Spinoza rejects fundamental tenets of received morality, including the notions of Providence and free will. Yet he retains rich theories of good and evil, virtue, perfection, and freedom. Building interconnected readings of Spinoza's accounts of imagination, error, and desire, Michael LeBuffe defends a comprehensive interpretation of Spinoza's enlightened vision of human excellence. Spinoza holds that what is fundamental to human morality is the fact that we find things to be good or evil, not what we take those designations to mean. When we come to understand the conditions under which we act-that is, when we come to understand the sorts of beings that we are and the ways in which we interact with things in the world-then we can recast traditional moral notions in ways that help us to attain more of what we find to be valuable.
For Spinoza, we find value in greater activity. Two hazards impede the search for value. First, we need to know and acquire the means to be good. In this respect, Spinoza's theory is a great deal like Hobbes's: we strive to be active, and in order to do so we need food, security, health, and other necessary components of a decent life. There is another hazard, however, that is more subtle. On Spinoza's theory of the passions, we can misjudge our own natures and fail to understand the sorts of beings that we really are. So we can misjudge what is good and might even seek ends that are evil. Spinoza's account of human nature is thus much deeper and darker than Hobbes's: we are not well known to ourselves, and the self-knowledge that is the foundation of virtue and freedom is elusive and fragile.

In his work on metaphysics, Spinoza associates reasons with causes or explanations. He contends that there is a reason for whatever exists and whatever does not exist. In his account of the human mind, Spinoza makes reason a peculiarly powerful kind of idea and the only source of our knowledge of objects in experience. In his moral theory, Spinoza introduces dictates of reason, which are action-guiding prescriptions. In politics, Spinoza suggests that reason, with religion, motivates cooperation in society. Reason shapes Spinoza's philosophy, and central debates about Spinoza-including his place in the history of philosophy and in the European Enlightenment-turn upon our understanding of these claims. Spinoza on Reason starts with striking claims in each of these areas, which Michael LeBuffe draws from Spinoza's two great works, the Ethics and the Theological Political Treatise. The book takes each characterization of reason on its own terms, explaining the claims and their historical context. While acknowledging the striking variety of reason's roles, LeBuffe emphasizes the extent to which these different doctrines build upon one another. The result is a rich understanding of the meaning and function of each claim and, in the book's conclusion, an overview of the contribution of reason to the systematic coherence of Spinoza's philosophy.

Spinoza rejects fundamental tenets of received morality, including the notions of Providence and free will. Yet he retains rich theories of good and evil, virtue, perfection, and freedom. Building interconnected readings of Spinoza's accounts of imagination, error, and desire, Michael LeBuffe defends a comprehensive interpretation of Spinoza's enlightened vision of human excellence. Spinoza holds that what is fundamental to human morality is the fact that we find things to be good or evil, not what we take those designations to mean. When we come to understand the conditions under which we act-that is, when we come to understand the sorts of beings that we are and the ways in which we interact with things in the world-then we can recast traditional moral notions in ways that help us to attain more of what we find to be valuable. For Spinoza, we find value in greater activity. Two hazards impede the search for value. First, we need to know and acquire the means to be good. In this respect, Spinoza's theory is a great deal like Hobbes's: we strive to be active, and in order to do so we need food, security, health, and other necessary components of a decent life. There is another hazard, however, that is more subtle. On Spinoza's theory of the passions, we can misjudge our own natures and fail to understand the sorts of beings that we really are. So we can misjudge what is good and might even seek ends that are evil. Spinoza's account of human nature is thus much deeper and darker than Hobbes's: we are not well known to ourselves, and the self-knowledge that is the foundation of virtue and freedom is elusive and fragile.

Baruch Spinoza's Ethics was published in 1677 just after his death. Along with Descartes's Meditations (1641) and Leibniz's mature essays (1685-1714) the Ethics is regarded as among the most important philosophical work of continental Early Modern Europe. In this guide, Michael LeBuffe follows the Ethics closely and helps readers to understand Spinoza's masterpiece for themselves. The Ethics is a hugely ambitious work that offers strong, controversial views on almost every aspect of philosophy. In a geometrical style, in which propositions build upon definitions and axioms, Spinoza contends that there is only one substance, God, and that everything that exists, including God and human beings, is subject to absolute necessity. Nevertheless, he also defends rich theories of human action and ethics. Spinoza maintains that we can and should work to overcome the harmful influence of passion and enjoy salvation and blessedness. LeBuffe includes an introduction designed to supply first time readers with enough background to study the text productively. He then devotes a chapter to each of the Ethics' five parts: on God, mind, the affects or emotions, human bondage, and human freedom. The guide focuses on one manageable part of Spinoza's dense argument at a time, pausing frequently to raise and consider questions for further research. This accessible guide to the Ethics will help readers to understand the challenging text and to develop their own sophisticated interpretations of Spinoza.

Baruch Spinoza's Ethics was published in 1677 just after his death. Along with Descartes's Meditations (1641) and Leibniz's mature essays (1685-1714) the Ethics is regarded as among the most important philosophical work of continental Early Modern Europe. In this guide, Michael LeBuffe follows the Ethics closely and helps readers to understand Spinoza's masterpiece for themselves. The Ethics is a hugely ambitious work that offers strong, controversial views on almost every aspect of philosophy. In a geometrical style, in which propositions build upon definitions and axioms, Spinoza contends that there is only one substance, God, and that everything that exists, including God and human beings, is subject to absolute necessity. Nevertheless, he also defends rich theories of human action and ethics. Spinoza maintains that we can and should work to overcome the harmful influence of passion and enjoy salvation and blessedness. LeBuffe includes an introduction designed to supply first time readers with enough background to study the text productively. He then devotes a chapter to each of the Ethics' five parts: on God, mind, the affects or emotions, human bondage, and human freedom. The guide focuses on one manageable part of Spinoza's dense argument at a time, pausing frequently to raise and consider questions for further research. This accessible guide to the Ethics will help readers to understand the challenging text and to develop their own sophisticated interpretations of Spinoza.