This volume begins where the first DAring book of 1995 finished by considering what effects the rules had on legislative output during the same period. It addresses four distinct yet complementary research topics: - the connection between a number of veto players and law production in West European parliamentary democracies - the impact of closed versus open rules - the effects of committee structure and organization on the degree of conflict or consensus on the procedure of passing legislation - the importance of agenda setting and agenda control for the prevention of cycling across issues and the distribution of particular benefits of shifting and transient majorities. Fundamental to this volume is the ability of the project group to fashion an original data set. As a consequence, this volume is able to ascertain the extent to which parliamentary procedures contributed to shaping policy output in this field during the 1980s.

This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.

The budget is the main tool used to allocate scarce public resources, and it is in the context of the budget process that politicians must make trade-offs between different policy priorities. The characteristics of the budget process determine not only the sustainability of fiscal accounts but also their adaptability, efficiency, and representativeness. This volume describes the budget practices, both formal and informal, in ten countries of Latin America and explains fiscal results in terms of these four features. The country studies identify the actors involved in budget policymaking and distinguish their incentives. The studies also present the laws and regulations that affect the incentives and behavior of each actor, as well as the transactions these actors engage in from a general equilibrium perspective. Equally important, and a central focus of each study, is the interaction among the different actors during the budget process. Through this unique framework, the authors identify the role that the budget process may have in the broader policymaking game as a crucial arena to carry out key political transactions.

This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.

Under European Monetary Union, member states lose the ability to steer their economies by manipulating monetary policy. Domestic Budgets in a United Europe, which explains the content, evolution, and effectiveness of fiscal institutions, will be the definitive account of European budget reform in the late twentieth century.Mark Hallerberg examines the making of budgets in EU countries from 1973 to 2000 and explores why those countries introduced fiscal rules when they did. In 1993, when the fiscal-policy criteria for monetary union were first announced, only Luxembourg and the Republic of Ireland would have qualified. In 1997, only Greece failed. Various explanations have been advanced for this rapid turnaround, including luck (a favorable economic climate reduced pressures on local budgets), accounting tricks, and the increasing pressures caused by international capital mobility. Underlying these various explanations is a basic skepticism about whether countries in the European Union actively worked to reform their national budgeting procedures. In rich case studies, Hallerberg shows that the member-states did indeed reform their budget institutions. Many of them, he finds, had started that process long before the formal signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, making domestic changes that allowed them to qualify individually under EMU criteria.

Principles of International Political Economy is the only text to bridge the gap between the real world of politics underlying the international economy and the tools that researchers use to understand IPE. Utilizing a central theoretical framework, the book provides a systematic and widespread introduction to the standard topics covered in an IPE course. It also emphasizes the role of domestic and international institutions in IPE and incorporates several subject areas that are not covered well in other texts, including political determinants and consequences of financial crises; implications of the rise of the BRICs; international environmental politics; the political origins and effect of sovereign debt; and the politics of foreign aid and its effect on development, democracy, and human rights.