This important book presents a new original study of the German and UK financial markets. It addresses the relationship between corporate governance, ownership and financial performance in German and UK firms floated during the 1980s. Marc Goergen uses detailed company micro-data to examine the ownership and performance of each firm from the time of its flotation to six years later. He finds that the evolution of ownership depends on certain corporate characteristics and that differences in financial performance cannot be explained simply by differences in the concentration of ownership. The book sheds new light on the important issue of whether corporate ownership influences or is influenced by financial performance. The main findings of the book have important implications for public policy and the current public debate on corporate governance and the globalisation of financial markets. They are important for established financial markets and the transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe as well as for international scholars interested in issues of corporate governance and the performance of firms.

Corporate Governance: A Global Perspective provides a comprehensive introduction to corporate governance theory and practice. Covering topics such as ownership and control, boards of directors and emerging markets, this text highlights the multidisciplinary nature of corporate governance and demonstrates that there is much more to it than compliance with codes of best practice. This edition covers important issues relating to the design of capitalist systems, discussing how emerging economies such as China escaped the Financial Crisis unscathed and exploring the impact of immigration and rising inequality. Corporate Governance: A Global Perspective is suitable for undergraduate, Master's and MBA students. This newly acquired title has been thoroughly revised by Cengage to reflect the latest development in Corporate Governance, including updates to regulation and codes of best practice.

'This book is a major advancement in the area of complexity and corporate governance. By bringing together a range of leading experts in the fields of complexity and corporate governance, this book manages to knowledgeably wed the emerging field of complex systems thinking with the more established area of corporate governance. It brings a range of new and exciting concepts, such as emergence, co-evolution and self-organisation, and integrates them into an overarching and holistic understanding of corporate governance that is a clear benefit to corporate actors and stakeholders. The book is a major resource for both academic and practitioner audiences.' - Robert Geyer, Lancaster University, UK`Corporations are usually perceived through the lens of traditional disciplines as creatures of law or as economic agents. The absence of a single language of accountability has been unsatisfactory to the point of contributing to the seeming endemic failures of corporate governance. Corporate Governance and Complexity Theory is a hugely important step forward in introducing a new way of thinking about the impact of corporate power. Its concluding words tell it all. ''The holistic approach adopted by complexity theory consists of looking at all related entities, or in this case all corporate governance actors, that interact and influence each other, within the entire corporate governance environment or corporate governance social ecosystem''. The theory also offers a new interpretation of corporate governance, and thus provides some novel insights. The book is well written, helpfully organized and jargon free. It is exciting in concept and execution. You will enjoy it.' - Robert Monks, Lens Governance Advisors< This multidisciplinary book takes an innovative approach to corporate governance by linking governance and complexity theory. It provides important new insights into why governance systems are failing and what may be done to improve this situation. A key issue that scholars, practitioners and regulators of corporate governance face is the complexity of the relationships between a company and its shareholders, as well as its stakeholders and gatekeepers. The authors, who are corporate governance specialists from a variety of disciplines including law, finance and economics, propose an innovative approach and key insights on corporate governance. In the process they also address some significant gaps in the literature and deal with methodological limitations. This new approach uses concepts from complexity theory to deal with the frequently complex relationships between the corporation and its stakeholders and gatekeepers. The holistic approach to the study of corporate governance will prove invaluable to academics and postgraduate students in accounting, economics, finance, law or complexity theory with an interest in corporate governance. This book will be also prove to be an essential resource for regulators and practitioners interested in corporate governance issues.

Dividends are not only a signal about a firm's prospects under asymmetric information, but they can also act as a corporate governance device to align the management's interests with those of the shareholders. Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance is the first comprehensive volume on the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance, and examines in detail empirical studies and current theories. Reviewing the interactions between dividend policy and other corporate governance mechanisms, it compares results for the UK and the US with those for other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, and provides new empirical evidence on corporate governance in continental Europe and its impact on dividends. Focusing on one of the main representatives of this system, Germany, it highlights major differences between the dividend policies of German firms and those of UK or US firms. Conventional wisdom states that German dividends are lower than UK or US dividends, yet on a published-profits basis, the exact converse is true. In addition, the authors demonstrate a link between corporate control structures and dividend payouts, report evidence that the existence of a loss is an additional determinant of dividend changes, and demonstrate that the tax status of the controlling shareholder and the firm's dividend payout are not linked. The conclusions reached in this book have important implications for the current debate on corporate governance, making it invaluable for academics, finance professionals, regulators and legal advisors.

How Reported Board Independence Overstates Actual Board Independence in Family Firms: A Methodological Concern studies board independence in French, German, and UK listed family firms. It focuses on these countries because of their distinct legal and corporate governance systems. While investor protection is strong under UK common law, it is much weaker under French and German civil law. Ownership and control are much more concentrated in France and Germany compared to the UK and the three countries also differ in terms of their board structures. This monograph contributes to the literature both methodologically and empirically. After a short introduction, Section 2 reviews the literature on the influence of ownership and control of families in their firms, with particular focus on the CEO succession decision. The authors suggest that the choice of the CEO successor in family firms is determined by important corporate governance characteristics of these firms, the key determinant being correctly measured board independence. The discussion in this section is critical to support and develop the proposed measure of board independence in family controlled firms. Section 3 focuses on directors' independence. This section begins with a discussion of the recommendations regarding board independence in the codes of best practice of France, Germany, and the UK. This is followed by a review of the literature and the motivation for adjusting directors' independence. The authors present their methodology for the adjusted measure in Section 4, followed by a discussion of the observed differences between conventional and adjusted board independence in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.