The highly praised Western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, has been used in many game-theory courses over the years and has also found its way into leading journals of this field. Using the rich material offered by this movie, alongside other elements from popular culture, literature and history, this book furthers this exploration into a fascinating area of economics. In his series of Schumpeter lectures, Manfred J. Holler uses his analysis of Sergio Leone's movie as a starting point to argue that combinations of desires, secrets and second-mover advantages trigger conflicts but also allow for conflict resolution. Many people and organizations have a desire for secrecy, and this is often motivated by a desire to create a second-mover advantage, and by undercutting the second-mover advantage of others. This book demonstrates that the interaction of these three ingredients account for a large share of social problems and failures in politics and business but, somewhat paradoxically, can also help to overcome some of the problems that result by applying one or two of them in isolation. This book has been written for curious readers who want to see the world from a different perspective and who like simple mathematics alongside story telling. Its accessible approach means that it will be of use to students and academics alike, especially all those interested in decision making, game theory, and market entry.

The highly praised Western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, has been used in many game-theory courses over the years and has also found its way into leading journals of this field. Using the rich material offered by this movie, alongside other elements from popular culture, literature and history, this book furthers this exploration into a fascinating area of economics. In his series of Schumpeter lectures, Manfred J. Holler uses his analysis of Sergio Leone's movie as a starting point to argue that combinations of desires, secrets and second-mover advantages trigger conflicts but also allow for conflict resolution. Many people and organizations have a desire for secrecy, and this is often motivated by a desire to create a second-mover advantage, and by undercutting the second-mover advantage of others. This book demonstrates that the interaction of these three ingredients account for a large share of social problems and failures in politics and business but, somewhat paradoxically, can also help to overcome some of the problems that result by applying one or two of them in isolation. This book has been written for curious readers who want to see the world from a different perspective and who like simple mathematics alongside story telling. Its accessible approach means that it will be of use to students and academics alike, especially all those interested in decision making, game theory, and market entry.

The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. The book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication "Power, Voting and Voting Power" (edited by Manfred J. Holler). Thirty years later this essential topic has been taken up again and many of the authors from its predecessor participate here again in discussing the state-of-the-art, demonstrating the achievements of three decades of intensive research, and pointing the way to key issues for future work.

This book introduces readers to basic game theory as a tool to deal with strategic decision problems, helping them to understand the complexity of such problems - to extract a solution, if possible - and to manage the complexity by revising the game if appropriate. The authors discuss basic decision situations modeled as Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag Hunt Game, as well as concepts like the Nash equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfectness, Rationalizable Strategies and the Theory of Moves to introduce game theoretic thinking. Further, the book presents pioneers of strategic thinking, e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life - to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others.

Modelle helfen uns, die Welt zu beschreiben, zu interpretieren und zu verstehen. Dieses Buch fuhrt in die Grundmodelle der Arbeitsmarkttheorie ein. Es handelt von Gewerkschaften, Selbstverwaltungsbetrieben, gewinnmaximierenden Unternehmen und nutzenmaximierenden Arbeitnehmern, Arbeitszertifikaten, Arbeitsmotivation und Lohnverhandlungen, Steuern, Loehnen und Arbeitslosigkeit. Im Mittelpunkt stehen Modelle zur Bestimmung der Unternehmensform, die sich aus der Beziehung zwischen Arbeitnehmer und Kapitaleigentumer ergeben; Theorien des Arbeitnehmerunternehmens und der Verhandlungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften sowie Effizienzlohnansatze in mikrooekonomischen und makrooekonomischen Zusammenhangen.

Was hat Hamlet falsch gemacht? In diesem Buch lernen Sie Instrumente kennen, mit denen Sie dieser Frage systematisch nachgehen koennen - die Ihnen helfen, Entscheidungssituationen zu durchdenken, die sich durch Konflikte und Koordinationsprobleme auszeichnen. Mit Hilfe spieltheoretischer Konzepte und Ansatze werden Sie Ihre Antwort darauf finden, was Hamlet falsch gemacht hat, warum der Kalte Krieg "kalt" blieb und warum Michelin seinen Eintritt in den US-Markt besser vermieden hatte. Die Spieltheorie ist aus der heutigen OEkonomik nicht mehr wegzudenken. Auch in der Politikwissenschaft, Soziologie und Philosophie findet sich inzwischen ein breites Band sehr unterschiedlicher Anwendungen. Diese Einfuhrung in die Spieltheorie liefert die theoretischen Grundlagen und schult beim Leser die spieltheoretische Argumentationsweise. Fur die vorliegende 8. Auflage wurden grosse Teile der Kapitel 1 bis 4 grundlich uberarbeitet und erganzt. Das neue Kapitel 9 bietet unterhaltsame Einblicke in die spannende (Vor-)Geschichte der Spieltheorie. Eine gut lesbare Einfuhrung!