This book examines the conceptual, existential, and logical conditions under which the philosophical novel can be treated as a literary genre on a par with generally recognized literary genres, such as mystery, romantic, adventure, religious, or historical novel. Michael H. Mitias argues that the philosophical novel meets these conditions. He advances a detailed analysis of the concept of literary genre, and discusses the reasons which justify the claim that philosophical novel is a distinct literary genre. This is based on the assumption that philosophical ideas can be communicated metaphorically. An analysis of this assumption necessarily leads to a detailed discussion of the concept of metaphor and the extent to which it can be the vehicle of communicating philosophical truth.

One of the most difficult problems challenging the human mind is knowledge of the world in its human, natural, and supra-natural dimensions: what is the nature of this multidimensional reality? How do we know and verify the truth of our knowledge claims of this reality? A contemporary Polish philosopher, Malgorzata Czarnocka, has advanced one of the most comprehensive and insightful studies of the cognitive act and the conditions under which it takes place. The proposition explicated in this book is that Czarnocka's analysis of perception functions as a model of explanation in our attempt to know the nature of the being that underlies the universe. This analysis becomes the basis of the author's discussion of symbolic truth as a model of explanation and its other applications.

Is dialogue between the major religions of the world possible? If it is possible, under what conditions? In this book, Michael H. Mitias argues that it is possible provided various conditions are met. These conditions include mutual respect, mutual understanding, and God-centeredness. First, how can a religion that is unusually complex -composed of a doctrine founded in a unique divine revelation, a leadership class of theologians, teachers, clergy, and administrators, and a community across global cultures-show uniform respect to another religion? How can a complex institution like a religion truly understand another religion? Third, can the different religions worship the same God if their conceptions of God are based on their unique doctrines? Mitias addresses these questions and argues that it is possible for religions to respect and understand one another. Further, he argues that the different conceptions of God are necessarily founded in a belief in the existence of a transcendent, infinite, and wise being.

Is dialogue between the major religions of the world possible? If it is possible, under what conditions? In this book, Michael H. Mitias argues that it is possible provided various conditions are met. These conditions include mutual respect, mutual understanding, and God-centeredness. First, how can a religion that is unusually complex -composed of a doctrine founded in a unique divine revelation, a leadership class of theologians, teachers, clergy, and administrators, and a community across global cultures-show uniform respect to another religion? How can a complex institution like a religion truly understand another religion? Third, can the different religions worship the same God if their conceptions of God are based on their unique doctrines? Mitias addresses these questions and argues that it is possible for religions to respect and understand one another. Further, he argues that the different conceptions of God are necessarily founded in a belief in the existence of a transcendent, infinite, and wise being.

Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing.