|
Showing 1 - 9 of
9 matches in All Departments
This book argues for two claims: firstly, determinism in science
does not infringe upon human free will because it is descriptive,
not prescriptive, and secondly, the very formulation, testing and
justification of scientific theories presupposes human free will
and thereby persons as ontologically primitive. The argument
against predetermination is broadly Humean, or more precisely
'Super-Humean', whereas that against naturalist reduction is in
large Kantian, drawing from Sellars on the scientific and the
manifest image. Thus, whilst the book defends scientific realism
against the confusion between fact and fake, it also reveals why
scientific theories, laws and explanations cannot succeed in
imposing norms for our actions upon us, neither on the level of the
individual nor on that of society. Esfeld makes a strong case for
an ontology of science that is minimally sufficient to explain our
scientific and common sense knowledge, not only removing the
concern that the laws of nature are incompatible with human
freedom, but furthermore showing how our freedom is in fact a very
presupposition for science.
This book seeks to work out which commitments are minimally
sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world that matches
all of today's well-established physical theories. We propose an
ontology of the natural world that is defined only by two axioms:
(1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects,
namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the
distances between them changing. Everything else comes in as a
means to represent the change in the distance relations in a manner
that is both as simple and as informative as possible. The book
works this minimalist ontology out in philosophical as well as
mathematical terms and shows how one can understand classical
mechanics, quantum field theory and relativistic physics on the
basis of this ontology. Along the way, we seek to achieve four
subsidiary aims: (a) to make a case for a holistic individuation of
the basic objects (ontic structural realism); (b) to work out a new
version of Humeanism, dubbed Super-Humeanism, that does without
natural properties; (c) to set out an ontology of quantum physics
that is an alternative to quantum state realism and that avoids any
ontological dualism of particles and fields; (d) to vindicate a
relationalist ontology based on point objects also in the domain of
relativistic physics.
This book seeks to work out which commitments are minimally
sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world that matches
all of today's well-established physical theories. We propose an
ontology of the natural world that is defined only by two axioms:
(1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects,
namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the
distances between them changing. Everything else comes in as a
means to represent the change in the distance relations in a manner
that is both as simple and as informative as possible. The book
works this minimalist ontology out in philosophical as well as
mathematical terms and shows how one can understand classical
mechanics, quantum field theory and relativistic physics on the
basis of this ontology. Along the way, we seek to achieve four
subsidiary aims: (a) to make a case for a holistic individuation of
the basic objects (ontic structural realism); (b) to work out a new
version of Humeanism, dubbed Super-Humeanism, that does without
natural properties; (c) to set out an ontology of quantum physics
that is an alternative to quantum state realism and that avoids any
ontological dualism of particles and fields; (d) to vindicate a
relationalist ontology based on point objects also in the domain of
relativistic physics.
Conservative Reductionism sets out a new theory of the relationship
between physics and the special sciences within the framework of
functionalism. It argues that it is wrong-headed to conceive an
opposition between functional and physical properties (or
functional and physical descriptions, respectively) and to build an
anti-reductionist argument on multiple realization. By contrast,
(a) all properties that there are in the world, including the
physical ones, are functional properties in the sense of being
causal properties, and (b) all true descriptions (laws, theories)
that the special sciences propose can in principle be reduced to
physical descriptions (laws, theories) by means of functional
reduction, despite multiple realization. The book develops
arguments for (a) from the metaphysics of properties and the
philosophy of physics. These arguments lead to a conservative
ontological reductionism. It then develops functional reduction
into a fully-fledged, conservative theory reduction by means of
introducing functional sub-types that are coextensive with physical
types, illustrating that conservative reductionism by means of case
studies from biology (notably the relationship between classical
and molecular genetics).
Fifty years after Willard Van Orman Quine published From a logical
point of view (1953), John Heil brought out his book 'From an
ontological point of view' (2003). The title expresses the shift in
contemporary philosophy from logical and epistemological concerns
to metaphysics. The papers of this symposium discuss that shift,
focussing on what John Heil calls 'ontological seriousness',
truth-making, levels of being, properties, powers, and
reductionism. Each paper is followed by a comment from John Heil.
The volume covers a number of the most hotly debated issues in
today s metaphysics and moves the discussion on in several
important aspects. 'It would be difficult to imagine a collection
of more astute, penetrating, and philosophically hard-hitting
discussions of the kind of metaphysical realism articulated in
'From an Ontological Point of View'. Symposium participants deploy
an impressive range of analytical skills in a way that illuminates
connections among metaphysical positions that too often escape
notice.' (John Heil)"
Conservative Reductionism sets out a new theory of the relationship
between physics and the special sciences within the framework of
functionalism. It argues that it is wrong-headed to conceive an
opposition between functional and physical properties (or
functional and physical descriptions, respectively) and to build an
anti-reductionist argument on multiple realization. By contrast,
(a) all properties that there are in the world, including the
physical ones, are functional properties in the sense of being
causal properties, and (b) all true descriptions (laws, theories)
that the special sciences propose can in principle be reduced to
physical descriptions (laws, theories) by means of functional
reduction, despite multiple realization. The book develops
arguments for (a) from the metaphysics of properties and the
philosophy of physics. These arguments lead to a conservative
ontological reductionism. It then develops functional reduction
into a fully-fledged, conservative theory reduction by means of
introducing functional sub-types that are coextensive with physical
types, illustrating that conservative reductionism by means of case
studies from biology (notably the relationship between classical
and molecular genetics).
This book argues for two claims: firstly, determinism in science
does not infringe upon human free will because it is descriptive,
not prescriptive, and secondly, the very formulation, testing and
justification of scientific theories presupposes human free will
and thereby persons as ontologically primitive. The argument
against predetermination is broadly Humean, or more precisely
'Super-Humean', whereas that against naturalist reduction is in
large Kantian, drawing from Sellars on the scientific and the
manifest image. Thus, whilst the book defends scientific realism
against the confusion between fact and fake, it also reveals why
scientific theories, laws and explanations cannot succeed in
imposing norms for our actions upon us, neither on the level of the
individual nor on that of society. Esfeld makes a strong case for
an ontology of science that is minimally sufficient to explain our
scientific and common sense knowledge, not only removing the
concern that the laws of nature are incompatible with human
freedom, but furthermore showing how our freedom is in fact a very
presupposition for science.
Ce livre vise dresser un bilan de l' tat actuel des discussions en
philosophie de l'esprit qui peut servir d'introduction ce domaine.
Il prend comme fil conducteur le probl me de la causalit mentale -
c'est- -dire la question concernant la fa on dont les tats mentaux
peuvent influencer notre comportement. Dans la premi re partie
(chapitres 1 4) sont expos s le probl me de la causalit mentale
ainsi que les principales strat gies qui ont t propos es pour le
solutionner. Dans la seconde partie (chapitres 5 7) est pr sent le
fonctionnalisme, le paradigme dominant en philosophie de l'esprit
depuis les ann es 1970. La troisi me partie (chapitres 8 12) aborde
les th mes du libre arbitre, de l'exp rience v cue et du contenu
conceptuel. la fin de chaque chapitre est propos un appareil
didactique qui cherche susciter la r flexion du lecteur par des
suggestions de lecture, des questions d'auto-contr le et des
propositions de travail.
|
|