The present volume collects some of the talks given at the Bertrand Russell Colloquium on Exact Philosophy, attached to the McGill University Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit. It also includes a paper, on Bertrand Russell's method of philosophizing, read at the memorial symposium held at Sir Gorge Williams University shortly after the philosopher's death. All the papers appear here for the first time. Unlike many a philosophy of science anthology, this one is not center ed on the philosophy of physics. In fact the papers deal with conceptual and, in particular, philosophical problems that pop up in almost every one of the provinces of the vast territory constituted by the foundations, meth odology and philosophy of science. A couple of border territories which are in the process of being infiltrated have been added for good measure. The inclusion of papers in the philosophy of formal science and in the philosophies of physics and of biology, in a volume belonging to a series devoted to the philosophy and methodology of the social and behavioral sciences, should raise no eyebrows. Because the sciences of man make use of logic and mathematics, they are interested in questions such as whether the formal sciences have anything to do with reality (rather than with our theories about reality) and whether or not logic has kept up with the practice of mathematicians. These two problems are tackled in Part II, on the philosophy of formal science."

This book deals with some of the current issues in the philosophy, methodology and foundations of physics. Some such problems are: - Do mathematical formalisms interpret themselves or is it necessary to adjoin them interpretation assumptions, and if so how are these as sumptions to be framed? - What are physical theories about: physical systems or laboratory operations or both or neither? - How are the basic concepts of a theory to be introduced: by ref erence to measurements or by explicit definition or axiomatically? - What is the use ofaxiomatics in physics? - How are the various physical theories inter-related: like Chinese boxes or in more complex ways? - What is the role of analogy in the construction and in the inter pretation of physical theories? In particular, are classical analogues like those of particle and wave indispensable in quantum theories? - What is the role of the apparatus in quantum phenomena and what is the place of measurement theory in quantum mechanics? - How does a theory face experiment: single-handed or with the help of further theories? These and several other questions of the kind are met with by the research physicist, the physics teacher and the physics student in their everyday work. If dodged they will recur. And a wrong answer to them may obscure the understanding of what has been achieved and may even hamper further advancement. Philosophy, methodology and foundations, like rose bushes, are enjoyable when cultivated but become ugly and thorny when neglected."

The purpose of this Introduction is to sketch our approach to the study of value, morality and action, and to show the place we assign it in the system of human knowledge. 1. VALUE, MORALITY AND ACTION: FACT, THEORY, AND METATHEORY We take it that all animals evaluate some things and some processes, and that some of them learn the social behavior patterns we call 'moral principles', and even act according to them at least some of the time. An animal incapable of evaluating anything would be very short-lived; and a social animal that did not observe the accepted social behavior patterns would be punished. These are facts about values, morals and behavior patterns: they are incorporated into the bodies of animals or the structure of social groups. We distinguish then the facts of valuation, morality and action from the study of such facts. This study can be scientific, philosophic or both. wayan animal evaluates environmental A zoologist may investigate the or internal stimuli; a social psychologist may examine the way children learn, or fail to learn, certain values and norms when placed in certain environments. And a philosopher may study such descriptive or explan atory studies, with a view to evaluating valuations, moral norms, or behavior patterns; he may analyze the very concepts of value, morals and action, as well as their cognates; or he may criticize or reconstruct value beliefs, moral norms and action plans."

The aims of this Introduction are to characterize the philosophy of science and technology, henceforth PS & T, to locate it on the map ofiearning, and to propose criteria for evaluating work in this field. 1. THE CHASM BETWEEN S & T AND THE HUMANITIES It has become commonplace to note that contemporary culture is split into two unrelated fields: science and the rest, to deplore this split - and to do is some truth in the two cultures thesis, and even nothing about it. There greater truth in the statement that there are literally thousands of fields of knowledge, each of them cultivated by specialists who are in most cases indifferent to what happens in the other fields. But it is equally true that all fields of knowledge are united, though in some cases by weak links, forming the system of human knowledge. Because of these links, what advances, remains stagnant, or declines, is the entire system of S & T. Throughout this book we shall distinguish the main fields of scientific and technological knowledge while at the same time noting the links that unite them.

In this Introduction we shall state the business of both descriptive and normative epistemology, and shall locate them in the map oflearning. This must be done because epistemology has been pronounced dead, and methodology nonexisting; and because, when acknowledged at all, they are often misplaced. 1. DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY The following problems are typical of classical epistemology: (i) What can we know? (ii) How do we know? (iii) What, if anything, does the subject contribute to his knowledge? (iv) What is truth? (v) How can we recognize truth? (vi) What is probable knowledge as opposed to certain knowledge? (vii) Is there a priori knowledge, and if so of what? (viii) How are knowledge and action related? (ix) How are knowledge and language related? (x) What is the status of concepts and propositions? In some guise or other all of these problems are still with us. To be sure, if construed as a demand for an inventory of knowledge the first problem is not a philosophical one any more than the question 'What is there?'. But it is a genuine philosophical problem if construed thus: 'What kinds of object are knowable-and which ones are not?' However, it is doubtful that philosophy can offer a correct answer to this problem without the help of science and technology. For example, only these disciplines can tell us whether man can know not only phenomena (appearances) but also noumena (things in themselves or self-existing objects).

The word 'materialism' is ambiguous: it designates a moral doc trine as well as a philosophy and, indeed, an entire world view. Moral materialism is identical with hedonism, or the doctrine that humans should pursue only their own pleasure. Philosophical ma terialismis the view that the real worId is composed exclusively of material things. The two doctrines are logically independent: hedonism is consistent with immaterialism, and materialism is compatible with high minded morals. We shall be concerned ex c1usively with philosophical materialism. And we shall not confuse it with realism, or the epistemological doctrine that knowIedge, or at any rate scientific knowledge, attempts to represent reality. Philosophical materialism is not a recent fad and it is not a solid block: it is as old as philosophy and it has gone through six quite different stages. The first was ancient materialism, centered around Greek and Indian atomism. The second was the revival of the first during the 17th century. The third was 18th century ma terialism, partly derived from one side of Descartes' ambiguous legacy. The fourth was the mid-19th century "scientific" material ism, which flourished mainly in Germany and England, and was tied to the upsurge of chemistry and biology. The fifth was dialec tical and historical materialism, which accompanied the consolida tion of the socialist ideology. And the sixth or current stage, evolved mainly by Australian and American philosophers, is aca demic and nonpartisan but otherwise very heterogeneous. Ancient materialism was thoroughly mechanistic."

The aims of this Introduction are to characterize the philosophy of science and technology, henceforth PS & T, to locate it on the map ofiearning, and to propose criteria for evaluating work in this field. 1. THE CHASM BETWEEN S & T AND THE HUMANITIES It has become commonplace to note that contemporary culture is split into two unrelated fields: science and the rest, to deplore this split - and to do is some truth in the two cultures thesis, and even nothing about it. There greater truth in the statement that there are literally thousands of fields of knowledge, each of them cultivated by specialists who are in most cases indifferent to what happens in the other fields. But it is equally true that all fields of knowledge are united, though in some cases by weak links, forming the system of human knowledge. Because of these links, what advances, remains stagnant, or declines, is the entire system of S & T. Throughout this book we shall distinguish the main fields of scientific and technological knowledge while at the same time noting the links that unite them.

The purpose of this Introduction is to sketch our approach to the study of value, morality and action, and to show the place we assign it in the systemof human knowledge. 1. VALUE, MORALITY AND ACTION: FACT, THEORY, AND METATHEORY We take it that all animals evaluate some things and some processes, and that some of them learn the social behavior patterns we call 'moral principles', and even act according to them at least some of the time. An animal incapable of evaluating anything would be very short-lived; and a social animal that did not observe the accepted social behavior patterns would be punished. These are facts about values, morals and behavior patterns: they are incorporated into the bodies of animals or the structure ofsocialgroups. We distinguish theq the facts of valuation, morality and action from the study of such facts.This study can be scientific, philosophic or both. A zoologist may investigate the wayan animal evaluates environmental or internal stimuli; a social psychologist may examine the way children learn, or fail to learn, certain values and norms when placed in certain environments. And a philosopher may study such descriptive or explan atory studies, with a view to evaluating valuations, moral norms, or behavior patterns; he may analyze the very concepts of value, morals and action, as well as their cognates; or he may criticize or reconstruct value beliefs, moral norms and action plans."

This volume is a logical sequel of Volume I, The Search for System: indeed, it concerns the ways theoretical systems are put to work and subjected to test. Yet it can be read independently by anyone familiar with some factual theories, referring back to Volume I when necessary. Special Symbols AS;B the set A is included in the set B AvB the union of the sets A and B AnB the common part of the sets A and B aEB the individual a is in (or belongs to) the set A Card (A) cardinality (numerosity) of the set A AxB Cartesian product of the sets A and B en(A) consequence(s) of the set A of assumptions equals by definition =dt definition Dt* some x (or there is at least one x such that) (3 x) e empirical datum e* translation of e into a semiempirical, semitheoreticallanguage h hypothesis m(r) measured value of the degree r m(;) average (or mean) value of a set of measured values of ,; P-jT T presupposes P p, q arbitrary (unspecified) propositions (statements) P(x) x has the property P (or x is a P) {xl P(x)} set of the x such that every x is a P pVq p and/or q (inclusive disjunction) p &q p and q (conjunction) p-+q if p, then q (conditional or implication) p if and only if q (biconditional or equivalence) p-q sum over i 2:; t theorem, testable consequence

The Tum of the Tide During centuries physicists were supposed to be studying the physical world. Since the turn of the century this assumption has often been challenged as naive: it was proclaimed that physics is not about the external world but about observers and their manipUlations: that it is meaningless to talk of anything else than observation devices and opera tions: that the laws of physics concern our knowledge rather than the external world. This view of the nature of physical science has old roots in philo sophy but it was independently reinvented by a number of philosophi cally inclined physicists, notably ERNST MACH. These scientists were disgusted with the school philosophies and they were alarmed by the increasing number of physical concepts which they regarded as meta physical or beyond experimental control, such as those of absolute motion, ether, electromagnetic field, and molecule. Reasonably enough, they wished to keep physics testable. To accomplish this goal they adopted the safe method, namely to banish every idea that could not be closely tied to observation. In this way they certainly avoided the risks of untestable speculation but they also failed to enjoy the benefits of theoretical invention. Furthermore they instituted unawares a new meta physics that was to dominate the philosophy of physics for half a century: the metaphysics according to which the world is made of sense experience."

This is a collection of technical papers in the foundations and the philoso It takes both "foundations" phy of physics with emphasis on the former. and "philosophy" in their narrow technical senses but it construes "physics" lato sensu, as including all the sciences of nonliving systems. All eleven papers constituting this volume were written for it. The problems tackled in this book concern certain basic concepts, hypotheses, theories, and research programmes in physical science. Some of these problems are topical, others new, but they are all fundamental and the subject of research and controversy. Consequently this volume is expected to serve those students, teachers and researchers who enjoy learning, teaching, discussing or doing theoretical physics. It is addressed to the nine to niners rather than to the nine to fivers. It is expected to attract the theoretician in search for new basic ideas, the teacher eager to perfect his understanding of physical theory and transmit his own zeal and his own doubts, as well as the student anxious to get down to essentials. This book may also interest the mathematician for whom physics offers a challenge (or a good pretext). Finally, it should get the attention of the philosopher of science aware of the advantages of philosophizing on foundations research problems rather than on the popularization of some results of research. There are at least two reasons for valuing foundations research."

The word 'materialism' is ambiguous: it designates a moral doc trine as well as a philosophy and, indeed, an entire world view. Moral materialism is identical with hedonism, or the doctrine that humans should pursue only their own pleasure. Philosophical ma terialismis the view that the real worId is composed exclusively of material things. The two doctrines are logically independent: hedonism is consistent with immaterialism, and materialism is compatible with high minded morals. We shall be concerned ex c1usively with philosophical materialism. And we shall not confuse it with realism, or the epistemological doctrine that knowIedge, or at any rate scientific knowledge, attempts to represent reality. Philosophical materialism is not a recent fad and it is not a solid block: it is as old as philosophy and it has gone through six quite different stages. The first was ancient materialism, centered around Greek and Indian atomism. The second was the revival of the first during the 17th century. The third was 18th century ma terialism, partly derived from one side of Descartes' ambiguous legacy. The fourth was the mid-19th century "scientific" material ism, which flourished mainly in Germany and England, and was tied to the upsurge of chemistry and biology. The fifth was dialec tical and historical materialism, which accompanied the consolida tion of the socialist ideology. And the sixth or current stage, evolved mainly by Australian and American philosophers, is aca demic and nonpartisan but otherwise very heterogeneous. Ancient materialism was thoroughly mechanistic."

The aims of this Introduction are to characterize the philosophy of science and technology, henceforth PS & T, to locate it on the map ofiearning, and to propose criteria for evaluating work in this field. 1. THE CHASM BETWEEN S & T AND THE HUMANITIES It has become commonplace to note that contemporary culture is split into two unrelated fields: science and the rest, to deplore this split - and to do is some truth in the two cultures thesis, and even nothing about it. There greater truth in the statement that there are literally thousands of fields of knowledge, each of them cultivated by specialists who are in most cases indifferent to what happens in the other fields. But it is equally true that all fields of knowledge are united, though in some cases by weak links, forming the system of human knowledge. Because of these links, what advances, remains stagnant, or declines, is the entire system of S & T. Throughout this book we shall distinguish the main fields of scientific and technological knowledge while at the same time noting the links that unite them.

The purpose of this Introduction is to sketch our approach to the study of value, morality and action, and to show the place we assign it in the system of human knowledge. 1. VALUE, MORALITY AND ACTION: FACT, THEORY, AND METATHEORY We take it that all animals evaluate some things and some processes, and that some of them learn the social behavior patterns we call 'moral principles', and even act according to them at least some of the time. An animal incapable of evaluating anything would be very short-lived; and a social animal that did not observe the accepted social behavior patterns would be punished. These are facts about values, morals and behavior patterns: they are incorporated into the bodies of animals or the structure of social groups. We distinguish then the facts of valuation, morality and action from the study of such facts. This study can be scientific, philosophic or both. wayan animal evaluates environmental A zoologist may investigate the or internal stimuli; a social psychologist may examine the way children learn, or fail to learn, certain values and norms when placed in certain environments. And a philosopher may study such descriptive or explan atory studies, with a view to evaluating valuations, moral norms, or behavior patterns; he may analyze the very concepts of value, morals and action, as well as their cognates; or he may criticize or reconstruct value beliefs, moral norms and action plans."

In this Introduction we shall state the business of both descriptive and normative epistemology, and shall locate them in the map oflearning. This must be done because epistemology has been pronounced dead, and methodology nonexisting; and because, when acknowledged at all, they are often misplaced. 1. DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY The following problems are typical of classical epistemology: (i) What can we know? (ii) How do we know? (iii) What, if anything, does the subject contribute to his knowledge? (iv) What is truth? (v) How can we recognize truth? (vi) What is probable knowledge as opposed to certain knowledge? (vii) Is there a priori knowledge, and if so of what? (viii) How are knowledge and action related? (ix) How are knowledge and language related? (x) What is the status of concepts and propositions? In some guise or other all of these problems are still with us. To be sure, if construed as a demand for an inventory of knowledge the first problem is not a philosophical one any more than the question 'What is there?'. But it is a genuine philosophical problem if construed thus: 'What kinds of object are knowable-and which ones are not?' However, it is doubtful that philosophy can offer a correct answer to this problem without the help of science and technology. For example, only these disciplines can tell us whether man can know not only phenomena (appearances) but also noumena (things in themselves or self-existing objects).

In this Introduction' we shall sketch the business of ontology, or metaphysics, and shall locate it on the map of learning. This has to be done because there are many ways of construing the word 'ontology' and because of the bad reputation metaphysics has suffered until recently - a well deserved one in most cases. 1. ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS Ontological (or metaphysical) views are answers to ontological ques tions. And ontological (or metaphysical) questions are questions with an extremely wide scope, such as 'Is the world material or ideal - or perhaps neutral?" 'Is there radical novelty, and if so how does it come about?', 'Is there objective chance or just an appearance of such due to human ignorance?', 'How is the mental related to the physical?', 'Is a community anything but the set of its members?', and 'Are there laws of history?'. Just as religion was born from helplessness, ideology from conflict, and technology from the need to master the environment, so metaphysics - just like theoretical science - was probably begotten by the awe and bewilderment at the boundless variety and apparent chaos of the phenomenal world, i. e. the sum total of human experience. Like the scientist, the metaphysician looked and looks for unity in diversity, for pattern in disorder, for structure in the amorphous heap of phenomena - and in some cases even for some sense, direction or finality in reality as a whole."

The present volume collects some of the talks given at the Bertrand Russell Colloquium on Exact Philosophy, attached to the McGill University Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit. It also includes a paper, on Bertrand Russell's method of philosophizing, read at the memorial symposium held at Sir Gorge Williams University shortly after the philosopher's death. All the papers appear here for the first time. Unlike many a philosophy of science anthology, this one is not center ed on the philosophy of physics. In fact the papers deal with conceptual and, in particular, philosophical problems that pop up in almost every one of the provinces of the vast territory constituted by the foundations, meth odology and philosophy of science. A couple of border territories which are in the process of being infiltrated have been added for good measure. The inclusion of papers in the philosophy of formal science and in the philosophies of physics and of biology, in a volume belonging to a series devoted to the philosophy and methodology of the social and behavioral sciences, should raise no eyebrows. Because the sciences of man make use of logic and mathematics, they are interested in questions such as whether the formal sciences have anything to do with reality (rather than with our theories about reality) and whether or not logic has kept up with the practice of mathematicians. These two problems are tackled in Part II, on the philosophy of formal science."