The arms control initiatives which were begun by the superpowers symbolize the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but the passage of time has not resolved disputes about the role of arms control in preserving peace. Both international relations theorists and foreign policy practitioners must decide which security strategy is most appropriate for a post-Cold War world characterized by the decline in superpower hostility and the rise of regional rivalries; the rapid diffusion of knowledge-intensive technologies; and the increasingly complex relationships between political, military and economic issues. The essays in this volume address the question of how should arms control theory and policy be altered to improve the prospects for co-operation. They explore the complexity of national arms control decision-making and multilateral negotiations, and the challenges of reaching domestic and international agreement on verification.

A decade has passed since the superpowers began a series of arms control initiatives which now symbolize the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but the passage of time has not resolved disputes about the role of arms control in preserving peace. Both international relations theorists and foreign policy practitioners must decide which security strategy is most appropriate for a post-Cold War world characterized by the decline in superpower hostility and the rise of regional rivalries; the rapid diffusion of knowledge-intensive technologies; and the increasingly complex relationships between political, military, and economic issues.
How should arms control theory and policy be altered to improve the prospects for cooperation? The essays in this volume address this question by exploring the complexity of national arms control decision-making and multilateral negotiations, and the challenges of reaching domestic and international agreement on verification. Conscious that the gulf between theory and policy is growing at a time when the need for policy-friendly theory is greater than ever, the authors offer a range of jargon-free views from the academic and policy-making worlds, some arguing that growing interdependence creates both the need and the opportunity for a radical reorientation of arms control efforts, while others contend that increasing complexity in arms control problems still constrains what can be negotiated and ratified.

How to evaluate compliance is among the most difficult questions that arise during treaty negotiations and ratification debates. Arguments over verification principles and procedures are increasingly common for accords about the environment, human rights, and economics, but they have been especially important in the arena of national security. Nancy Gallagher explains, "In a world in which states face conflicting pressures to maximize military capabilities and negotiate mutual restraints, the prospects for arms control often hinge on verification... In the standard American formulation, verification is the 'critical element of arms control.'"

In "The Politics of Verification," Gallagher explores the causes of verification controversies and the processes through which they are perpetuated or provisionally resolved. By examining nuclear test ban negotiations from the Eisenhower through the Clinton administrations, Gallagher finds that the assumptions about verification that have dominated U.S. policy shape domestic debates in ways that hinder stable agreement on significant test restrictions. She focuses on the dynamic interconnections between domestic and international politics, and analyzes the slow process of coalition building when conflicting interests and ideas create divisions both among and inside states.

Gallagher concludes that the end of the Cold War has altered the arms control context without resolving basic questions about the appropriate amount and type of verification. Thus, the negotiation and ratification of major cooperative accords will continue to be shaped by verification compromises and coalitions.