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This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from
an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include
philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and
cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections
following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from
leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed
picture of indirect reports in the world's languages and their
significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous
book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an
empirical and cross-linguistic approach that covers an impressive
range of languages, such as Cantonese, Japanese, Hebrew, Persian,
Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Armenian, Italian, English, Hungarian,
German, Rumanian, and Basque.
According to two-dimensional semantics, the meaning of an
expression involves two different "dimensions": one dimension
involves reference and truth-conditions of a familiar sort, while
the other dimension involves the way that reference and
truth-conditions depend on the external world (for example,
reference and truth-conditions might be held to depend on which
individuals and substances are present in the world, or on which
linguistic conventions are in place). A number of different
two-dimensional frameworks have been developed, and these have been
applied to a number of fundamental problems in philosophy: the
nature of communication, the relation between the necessary and the
a priori, the role of context in assertion, Frege's distinction
between sense and reference, the contents of thought, and the
mind-body problem. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Josep Macia present
a selection of new essays by an outstanding international team,
shedding fresh light both on foundational issues regarding _
two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. The
volume will be the starting-point for future work on this approach
to issues in philosophy of language, _ epistemology, and
metaphysics. _
The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these
factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the
context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in
the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed
where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an
utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and
that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most
prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances
attributing knowledge, utterances that state that something is
probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the
contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard
picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining
factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of
any such extra factors. With contributions from some of the key
figures in the contemporary debate on relativism this book is about
a topic that is the focus of much traditional and current interest:
whether truth is relative to standards of taste, values, or
subjective informational states. It is an issue in the philosophy
of language, but one with important connections to other areas of
philosophy, such as meta-ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from
an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include
philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and
cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections
following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from
leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed
picture of indirect reports in the world's languages and their
significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous
book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an
empirical and cross-linguistic approach that covers an impressive
range of languages, such as Cantonese, Japanese, Hebrew, Persian,
Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Armenian, Italian, English, Hungarian,
German, Rumanian, and Basque.
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Relative Truth (Hardcover)
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Max Koelbel
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R3,584
R1,504
Discovery Miles 15 040
Save R2,080 (58%)
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Ships in 12 - 17 working days
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The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these
factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the
context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in
the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed
where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an
utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and
that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most
prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances
attributing knowledge, utterances that state that something is
probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the
contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard
picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining
factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of
any such extra factors.
With contributions from some of the key figures in the
contemporary debate on relativism this book is about a topic that
is the focus of much traditional and current interest: whether
truth is relative to standards of taste, values, or subjective
informational states. It is an issue in the philosophy of language,
but one with important connections to other areas of philosophy,
such as meta-ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
According to two-dimensional semantics, the meaning of an
expression involves two different "dimensions": one dimension
involves reference and truth-conditions of a familiar sort, while
the other dimension involves the way that reference and
truth-conditions depend on the external world (for example,
reference and truth-conditions might be held to depend on which
individuals and substances are present in the world, or on which
linguistic conventions are in place). A number of different
two-dimensional frameworks have been developed, and these have been
applied to a number of fundamental problems in philosophy: the
nature of communication, the relation between the necessary and the
a priori, the role of context in assertion, Frege's distinction
between sense and reference, the contents of thought, and the
mind-body problem. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Josep Macia present
a selection of new essays by an outstanding international team,
shedding fresh light both on foundational issues regarding
two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. The
volume will be the starting-point for future work on this approach
to issues in philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics.
It is the linguistic job of singular terms to pick out the objects
that we think or talk about. But what about singular terms that
seem to fail to designate anything, because the objects they refer
to don't exist? We can employ these terms in meaningful thought and
talk, which suggests that they are succeeding in fulfilling their
representational task. A team of leading experts presents new
essays on the much-debated problem of empty reference and thought.
In the 1960s and 1970s Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke
and Hilary Putnam initiated a revolution in the then standard
conception of reference-a concept at the core of philosophical
inquiry. The repercussions of the revolution, particularly felt in
metaphysics and epistemology, were soon refined by other
influential writers such as Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, and John
Perry. They argued that some linguistic and mental representations
have contents individuated by what they are about-by ordinary
referents of expressions such as proper names, indexicals, definite
descriptions and common nouns, i.e. by planets, people or natural
kinds. The view was at odds with a central philosophical
presumption at that time: that cognitive and linguistic access to
objective reality is indirect and accidental, mediated by general
descriptive characterizations, the only constitutive semantic
feature of the expressions; hence its ontological and
epistemological repercussions. A turning-point in the debate about
how linguistic and mental representation reach external contents
concerned the nature of empty mental and linguistic
representations, framed by means of the very same expressions
crucially invoked in the Donnellan-Kaplan-Kripke-Putnam arguments.
The papers in this volume address different aspects of reference
and thought about the (apparently) non-existent.
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of
first-personal, or de se, thought and how such thoughts are
communicated. One of the questions addressed is whether there is
anything distinctive about first-person thought or whether it can
be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that
first-person thought motivates a revision of traditional accounts
of content or motivates positing special ways of accessing such
contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts
involve a subject being 'presented to himself in a particular and
primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.' However,
as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we
consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there
indeed something special about first-person thought such that it
requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by
others? If there really is something special about first-person
thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do
you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my
first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only
entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe?
It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to
answer.
With chapters written by leading international scholars in the
field, this is an authoritative reference guide for researchers
working in the Philosophy of Language today. "The Continuum
Companion to Philosophy of Language" offers the definitive guide to
contemporary philosophy of language. The book covers all the
fundamental questions asked by the philosophy of language - areas
that have continued to attract interest historically as well as
topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research.
Ten specially commissioned essays from an international team of
experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the
area and, most valuably, the exciting new directions the field is
taking. The Companion explores issues pertaining to the nature of
language, form semantics, theories of meaning, reference,
intensional contexts, context-dependence, pragmatics, the
normativity of language, analyticity, a priority and modality.
Featuring a series of indispensable research tools, including an A
to Z of key terms and concepts, a detailed list of resources and a
fully annotated bibliography, this is the essential reference tool
for anyone working in the philosophy of language. "The Continuum
Companions" series is a major series of single volume companions to
key research fields in the humanities aimed at postgraduate
students, scholars and libraries. Each companion offers a
comprehensive reference resource giving an overview of key topics,
research areas, new directions and a manageable guide to beginning
or developing research in the field. A distinctive feature of the
series is that each companion provides practical guidance on
advanced study and research in the field, including research
methods and subject-specific resources.
Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed
interest for the idea that experience generally includes an
experience of the self-a self-experience-whatever else it may
present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience
(as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is
not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a
certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is
also phenomenally aware of the fact that it is presented to her.
This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called
mineness, for-me-ness, pre-reflective self-awareness and subjective
character, among others. This view, associated with historical
figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre,
is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of
phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of
cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores
some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the
putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the
existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it
for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the
explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of
human experience, both normal and pathological, where a 'sense of
self' might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness,
introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights
into the possible relations between the notions of subjective
awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more
sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the
second, to more robust ones.
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