This book examines British policy towards Italy from the fall of
Mussolini on the 25th July 1943, to Italy's joining the North
Atlantic alliance on the 4th April 1949.
The author shows that British policy as it was shaped prior to
the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943 was designed to
weaken Italy to such an extent that it would never be able to
engage in future aggression and would be subject to British
hegemony.
That Britain was unable to carry through this strategy rested on
the simple truth that the strategy was in inverse proportion to
Britain's military, economic and political power.
The Americans believed that any foreign hegemony would disturb
the international status quo and sow the seeds of a future
conflict. The Americans had additional historical and domestic
considerations -- a large concentration of Italian Americans and an
election year was coming up. This disagreement between the Allies
was to some extent mitigated by the Soviet Union's decision to
resume diplomatic relations with Italy in March 1944, and
Churchill's visit to Italy in August 1944 marked the beginning of a
change in British strategy, namely to prevent Italy turning
communist and to retain it within the western sphere of
influence.
Britain did not deny Italy's strategic importance to the west,
but found it hard to accept Italy's transformation from being a
hostile country fighting alongside Nazi Germany, to an ally
fulfilling a vital, albeit secondary role in a western
alliance.
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