In late antiquity the works of Plato and Aristotle were subject to intense study, which eventually led to the development of a new literary form, the philosophical commentary. Until recently these commentaries were understood chiefly as sources of information for the masters - Plato and Aristotle - they commented upon. However, in recent years, it has become increasingly acknowledged that the commentators themselves - Aspasius, Alexander, Themistius, Porphyry, Proclus, Philoponus, Simplicius and others - even though they worked in the Platonist - Aristotelian framework, contributed to this tradition in original, innovative and significant ways such that their commentaries are philosophically important sources in their own right. This book provides the first systematic introduction to the 'philosophy' of the commentators: their way of doing philosophy and the kind of philosophical problems they found interesting.Although there was no philosophy of the commentators in the sense of a definite set of doctrines, Tuominen shows how the commentary format was nevertheless a vehicle for original philosophical theorizing and argues convincingly that the commentators should take their place alongside other philosophers of antiquity in the history of western philosophy.

In late antiquity the works of Plato and Aristotle were subject to intense study, which eventually led to the development of a new literary form, the philosophical commentary. Until recently these commentaries were understood chiefly as sources of information for the masters - Plato and Aristotle - they commented upon. However, in recent years, it has become increasingly acknowledged that the commentators themselves - Aspasius, Alexander, Themistius, Porphyry, Proclus, Philoponus, Simplicius and others - even though they worked in the Platonist - Aristotelian framework, contributed to this tradition in original, innovative and significant ways such that their commentaries are philosophically important sources in their own right. This book provides the first systematic introduction to the 'philosophy' of the commentators: their way of doing philosophy and the kind of philosophical problems they found interesting.Although there was no philosophy of the commentators in the sense of a definite set of doctrines, Tuominen shows how the commentary format was nevertheless a vehicle for original philosophical theorizing and argues convincingly that the commentators should take their place alongside other philosophers of antiquity in the history of western philosophy

If we know something, do we always know it through something else? Does this mean that the chain of knowledge should continue infinitely? Or, rather, should we abandon this approach and ask how we acquire knowledge? Irrespective of the fact that very basic questions concerning human knowledge have been formulated in various ways in different historical and philosophical contexts, philosophers have been surprisingly unanimous concerning the point that structures of knowledge should not be infinite. In order for there to be knowledge, there must be at least some primary elements which may be called starting points .

This book offers the first synoptic study of how the primary elements in knowledge structures were analysed in antiquity from Plato to late ancient commentaries, the main emphasis being on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. It argues that, in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, the question of starting points was treated from two distinct points of view: from the first perspective, as a question of how we acquire basic knowledge; and from the second perspective, as a question of the premises we may immediately accept in the line of argumentation. It was assumed that we acquire some general truths rather naturally and that these function as starting points for inquiry. In the Hellenistic period, an alternative approach was endorsed: the very possibility of knowledge became a central issue when sceptics began demanding that true claims should always be distinguishable from false ones."

If we know something, do we always know it through something else? Does this mean that the chain of knowledge should continue infinitely? Or, rather, should we abandon this approach and ask how we acquire knowledge? Irrespective of the fact that very basic questions concerning human knowledge have been formulated in various ways in different historical and philosophical contexts, philosophers have been surprisingly unanimous concerning the point that structures of knowledge should not be infinite. In order for there to be knowledge, there must be at least some primary elements which may be called a ~starting pointsa (TM).

This book offers the first synoptic study of how the primary elements in knowledge structures were analysed in antiquity from Plato to late ancient commentaries, the main emphasis being on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. It argues that, in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, the question of starting points was treated from two distinct points of view: from the first perspective, as a question of how we acquire basic knowledge; and from the second perspective, as a question of the premises we may immediately accept in the line of argumentation. It was assumed that we acquire some general truths rather naturally and that these function as starting points for inquiry. In the Hellenistic period, an alternative approach was endorsed: the very possibility of knowledge became a central issue when sceptics began demanding that true claims should always be distinguishable from false ones.

Suicide is a puzzling phenomenon. Not only is its demarcation problematic but it also eludes simple explanation. The cultures in which suicide mortality is high do not necessarily have much else in common, and neither is a single mental illness such as depression sufficient to lead a person to suicide. In a word, despite its statistical regularity, suicide is unpredictable on the individual level. The main argument emerging from this collection is that suicide should not be understood as a separate realm of pathological behavior but as a form of human action. As such it is always dependent on the decision that the individual makes in a cultural, ethical and socio-economic context, but the context never completely determines the decision. This book also argues that cultural narratives concerning suicide have a problematic double function: in addition to enabling the community to make sense of self-inflicted death, they also constitute a blueprint depicting suicide as a solution to common human problems.