Conservative Reductionism sets out a new theory of the relationship
between physics and the special sciences within the framework of
functionalism. It argues that it is wrong-headed to conceive an
opposition between functional and physical properties (or
functional and physical descriptions, respectively) and to build an
anti-reductionist argument on multiple realization. By contrast,
(a) all properties that there are in the world, including the
physical ones, are functional properties in the sense of being
causal properties, and (b) all true descriptions (laws, theories)
that the special sciences propose can in principle be reduced to
physical descriptions (laws, theories) by means of functional
reduction, despite multiple realization. The book develops
arguments for (a) from the metaphysics of properties and the
philosophy of physics. These arguments lead to a conservative
ontological reductionism. It then develops functional reduction
into a fully-fledged, conservative theory reduction by means of
introducing functional sub-types that are coextensive with physical
types, illustrating that conservative reductionism by means of case
studies from biology (notably the relationship between classical
and molecular genetics).
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