Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed
interest for the idea that experience generally includes an
experience of the self-a self-experience-whatever else it may
present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience
(as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is
not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a
certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is
also phenomenally aware of the fact that it is presented to her.
This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called
mineness, for-me-ness, pre-reflective self-awareness and subjective
character, among others. This view, associated with historical
figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre,
is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of
phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of
cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores
some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the
putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the
existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it
for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the
explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of
human experience, both normal and pathological, where a 'sense of
self' might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness,
introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights
into the possible relations between the notions of subjective
awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more
sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the
second, to more robust ones.
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