In this comprehensive study, Gat looks at British policy in the period leading up to the Six-Day War. Although Britain holds center stage in this account, the study discusses in some detail American policy and its effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also focuses on the Middle East water dispute, its impact on future events, and eventually the outbreak of war in 1967. This is a fascinating look at the process by which the Middle East became yet another Cold War playground.

To date, most scholars on the Arab-Israeli conflict have focused on the events of the Six-Day War, rather than on the tumultuous years prior to the war. Gat is the first to examine this turbulent yet decisive chapter in the history of the Middle East within the context of the Cold War, while making extensive use of British, American, and Israeli archives.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956-1975 contains a collection of articles that examine select issues between the end of the Suez Campaign in November 1956 and the Sinai II, or Interim Agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt in September 1975. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the struggle between the three superpowers - the UK, the United States and the Soviet Union - and the effects this had on the region. It also explores the circumstances that led to the Six Day War in June 1967, such as the use of air power and the Israeli retaliatory raids. Two chapters look at the two leaders during the war: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the Arab world - a charismatic and dominant persona - and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, considered weak and inconspicuous. Three chapters focus on the period between the two wars - June 1967 and October 1973 - and one explores the aftermath. Emphasis is placed on Israeli policy between 1967 and 1973, which primarily focused on the use of military power and foreign policy inaction. It is argued that it was this policy that hindered all progress in the peace process, and ultimately led, among other factors, to the Yom Kippur War. The final chapter is on Kissinger and the road to the Sinai II Agreement. It discusses the huge shift in American policy - from avoiding a significant role in the prevention of an imminent war during May and June of 1967, to deep involvement in every detail of the dispute during and following the Yom Kippur War. Providing an in-depth examination of this important period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Middle Eastern History and Politics, Conflict Studies and International Relations.

In 1950 and 1951, more than 120,000 Jews left Iraq for Israel, most coming by air in the largest airlift in history. Scholars give various reasons for this exodus. Some point to the strength of Zionism amongst the Jews in Iraq whereas others blame the anti-Semitic policies of the Iraqi government. Yet others see the cause as a combination of Iraqi oppression and Zionist education.
Moshe Gat makes extensive use of the available official documents and primary sources to produce a thoroughly researched study of the extraordinary operation known as 'Ezra and Nehemiah'. He provides a background to these events and argues that both Iraqi discrimination and the actions of the Zionist underground in previous years played a part in the flight. The Denaturalization law of 1950 saw tens of thousands of Jews registering for emigration, and a bomb thrown at a synagogue in 1951 accelerated the exodus.

In 1950 and 1951, more than 120,000 Jews left Iraq for Israel, most coming by air in the largest airlift in history. Scholars give various reasons for this exodus. Some point to the strength of Zionism amongst the Jews in Iraq whereas others blame the anti-Semitic policies of the Iraqi government. Yet others see the cause as a combination of Iraqi oppression and Zionist education.
Moshe Gat makes extensive use of the available official documents and primary sources to produce a thoroughly researched study of the extraordinary operation known as 'Ezra and Nehemiah'. He provides a background to these events and argues that both Iraqi discrimination and the actions of the Zionist underground in previous years played a part in the flight. The Denaturalization law of 1950 saw tens of thousands of Jews registering for emigration, and a bomb thrown at a synagogue in 1951 accelerated the exodus.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956-1975 contains a collection of articles that examine select issues between the end of the Suez Campaign in November 1956 and the Sinai II, or Interim Agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt in September 1975. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the struggle between the three superpowers - the UK, the United States and the Soviet Union - and the effects this had on the region. It also explores the circumstances that led to the Six Day War in June 1967, such as the use of air power and the Israeli retaliatory raids. Two chapters look at the two leaders during the war: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the Arab world - a charismatic and dominant persona - and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, considered weak and inconspicuous. Three chapters focus on the period between the two wars - June 1967 and October 1973 - and one explores the aftermath. Emphasis is placed on Israeli policy between 1967 and 1973, which primarily focused on the use of military power and foreign policy inaction. It is argued that it was this policy that hindered all progress in the peace process, and ultimately led, among other factors, to the Yom Kippur War. The final chapter is on Kissinger and the road to the Sinai II Agreement. It discusses the huge shift in American policy - from avoiding a significant role in the prevention of an imminent war during May and June of 1967, to deep involvement in every detail of the dispute during and following the Yom Kippur War. Providing an in-depth examination of this important period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Middle Eastern History and Politics, Conflict Studies and International Relations.

This book examines British policy towards Italy from the fall of Mussolini on the 25th July 1943, to Italy's joining the North Atlantic alliance on the 4th April 1949.

The author shows that British policy as it was shaped prior to the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943 was designed to weaken Italy to such an extent that it would never be able to engage in future aggression and would be subject to British hegemony.

That Britain was unable to carry through this strategy rested on the simple truth that the strategy was in inverse proportion to Britain's military, economic and political power.

The Americans believed that any foreign hegemony would disturb the international status quo and sow the seeds of a future conflict. The Americans had additional historical and domestic considerations -- a large concentration of Italian Americans and an election year was coming up. This disagreement between the Allies was to some extent mitigated by the Soviet Union's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Italy in March 1944, and Churchill's visit to Italy in August 1944 marked the beginning of a change in British strategy, namely to prevent Italy turning communist and to retain it within the western sphere of influence.

Britain did not deny Italy's strategic importance to the west, but found it hard to accept Italy's transformation from being a hostile country fighting alongside Nazi Germany, to an ally fulfilling a vital, albeit secondary role in a western alliance.