This book discusses in what sense constitutional law has a political dimension, raising the question whether constitutional law is fundamentally political as to its validity, terms of its origin, conceptual structure and/or corresponding practice. It also poses the question whether that dimension is a political-theological dimension. A positive answer to these questions challenges the prevailing view that constitutional law is to be conceived strictly as law, moreover as written law, approved at a certain point in history by a particular power and interpreted as any other law by the judiciary. The essays included in this book, written by leading scholars in constitutional theory - including Martin Loughlin, Paul Kahn, Manon Altwegg-Boussac and Massimo La Torre - address these questions in a timely and original way.

This book discusses in what sense constitutional law has a political dimension, raising the question whether constitutional law is fundamentally political as to its validity, terms of its origin, conceptual structure and/or corresponding practice. It also poses the question whether that dimension is a political-theological dimension. A positive answer to these questions challenges the prevailing view that constitutional law is to be conceived strictly as law, moreover as written law, approved at a certain point in history by a particular power and interpreted as any other law by the judiciary. The essays included in this book, written by leading scholars in constitutional theory - including Martin Loughlin, Paul Kahn, Manon Altwegg-Boussac and Massimo La Torre - address these questions in a timely and original way.

This volume offers different perspectives on judicial practice in the European and American contexts, both arguably characterized in the last decades by the emergence of novel normative and even policy arguments by judges. The central question deserving the attention of the contributors concerns the degree in which judicial exercises in practical reasoning may amount to forms of judicial usurpation of the legislative function by courts. Since different views as to the nature and scope of legal reasoning lead to different degrees of tolerance regarding what should be admissible to courts, that same nature and scope is thoroughly debated. The main disciplinary approach is that of general jurisprudence, but the contributions take stock of other disciplines in which judicial activism has been addressed, namely positive theories of judicial behavior. Accordingly, the book also explores the development of interdisciplinary dialogue about the theme.