Irwin asserts that the federal government, in the name of preserving national security, has imposed such additional regulation on American businesses that their competitive position in global markets has been severely compromised. In his well-written, cogently argued account of the impact of national security regulations on competitive freedom, Irwin demonstrates that federal government agencies--the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense; the National Technical Information Services; the Federal Communications Commission; and others--all attempt to micromanage the firM's decision to sell, buy, invest, innovate, and compete internationally. In addition, Irwin shows, jurisdictional disputes among the various federal agencies for control over corporate economic activities further exacerbate the problem by hampering the corporation's ability to react quickly to market conditions. As his analysis clearly illustrates, the end result is a price/cost squeeze on U.S. firms that handicaps their ability to compete with overseas rivals.

Some of the results of increased government oversight Irwin identifies directly threaten overall U.S. competitiveness abroad. U.S. corporations find that the compliance cost of regulation is privatized, thus lifting total costs. The combination of dampened revenues and inflated costs curtails the resources for future product development--a vital factor in maintaining market position. And, Irwin demonstrates, this federal policy which acts to reward offshore rivals at the expense of U.S. firms is grounded on political consensus: the political right favors export control while the political left supports import control. The effect of this dual policy emphasis, Irwin argues, is a national security policy that serves to punish the U.S. firm in an environment of increased global risk, competition, and rivalry. Students of international business and public policy, as well as government decision makers themselves, will find Irwin's study enlightening and provocative.

Few historians have looked beyond the Teapot Dome scandal and examined the naval policies of President Warren Harding and his secretary of navy, Edwin Denby. Both sponsored policies that nourished the nation s industrial infrastructure. Their legacy would yield a dividend of growth, production, employment, and ultimately, national security. In this revised edition, Professor Manley R. Irwin brings forth an innovative approach to researching these policies, papers, and archives, adding additional research from new documents which expand, enhance, and complement the first edition. The book argues that Harding and Denby exercised unusual foresight in preparing the navy for a war against Japan. Both individuals promulgated structural changes in the department and adopted a set of management tools that would redound to the navy in its prosecution of its Pacific offensive in World War II. Irwin's thorough investigation and addition of new evidence from original documents provides invaluable details and insights into the lasting legacy of the Harding administration.

Few historians have looked beyond the veil of the Teapot Dome scandal and examined the naval policies of President Warren Harding and his secretary of navy, Edwin Denby. Historians have also periodically overlooked the personal papers and archives of the Harding administration as it bears on U.S. naval policy. However, Professor Manley R. Irwin brings forth an innovative approach to researching these policies, papers, and archives in Silent Strategists. The book boldly brings forth the argument that Harding and Denby exercised unusual foresight in preparing the navy for a war against Japan. Both individuals promulgated structural changes in the department and adopted a set of management tools that would redound to the navy in its prosecution of its Pacific offensive, World War II. The administrative legacy of the Harding administration remains as vital today as it did eight decades ago, and Professor Irwin's thorough investigation provides invaluable new details and insights.