Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime" and "Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries." Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world.
The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare.
Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare.
Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare--the gang.

Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void.

Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe.

As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and "uncomfortable" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

This book addresses the challenge of international narcotics control by applying "the Manwaring paradigm." The paradigm is the basis for an improved strategy and theory of engagement for weak governments of the developing world, built around the concept of the "gray area phenomenon."

This volume aims to operationalize General John R. Galvin's call for a new paradigm to fight the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today-insurgency. It contributes to the understanding needed to formulate and implement efforts in the contemporary international security arena.

This volume aims to operationalize General John R. Galvin's call for a new paradigm to fight the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today-insurgency. It contributes to the understanding needed to formulate and implement efforts in the contemporary international security arena.

This book addresses the challenge of international narcotics control by applying "the Manwaring paradigm." The paradigm is the basis for an improved strategy and theory of engagement for weak governments of the developing world, built around the concept of the "gray area phenomenon."

Departing from conventional policy rhetoric on the unconventional "new world disorder," Max G. Manwaring, Wm. J. Olson, and their colleagues here build upon Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr.'s three pillars of success for foreign policy and military management. They provide a sound intellectual road map through the dense fog of the contemporary inter

Environmental Security and Global Stability places environmental security at the center of the new, complex global security debate. By meshing strategic and operational expertise with academic and policy research the work demonstrates the imperative need to move theoretical and moral environmental protection programs from the state of study and rhetoric to the realm of action. The essays highlight-through case study discussions of environmental flash points in Asia, Africa, and Latin America-the clear linkages between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic tension, economic distress, and political instability. Offering a theoretical framework from which to approach environmental security policy as well as suggesting practical preventative and mitigatory measures for its implementation, this volume is an invaluable resource for scholars and policymakers alike.

This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

This volume commends itself to the reader to provoke thought about what governments and international organizations ought to do when faced with the responsibilities of a given peace operation. Equally important, it suggests what we as citizens in the world community ought to demand of our governments and that community in the current world disorder.
The intent is to help decision-makers, policy makers, opinion-makers and students understand the nature of the problem that is likely to provide the greatest challenge to international security management into the next century.

This volume commends itself to the reader to provoke thought about what governments and international organizations ought to do when faced with the responsibilities of a given peace operation. Equally important, it suggests what we as citizens in the world community ought to demand of our governments and that community in the current world disorder.
The intent is to help decision-makers, policy makers, opinion-makers and students understand the nature of the problem that is likely to provide the greatest challenge to international security management into the next century.

This book will help civilian and military leaders, opinion makers, scholars, and interested citizens come to grips with the realities of the 21st-century global security arena by dissecting lessons from both the past and the present. This book sets out to accomplish four tasks: first, to outline the evolution of the national and international security concept from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the present; second, to examine the circular relationship of the elements that define contemporary security; third, to provide empirical examples to accompany the discussion of each element-security, development, governance, and sovereignty; and fourth, to argue that substantially more sophisticated stability-security concepts, policy structures, and policy-making precautions are required in order for the United States to play more effectively in the global security arena. Case studies provide the framework to join the various chapters of the book into a cohesive narrative, while the theoretical linear analytic method it employs defines its traditional approach to case studies. For each case study it discusses the issue in context, findings and outcomes of the issue, and conclusions and implications. Issue and Context sections outline the political-historical situation and answers the "What?" question; Findings and Outcome sections answer the "Who?", "Why?", "How?", and "So What?" questions; and Conclusions and Implications sections address Key Points and Lessons. Addresses the changing nature of the contemporary global security landscape in an illuminating introductory chapter Clearly demonstrates the evolving nature of global security through case studies Takes a linear analytic approach, with a vignette that examines an internal security situation accompanying each chapter Addresses the major gaps in the national and international security literature

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

The author of this monograph, Dr. Max Manwaring, examines a cogent case that illustrates how would-be revolutionaries all around the world might seek to realize their dreams. They would include populists and neo-populists; the New Left, New Socialists, and 21st Century Socialists; criminal nonstate actors, agitators, gangs, and popular militias; and other "modern mercenaries."

The reality and severity of the threats associated with contemporary transnational security problems indicate that the U.S. and its national and international partners need a new paradigm for the conduct of unconventional asymmetric conflict, and an accompanying new paradigm for strategic leader development. The strategic-level basis of these new paradigms is found in the fact that the global community is redefining security in terms of nothing less than a reconceptualization of sovereignty. In the past, sovereignty was the acknowledged and/or real control of territory and the people in it. Now, sovereignty is the responsibility of governments to protect peoples' well-being and prevent great harm to those peoples. Thus, the security dilemma becomes, "Why, when, and how to intervene to protect people and prevent egregious human suffering?" We address some of the strategic-level questions and recommendations that arise out of that debate. We probably generate more questions than answers, but it is time to begin the strategic-level discussion.

This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states-and what the Mexican government calls "Zones of Impunity." All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico's other neighbors.

This monograph stems from the tactical and operational frustrations of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) regarding citizen and collective security in the Western Hemisphere. These frustrations have been demonstrated in each of the annual colloquia that the Strategic Studies Institute and its partners, Florida International University, the National Defense University, and USSOUTHCOM have conducted over the past 8 years. This monograph also reflects similar frustrations expressed by other U.S. Government organizations and agencies, as well as by various hemispheric governments and security institutions. The urgency and importance of the security issue have generated four related themes. First, several countries in Latin America are paradigms of the failing state and have enormous implications for the stability, development, democracy, prosperity, and peace of the entire Western Hemisphere. Second, the transnational drug and arms trafficking, paramilitary, insurgent, and gang organizations in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean Basin are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human horror, and internal instability that-if left unchecked at the strategic level-can ultimately threaten the collapse of various states and undermine the security and sovereignty of neighbors. Third, poverty, social exclusion, environmental degradation, and politicaleconomic- social expectations-and the conflicts generated by these indirect and implicit threats to stability and human well-being-lead to further degeneration of citizen security. Fourth, these threats constitute a serious challenge to U.S. national security, well-being, and position in the global community. Unfortunately, a strategic-level debate has largely been absent from all this discourse. The reality and severity of the threats associated with transnational security issues indicate that the United States and its national and international partners need a new paradigm for the conduct of contemporary warfare and an accompanying new paradigm for strategic leader development. The strategic-level basis of these new paradigms can be found in the fact that the global community is redefining security in terms of nothing less than a reconceptualization of sovereignty. In the past, sovereignty was the acknowledged and/or real control of territory and the people in it. Now, sovereignty is the responsibility of governments to protect the well-being of their peoples and to prevent great harm to those peoples. The security dilemma has now become: Why, when, and how to intervene to protect people and prevent egregious human suffering? Thus, we address some of the strategic-level questions and recommendations that arise from this elaboration. We will probably generate more questions than answers, but it is time to begin the strategic-level discussion. This monograph comes at a critical juncture-a time of promise for globalization, creating a world that has become increasingly interconnected and a positive force for good government, human rights, the environment, peace, and prosperity. At the same time, there is profound concern that the fragmentation associated with globalization is acting as a negative force-leading people everywhere to seek refuge in smaller groups, characterized by isolationism, separatism, fanaticism, and deteriorating citizen security and well-being. Strategic Studies Institute

Ambassador Stephen D. Krasner reminds us that policymakers in great power nations such as the United States can aspire to realizing grand strategies based on a rational ends, ways, and means formula. They rarely succeed, however. It has proved too hard to align vision, policies, and resources. Moreover, multiple state and nonstate actors, conflicts, interests, changing technological dynamics, and exposure to unexpected political, economic, and social shocks are too complex for such a rational process. The most obvious alternative to a grand strategy is no strategy at all, or a simple "wish list." Nevertheless, Krasner argues that reliance on one or more orienting principles is a second-better-alternative to a grand strategy.

This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In this monograph, Dr. Max G. Manwaring provides a comprehensive analysis of the Colombian crisis situation and makes viable recommendations to deal with it more effectively. In substantive U.S. national security terms, Dr. Manwaring addresses the questions, "Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done?" He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then Dr. Manwaring makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done.

Dr. Max Manwaring wrote this monograph in response to the fact that today over half the countries in the global community are faced with one variation or another of asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. That the United States will become involved directly or indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certain. The Balkans, Colombia, Mexico, Somalia, and the Philippines are only a few cases in point. Yet, little or no recognition and application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken place over the past several years are evident.

Another kind of war within the context of a "clash of civilizations" is being waged in various parts of the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world today. Some of the main protagonists are those who have come to be designated as first-second-, and third-generation street gangs, as well as their various possible allies such as traditional Transnational Criminal Organizations. In this new type of war, national security and sovereignty of affected countries is being impinged every day, and gangs' illicit commercial motives are, in fact, becoming an ominous political agenda.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced daunting challenges in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Threatened by failing states, insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism, the nation has been compelled to re-evaluate its traditional responses to global conflict. In this timely book, John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring present a much-needed strategy for conducting unconventional warfare in an increasingly violent world.

In the early 1990s, Manwaring introduced a new paradigm for addressing low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts other than major wars. Termed the Manwaring Paradigm or SWORD (Small Wars Operations Research Directorate) model, it has been tested successfully by scholars and practitioners and refined in the wake of new and significant "uncomfortable wars" around the world, most notably the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Uncomfortable Wars" Revisited broadens the definition of the original paradigm and applies it to specific confrontations

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare - the gang.Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void. Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe. As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and ""uncomfortable"" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.