"Necessity is the mother of invention. " Part I: What is in this book - details. There are several different types of formal proof procedures that logicians have invented. The ones we consider are: 1) tableau systems, 2) Gentzen sequent calculi, 3) natural deduction systems, and 4) axiom systems. We present proof procedures of each of these types for the most common normal modal logics: S5, S4, B, T, D, K, K4, D4, KB, DB, and also G, the logic that has become important in applications of modal logic to the proof theory of Peano arithmetic. Further, we present a similar variety of proof procedures for an even larger number of regular, non-normal modal logics (many introduced by Lemmon). We also consider some quasi-regular logics, including S2 and S3. Virtually all of these proof procedures are studied in both propositional and first-order versions (generally with and without the Barcan formula). Finally, we present the full variety of proof methods for Intuitionistic logic (and of course Classical logic too). We actually give two quite different kinds of tableau systems for the logics we consider, two kinds of Gentzen sequent calculi, and two kinds of natural deduction systems. Each of the two tableau systems has its own uses; each provides us with different information about the logics involved. They complement each other more than they overlap. Of the two Gentzen systems, one is of the conventional sort, common in the literature.

Godel's modal ontological argument is the centerpiece of an extensive examination of intensional logic. First, classical type theory is presented semantically, tableau rules for it are introduced, and the Prawitz/Takahashi completeness proof is given. Then modal machinery is added to produce a modified version of Montague/Gallin intensional logic. Finally, various ontological proofs for the existence of God are discussed informally, and the Godel argument is fully formalized. Parts of the book are mathematical, parts philosophical. "

Godel's modal ontological argument is the centrepiece of an extensive examination of intensional logic. First, classical type theory is presented semantically, tableau rules for it are introduced, and the Prawitz/Takahashi completeness proof is given. Then modal machinery is added, semantically and through tableau rules, to produce a modified version of Montague/Gallin intensional logic. Extensionality, rigidity, equality, identity, and definite descriptions are investigated. Finally, various ontological proofs for the existence of God are discussed informally, and the Godel argument is fully formalized. Objections to the Godel argument are examined, including one due to Howard Sobel showing Godel's assumptions are so strong that the modal logic collapses. It is shown that this argument depends critically on whether properties are understood intensionally or extensionally.
Parts of the book are mathematical, parts philosophical. A reader interested in (modal) type theory can safely skip ontological issues, just as one interested in Godel's argument can omit the more mathematical portions, such as the completeness proof for tableaus. There should be something for everybody (and perhaps everything for somebody)."

"Necessity is the mother of invention. " Part I: What is in this book - details. There are several different types of formal proof procedures that logicians have invented. The ones we consider are: 1) tableau systems, 2) Gentzen sequent calculi, 3) natural deduction systems, and 4) axiom systems. We present proof procedures of each of these types for the most common normal modal logics: S5, S4, B, T, D, K, K4, D4, KB, DB, and also G, the logic that has become important in applications of modal logic to the proof theory of Peano arithmetic. Further, we present a similar variety of proof procedures for an even larger number of regular, non-normal modal logics (many introduced by Lemmon). We also consider some quasi-regular logics, including S2 and S3. Virtually all of these proof procedures are studied in both propositional and first-order versions (generally with and without the Barcan formula). Finally, we present the full variety of proof methods for Intuitionistic logic (and of course Classical logic too). We actually give two quite different kinds of tableau systems for the logics we consider, two kinds of Gentzen sequent calculi, and two kinds of natural deduction systems. Each of the two tableau systems has its own uses; each provides us with different information about the logics involved. They complement each other more than they overlap. Of the two Gentzen systems, one is of the conventional sort, common in the literature.

This is a thorough treatment of first-order modal logic. The book covers such issues as quantification, equality (including a treatment of Frege's morning star/evening star puzzle), the notion of existence, non-rigid constants and function symbols, predicate abstraction, the distinction between nonexistence and nondesignation, and definite descriptions, borrowing from both Fregean and Russellian paradigms.

Russell's paradox arises when we consider those sets that do not belong to themselves. The collection of such sets cannot constitute a set. Step back a bit. Logical formulas define sets (in a standard model). Formulas, being mathematical objects, can be thought of as sets themselves-mathematics reduces to set theory. Consider those formulas that do not belong to the set they define. The collection of such formulas is not definable by a formula, by the same argument that Russell used. This quickly gives Tarski's result on the undefinability of truth. Variations on the same idea yield the famous results of Godel, Church, Rosser, and Post. This book gives a full presentation of the basic incompleteness and undecidability theorems of mathematical logic in the framework of set theory. Corresponding results for arithmetic follow easily, and are also given. Godel numbering is generally avoided, except when an explicit connection is made between set theory and arithmetic. The book assumes little technical background from the reader. One needs mathematical ability, a general familiarity with formal logic, and an understanding of the completeness theorem, though not its proof. All else is developed and formally proved, from Tarski's Theorem to Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Exercises are scattered throughout.