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Making history useful to the reader - this is one of the missions
of the Combat Studies Institute. We strive to produce works that
recount historical events to inform decision makers and to enable
experiential learning. This collection of events put together by
John McGrath, which occurred in Iraq during the 2003-2005
timeframe, addresses that mission. The authors largely used primary
source material - interviews and unit histories - to develop these
vignettes and in doing so have made the works relatable not only to
Soldiers who experienced similar situations but to any reader who
can imagine themselves having to function in these types of
situations. We honor those involved in these actions and hope that
by recounting their stories others may not only recognize them for
their service but may also learn and grow from their experience.
This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in
2006 with the publication of "In Contact " by the Combat Studies
Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military
vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study
methodology commonly found in military literature. The final
version of "Between the Rivers," instead of following this strict
case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative
accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders
in Iraq in 2003-2005. The present volume lies directly within the
tradition of these predecessor works on small-unit actions. Since
the fall of2001, the United States Army, along with the other
American armed services, has been engaged in military actions in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the current conflict has so many
different fronts and facets, no handful of small- unit case studies
could do justice to such a complex tapestry of events. This book
thus represents a volume that showcases the American soldier in
combat operations within the context of the Global War on
Terrorism/The Long War. This series of five case studies is drawn
from events in Iraq. Four of the studies discuss combat operations
within a counterinsurgency framework at the company and battalion
levels. The final case study presents a deployment dilemma facing a
brigade-level task force commander when he was asked to replace a
whole division in the same geographical space. In each case, the
story is derived from oral interviews and key documents and is
fully annotated. The primary purpose for presenting these vignettes
is to provide a vicarious education in what future participants
will face as the War on Terrorism continues and beyond.
Since the mid-19th century, the United States has frequently
employed the US Army on its southern border to perform various
roles in support of the Nation - from outright war, to patrolling
the border, to chasing bandits while securing persons and property
on both sides of the border, and most recently to supporting civil
law enforcement and antidrug efforts. Events since 9/11, such as
the recent deployment of National Guard Soldiers to the Mexican
border, are only the latest manifestation of this long tradition.
This 22nd Occasional paper in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI)
Long War Series, "The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical
Perspective," by CSI historian Matt M. Matthews, reviews the
lengthy history of the US Army on the Mexican border and highlights
recurring themes that are relevant to today's ongoing border
security mission. Between 1846 and the early decades of the 20th
century, the US Army carried out its security missions under a
variety of hardships imposed by the massive length and ruggedness
of the border. The shortage of soldiers to police the new and
oft-disputed border also proved especially problematic. Mexican
domestic politics and US-Mexican international relations greatly
affected the Army's operations. Since the 1920s, the Army's role
has been dramatically different, ranging from noninvolvement to
varied forms of support to local, state, and Federal civilian
agencies. Mr. Matthews' narrative brings to light these
complexities and makes for compelling reading. The ongoing,
post-9/11 debate over the military's role in securing our Nation's
southern border makes this paper important reading for today's
Soldiers. While current and future missions will not mirror those
of the past, the historical record is replete with insights and
lessons learned from the Army's past that are timely and relevant
today.
Recent Pakistani military operations against the Taliban have once
again thrust the historically volatile region of Pakistan's
North-West Frontier into the international limelight. Matthews
provides a brief historical background of the British in India,
geography of the North-West Frontier, the Pashtun tribes, and
provides a short interpretation of the First Afghan War; he
discusses British military operations from 1849-1900, the Punjab
Irregular Force (PIF), its efforts to stop Pashtun raids into
Punjab, and early corrective expeditions into the North-West
Frontier. Matthews further explores British attempts to capture the
lessons of the 1897-1898 Pashtun revolt through new training
manuals, new training programs, and folding the irregular forces
into the British and Indian Regular Army. He observes the successes
of these programs (the 1908 Khel and Mohmand campaigns), the
consequences of their abandonment prior to the 1919-1921 Waziristan
Campaign, and the challenges confronting the British and Indian
Army on the North-West Frontier during the 1920s and 1930s. He
discusses British attempts to "Pass It On" or include the past
lessons of "hill warfare" as well as the results of new tactical
adjustments that can be explored by examining the 1935 Mohmand
campaign, the 1936-1937 Waziristan campaign, and British efforts to
track down and kill the elusive Faqir of Ipi. Finally, Matthews
offers an analysis of lessons learned by the British on the
North-West Frontier and their relevance for the US Army and its
allies.
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest
publication in the Occasional Paper Series, "We Have Not Learned
How to Wage War There" The Soviet Approach in
Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr. Matt Matthews. For this work, Mr.
Matthews collected a wide variety of sources on the subject, many
of them of primary accounts, and used these materials to provide an
overview of the evolution of the Soviet operational approach in
Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. This Soviet experience offers a
number of useful insights for American military professionals who
are, as of this writing, conducting operations in Afghanistan. Mr.
Matthews begins his study by examining the Soviets' planning for
its invasion of Afghanistan and initial goals for that campaign.
The author then looks closely at how the Soviets adapted their
tactics and organization to meet the committed and resilient
insurgent threat that emerged to do battle against Soviet forces.
Despite conventional interpretations of this campaign in
Afghanistan which emphasize the rigidity of Soviet methods,
Matthews' study suggests that the Soviets were flexible in their
overall approach. The Soviet government did, for example, launch
nation-building initiatives that would look familiar to American
military officers who served in Afghanistan in the first decade of
the 21st century. These efforts, however, were seriously hindered
by a Soviet military culture that opposed a more comprehensive
campaign to foster a popular central Afghan government. Matthews
concludes his study by examining Soviet operations to extract their
forces from Afghanistan while nonetheless leaving a viable, if not
popular, Afghan government in place.
This analysis of the war includes examination of IDF and Hezbollah
doctrine, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical
problems encountered by the IDF. The author argues that the Israeli
reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based
Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) wari--
ghting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power,
were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank
territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and
untrained to i-- ght against a determined Hezbollah force that
conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, i-- xed-position
defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed
several prominent IDF ofi-- cers and other experts in the i-- eld.
Originally published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War
Series Occasional Paper 26, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006
Hezbollah-Israeli War" by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The
outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has
confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered
the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a
history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its
enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's
historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and
Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the
operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the
war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on
poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO)
and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a
nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of
Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency
(COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF
ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight
against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in
many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. IN research this
study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and
other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been
interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination
of the war. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups
around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and
exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as
the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare
since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly
relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US
Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an
uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and
learning.
Examines the almost continual efforts of British and Indian
soldiers (both regular and irregular) to combat and pacify the
Pashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier. It will also examine the
tactics employed in the various campaigns. Chapter 1 deals briefly
with the historical background of the British in India, geography
of the North-West Frontier, the Pashtun tribes, and a short account
of the First Afghan War. Chapter 2 addresses British military
operations from 1849-1900 and discusses the Punjab Irregular Force
(PIF) and its efforts to stop Pashtun raids into Punjab, as well as
early punitive expeditions into the North-West Frontier. The
chapter also examines the failure to pass along the lessons of the
PIF to the British and Indian regular forces as they deployed for
the first time in strength into the North-West Frontier during the
Pashtun revolt of 1897. The chapter additionally investigates the
renewed tactical effectiveness of the Pashtun tribes, brought about
by modern and more effective weapons. Chapter 3 will explore
British attempts to capture the lessons of the 1897-1898 Pashtun
revolt by publishing new training manuals, instituting new training
programs, and folding the irregular forces into the British and
Indian Regular Army. The chapter will examine the success of these
programs (the 1908 Khel and Mohmand campaigns), and the dire
consequences of their abandonment prior to the 1919-1921 Waziristan
Campaign. Chapter 4 will examine the challenges confronting the
British and Indian Army on the North-West Frontier during the 1920s
and 1930s. The chapter will discuss British attempts to "Pass It
On" or incorporate the past lessons of "hill warfare." The results
of these new tactical adjustments will be explored by examining the
1935 Mohmand campaign, the 1936-1937 Waziristan campaign, and
British efforts to track down and kill the elusive Faqir of Ipi.
The final chapter will offer an analysis of lessons learned by the
British on the North-West Frontier and their relevance for the US
Army and its allies.
The two battles for the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 were turning
points in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Elements of the US Marine Corps
began an offensive in April to destroy enemy forces in the town,
but the battle ended prematurely with the Marines being replaced by
the "Fallujah Brigade," followed soon after by a complete enemy
takeover of the city. Some units of the new Iraqi Army were also
committed to the first battle; they were found wanting and the
entire Iraqi training program significantly changed in response. In
November 2004, a combined USMC, US Army, and Iraqi Army offensive
succeeded in eliminating the enemy in Fallujah in a destructive
urban battle. In Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corp
Joint Operations, Mr. Matt Matthews focuses on the ways in which
Army and Marine forces operated together in the second Battle of
Fallujah. Among the many Army units that participated, Task Force
2-2 Infantry and Task Force 2-7 Cavalry spearheaded the attacks of
two Marine regimental combat teams into and through the city.
Matthews' gripping narrative de-scribes their role in the battle
from notification, to planning, and through the fighting to the
conclusion of their role in the battle. With access to first-person
accounts and unit histories from both task forces, Matthews'
monograph illuminates many aspects of the battle which have been
missing from popular journalistic accounts. Army - Marine
interoperability is the theme around which Matthews bases his
account. Well-educated and professional Army and Marine leaders at
the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels overcame many ingrained
cultural differences to synchronize operations. Army senior NCOs
and junior officers displayed tremendous initiative, flexibility,
and courage in fighting alongside their Marine counterparts. They
skillfully exploited the incredible firepower, survivability and
urban mobility of Army heavy forces to destroy enemy resistance in
some of the most brutal urban combat of the war. Matthews also
addresses areas in which the Army and Marines must continue to
improve their ability to fight side by side. Operation AL FAJR is a
compelling case study of combat at the tactical level in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM. Army - Marine relations have improved greatly since
the acrimony that sometimes plagued the WWII era. As Matthews makes
clear, there is more work to be done.
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