The book presents observations concerning automated decision-making from a general point of view at the same time as it analyses the manner in which praxis in some jurisdictions has evolved as concerns automated decision-making and how the requirements that are placed by the legal orders on it are formulated. The principle of the rule of law should apply in the context of automated decision-making of public authorities just as much as when the decision-makers are physical persons. In sync with increasing automatization of decision-making in public authorities, problematizing questions about the appropriate legal basis for algorithmic decision-making have started emerge. How should the principle of the rule of law apply within the area of automated decision-making, how should automated decision-making be regulated so that it satisfies the requirements created by the principle of the rule of law, and how should the principle of the rule of law be made concrete in decision-making that is based on algorithms? The proposal for an AI Act launched by the European Commission in April 2021, including an identification of high-risk uses of algorithmic techniques, raises further questions concerning practices and interpretations related to automated decision-making. The state based on the rule of law proceeds from the maxim that public powers are exercised within a legal frame that makes the exercise of public powers foreseeable in light of legal norms. Also, a state based on the rule of law requires that the contents of the exercise of public powers is regulated by legal norms, which means that the citizens must be able to know everything that is relevant about how the powers will be exercised, not only who it is that will exercise the powers. Because of rules and principles of this kind, including non-discrimination and proportionality, the exercise of powers will not become arbitrary.

With the spotlight on Magna Carta, which is 800 years old in 2015, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, which together are of undeniable importance for fundamental rights-thinking, the existence of similar fundamental rights documents in other European countries is often overlooked. Such fundamental rights documents did, however, exist in the precursors to the current European Union Member States. Some of the documents are ancient, even older than Magna Carta, and some are more recent, but all of them are texts that deserve to be brought out and analysed alongside Magna Carta and the French Declaration in order to better understand the evolution of fundamental rights thinking in Europe.This volume paints a multi-faceted picture of historical fundamental rights documents in the European space by collating the experience of 24 European Union Member States at times in history when most of these states did not even exist. It is the first comprehensive and systematic evaluation of early fundamental rights thinking across Europe and it reveals surprising diversity. Spanning documents from the fifth century BC right through to the 19th century and early 20th century AD, this review opens up themes not normally found in historiographical analyses of fundamental rights.

This study focuses on territorial autonomy, which is often used in different conflict-resolution and minority situations. Four typical elements are identified on the basis of the historical example of the Memel Territory and the so-called Memel case of the PCIJ; distribution of powers, participation through elections and referendums, executive power of territorial autonomy, and international relations. These elements are used for a comparative analysis of the constitutional law that regulates the position of six currently existing special jurisdictions, the Aland Islands in Finalnd, Scotland in the United Kingdom, Puerto Rico in the United States of America, Hong Kong in China, Aceh in Indonesia and Zanzibar in Tanzania. The current sub-state entities examined can be arranged in relation to Memel in a manner that indicates that Hong Kong and the Aland conform to the typical territorial autonomy, while Puerto Rico and Aceh should probably not be understood as territorial autonomies proper. At the same time, the territorial autonomies can be distinguished from federally organized sub-state entities.

This book analyses a middle position between single enumerations in a regular federal-like and a regular autonomy-like distribution of legislative powers by examining constitutional legislation in three countries (Canada, Denmark and Finland) that have established separate enumerations for the national level and the sub-state level. The sub-state level consists of provinces in Canada, the Faroe Islands in Denmark and the Aland Islands in Finland. The book provides interpretations of the competence line based on double enumeration between the national parliament and the sub-state entities, where relevant, on the basis of the travaux preparatoires of the fundamental norms on which the arrangements are based, judicial or quasi-judicial resolutions of competence problems, and relevant doctrine and literature.

This study focuses on territorial autonomy, which is often used in different conflict-resolution and minority situations. Four typical elements are identified on the basis of the historical example of the Memel Territory and the so-called Memel case of the PCIJ; distribution of powers, participation through elections and referendums, executive power of territorial autonomy, and international relations. These elements are used for a comparative analysis of the constitutional law that regulates the position of six currently existing special jurisdictions, the Aland Islands in Finalnd, Scotland in the United Kingdom, Puerto Rico in the United States of America, Hong Kong in China, Aceh in Indonesia and Zanzibar in Tanzania. The current sub-state entities examined can be arranged in relation to Memel in a manner that indicates that Hong Kong and the Aland conform to the typical territorial autonomy, while Puerto Rico and Aceh should probably not be understood as territorial autonomies proper. At the same time, the territorial autonomies can be distinguished from federally organized sub-state entities.