Metaphysics and Science brings together important new work within an emerging philosophical discipline: the metaphysics of science. In the opening chapter, a definition of the metaphysics of science is offered, one which explains why the topics of laws, causation, natural kinds, and emergence are at the discipline's heart. The book is then divided into four sections, which group together papers from leading academics on each of those four topics. Among the questions discussed are: How are laws and measurement methods related? Can a satisfactory reductive account of laws be given? How can Lorentz transformation laws be explained? How are dispositions triggered? What role should dispositional properties play in our understanding of causation? Are natural kinds and natural properties distinct? How is the Kripke-Putnam semantics for natural kind terms related to the natural kind essentialist thesis? What would have to be the case for natural kind terms to have determinate reference? What bearing, if any, does nonlinearity in science have on the issue of metaphysical emergence? This collection will be of interest to philosophers, scientists and post-graduates working on problems at the intersection of metaphysics and science.

Putting Properties First considers the metaphysics of natural science. It develops and defends a contemporary metaphysical theory of natural modality called 'Modal Platonism', which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties-such as mass and charge-are fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the behavioural dispositions of physical things. This theory differs from other 'properties-first' approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated by anything. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory solves a range of philosophical puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that laws of nature are a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science.