods by which different political regimes coped with similar problems and the level of their success; and the relationship between economic stabilization and political institutions, with particular emphasis on why IMF-supported programs encounter problems and how these problems can be overcome.

Exploring the previously overlooked relationship between economic and public policies, Manzetti begins his study by examining the balance of payments problems that afflict developing countries along with the role played by the IMF in solving them. He assesses IMF involvement both in terms of economic theory and policy recommendations, portraying the academic debate that for years has surrounded the IMF. The peculiarities of the Argentine case are outlined, as are contending interpretations of the country's chronic economic crises. A set of three chapters fully details the stabilization plans of the Frondizi, Videla, and Alfonsin administrations. Finally, a concluding chapter argues that wrong assumptions by the IMF and the mistakes of Argentina's policy makers were responsible for the limited success of the programs. This work will be an important reference tool for courses in economic development and Latin American studies, as well as a useful resource for academic and professional libraries.

This is a revised and updated edition of Snow's classic study of Argentine politics. The work is a description and analysis of the role played by Argentina's major political actors: the political parties, the armed forces, labor unions, the Catholic Church, and students. Their traditional roles are examined, but emphasis is placed on the part they have played since publication of the last edition of the work in 1979, especially the dramatic transition to democracy beginning in 1983. Snow and his new co-author, Manzetti, are slightly more optimistic than most analysts, and believe that Argentina's major political actors may have finally decided that authoritarian regimes are not to their--nor Argentina's--advantage. Written primarily as a supplementary text for courses in Latin American politics, this work will be of interest to scholars and students of contemporary Latin America.

The book analyses both the macro and micro factors under which policies of privatization of nationalized industries took place in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. It examines the economics of achieving privatization, the policy reform that took place, and the factors that emerged to wither encourage or deter privatization.

This is a revised and updated edition of SnoW's classic study of Argentine politics. The work is a description and analysis of the role played by Argentina's major political actors: the political parties, the armed forces, labor unions, the Catholic Church, and students. Their traditional roles are examined, but emphasis is placed on the part they have played since publication of the last edition of the work in 1979, especially the dramatic transition to democracy beginning in 1983. Snow and his new co-author, Manzetti, are slightly more optimistic than most analysts, and believe that Argentina's major political actors may have finally decided that authoritarian regimes are not to their--nor Argentina's--advantage.

Written primarily as a supplementary text for courses in Latin American politics, this work will be of interest to scholars and students of contemporary Latin America.

The agenda of neoliberal market reform known as the Washington Consensus, which was meant to turn around the economies of developing and postcommunist countries and provide the bedrock of economic success on which stable democracies could be built, has largely proved to be a failure, with Russia and many Latin American countries like Argentina left in severe economic crisis by the end of the 1990s.

Some proponents of neoliberal reform, such as Anne Krueger, have attributed this failure to the piecemeal and incomplete implementation of reform measures, while others, including Nobel Prize economist and former World Bank vice president Joseph Stiglitz, have pointed to technical flaws in the policies. While both of these assessments focus narrowly on economic factors, Luigi Manzetti highlights the crucial importance of political institutions and processes to a fully adequate explanation. His argument is that the ideology of neoliberal reform, rooted in the theories of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, assumed political checks and balances that did not exist in many of these countries undergoing market reform, and that only by taking political accountability as an influential variable in the equation for success can we really understand what happened. Where accountability was weak, patterns of corruption, collusion, and patronage worked to undermine the intended aims of market reform. Manzetti uses both large N statistical analyses and small N case studies (of Argentina, Chile, and Russia) to provide empirical evidence for his argument.