The Allied amphibious operation codenamed Shingle was launched in late January 1944. It was opposed by German forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno. Success depended on the element of surprise, and the speed with which the invaders could build up strength and move inland. This was understood by General Mark Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army, but not fully understood by his subordinate commanders. This German account focuses on the landing at Anzio as it was the only one that failed to achieve its objective of smashing the German defense and achieving operational freedom of movement. The battle lasted over six weeks, with mistakes made by leadership on both sides, and consequently also great sacrifice by solders on both sides. But the operation was not a German success either, and attempts to prevent the creation of a strong bridgehead failed. Ultimately the Allies would reach Rome, and the Allies applied lessons from this battle to facilitate the success of Overlord, launched five months later. While not complete, as the author did not have access to some of the war diaries of higher levels of German command, this is still one of the best German accounts of Operation Shingle and is here translated into English for the first time.

The Dragoon offensive in August 1944 was preceded by bombings and sabotage that hit hard the German forces located in the South of France – damaging communications, railroads and bridges. The landings were then overwhelmingly successful, despite localised German resistance. The following morning a German force the size of around four infantry battalions was able to launch a counterattack, but by the end of the day von Schwerin ordered a retreat under cover of night. What ensued was a race to retreat to the Burgundian Gate, or Belfort Gap, before they were cut off by the advancing Allied troops. The Allies had all the means for a successful pursuit, while most of the German troops, with the notable exception of the 11th Panzer Division, were largely incapable of undertaking an orderly retreat. Some units, including the LXII Corps headquarters, were surrounded and captured. This account, by Jörg Staiger, recounts the German retreat and explains how the 19th Army sacrificed divisions to enable its retreat through the Rhone Valley.

While 'winning' might be considered a fundamental part of the human objective, what constitutes winning and how one might achieve it remain somewhat abstract, in war as in any other human endeavour. 'Winning' militarily at the tactical level - in a firefight or a battle - has always been more quantifiable than at the strategic level. At the strategic level, success might be measured by means of three big ideas: ownership; intervention for effect; and fighting for ideas. The divergence between success at the tactical level and the political context of the war creates a challenge at the operational level when it relates to political and strategic matters. The result of a research project carried out by the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research for the British Army, this book analyses the philosophical constituents of what may comprise ‘victory’ or ‘winning’ and then travels, chronologically, through a wide set of historical case studies, exploring those more philosophical components and weaving them into the factual discussion. Thus the factual relation and analysis is the vehicle for a deeper exploration of the concept of success or ‘winning’, rather than a narrative end in itself.

This book discusses a number of raids undertaken by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps near the Black Sea in 1941/2 to explore the tactics used and why they were successful, based upon the detailed combat reports prepared by the corps staff immediately after each battle. "Die Wehrmacht im Kampf" Battles and Problems of the Second World War is a series published in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Written by ex-members of the German army in WWII, it provides important information not available elsewhere on the German army's perspective of many crucial campaigns and battles. None of the volumes have previously been available in English. Each volume has a modern introduction by Professor Matthias Strohn, expert on the German army.

In late 1943, 362. Infanterie-Division was formed around the remnants of 268. Infanterie-Division, which had been disbanded after high casualties on the Eastern Front. It fought at Anzio in early 1944, overrun when the Allied broke through the German lines in April. During its time at Anzio, the division was involved in the Benedicta massacre. The unit was withdrawn to Rome. Facing the Allied advance, it suffered further losses and had to be rebuilt once more. Returning to the front, it then fought until late April 1945, when it surrendered. This account focuses on the efforts of 362. Infanterie-Division to turn back the Allied forces from their advance north in late 1944 and early 1945. Its commander, Heinz Greiner led the division in a series of counterattacks against Allied forces outside Rome that slowed Allied progress. While Greiner did not have access to the unit war diary while writing this account his experience as commander of 362. Infanterie-Division thoughout this period means that it offers a unique insight into the battle from the German perspective well as a thorough account of the reestablishment, training and combat performance of a German division.

2020 marks 75 years since the end of World War II, yet even as the war slips from living memory, its legacies continue to influence current political and military thinking. This anthology will analyse these legacies for a number of countries and regions including China, Russia, the United States, the Near East, and Germany illustrating in detail how World War II is not merely a historical event, but a defining moment for current military and political thinking around the globe. This book will therefore be of interest for those interested in history, but also political and military decision makers, and followers of current political and military affairs.

The first two decades after the end of the Cold War were characterised by government's desires to reduce the sizes of their armed forces, not least in order to save money. Hand in hand with this general reduction went an intellectual and doctrinal re-orientation of the armies from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency operations. These trends combined had a deep impact on all armies, in particular in Europe. The geo-political landscape and the real and perceived threats from terrorist groups allowed for such developments to take place. As a result, capabilities were lost and the current generation of army leaders have lost the ability to think in terms of large-scale, conventional military operations. Recent changes to the geo-political situation and current developments in Eastern Europe have resulted in a new shift of thinking. The pendulum has now swung back to large-scale, conventional operations. Once again, this has huge implications for the forces, from training to equipment. Today, armies are growing again in size and all armies look back to the past in order to learn something about the build-up, composition and use of large formations. Lessons that had been learned by armies the hard way and had been the accepted wisdom for decades or even centuries now have to be re-learnt. It is these lessons from history that this book addresses. What does history tell us about these processes? How did armies prepare and train for a major conflict in times of peace? What internal structure did the armies adopt? What were the problems in the areas of equipment and how could an army ensure that in the case of war enough of the right material was available? How did the armies ensure that the doctrine and training used in a small army was adequate for a much enlarged army in the case of total war? All these questions were as relevant then as they are now. This anthology analyses a number of case studies and provides insights into themes and topics that characterised the so-called 'reconstitution' of armies in their historical and social contexts. The emphasis is on land forces, but air forces and navies of the relevant countries are also included. The period covered is the "age of total war" from the French Revolution to the end of the Second World War, which provides the intellectual framework for the challenges that armies are facing today.

In 2018, the world will be commemorating the centenary of the end of the First World War. In many ways, 1918 was the most dramatic year of the conflict. After the defeat of Russia in 1917, the Germans were able to concentrate their forces on the Western Front for the first time in the war, and the German offensives launched from March 1918 onward brought the Western Allies close to defeat. Having stopped the German offensives, the Entente started its counter-attacks on all fronts with the assistance of fresh US troops, driving the Germans back and, by November 1918, the Central Powers had been defeated.

This new study is a multi-author work containing ten chapters by some of the best historians of the First World War from around the world writing today. It provides an overview and analysis of the different levels of war for each of the main armies involved within the changing context of the reality of warfare in 1918. It also looks in detail at the war at sea and in the air, and considers the aftermath and legacy of the First World War.

Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.

Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.