This book seeks to extend the boundaries of aviation psychology in two interrelated ways: by broadening the focus of aviation psychology beyond the flight deck to the whole aviation system; and by discussing new theoretical developments which are shaping this applied discipline. A key feature of these theoretical advances is that they are grounded in a more developed, ecologically valid, understanding of practice. Among the issues addressed in this new integration of theory and practice are the following: what goes on in the flight deck is dependent on the wider organisational context; human factors issues in aircraft maintenance and grounding are critical to aviation safety; our capacity to learn from aviation accidents and incidents needs to be supported by more systematic human factors investigation and research; we must also develop our understanding of the human factors of accident survival as well as accident prevention; theories of crew coordination and decision making must be supported by an analysis of how decisions are actually made in the real world with all its stresses and constraints; training should be grounded in a thoroughgoing analysis of the complexity of the job and a full understanding of the training process itself. The text will be of interest to human factors researchers and practitioners in aviation and related areas. It will be of particular relevance to those who have a role in training, management or regulation throughout the aviation system.

The authors believe that a systematic organizational approach to aviation safety must replace the piecemeal approaches largely favoured in the past, but this change needs to be preceded by information to explain why a new approach is necessary. Accident records show a flattening of the safety curve since the early Seventies: instead of new kinds of accident, similar safety deficiencies have become recurrent features in accident reports. This suggests the need to review traditional accident prevention strategies, focused almost exclusively on the action or inaction's of front-line operational personnel. The organizational model proposed by the authors is one alternative means to pursue safety and prevention strategies in contemporary aviation; it is also applicable to other production systems. The model argues for a broadened approach, which considers the influence of all organizations (the blunt end ) involved in aviation operations, in addition to individual human performance (the sharp end ). If the concepts of systems safety and organizational accidents are to be advanced, aviation management at all levels must be aware of them. This book is intended to provide a bridge from the academic knowledge gained from research, to the needs of practitioners in aviation. It comprises six chapters: the fundamentals, background and justification for an organizational accident causation model to the flight deck, maintenance and air traffic control environments. The last chapter suggest different ways to apply the model as a prevention tool which furthermore enhances organizational effectiveness. The value of the organizational framework pioneered by Professor Reason in analyzing safety in high-technology production systems is felt by his co-authors to have an enduring role to play, both now and in coming decades. Applied now in this book, it has been adopted by ICAO, IFATCA, IMO, the US National Transportation Safety Board, the Transportation Safety B

The authors believe that a systematic organizational approach to aviation safety must replace the piecemeal approaches largely favoured in the past, but this change needs to be preceded by information to explain why a new approach is necessary. Accident records show a flattening of the safety curve since the early Seventies: instead of new kinds of accident, similar safety deficiencies have become recurrent features in accident reports. This suggests the need to review traditional accident prevention strategies, focused almost exclusively on the action or inaction's of front-line operational personnel. The organizational model proposed by the authors is one alternative means to pursue safety and prevention strategies in contemporary aviation; it is also applicable to other production systems. The model argues for a broadened approach, which considers the influence of all organizations (the blunt end ) involved in aviation operations, in addition to individual human performance (the sharp end ). If the concepts of systems safety and organizational accidents are to be advanced, aviation management at all levels must be aware of them. This book is intended to provide a bridge from the academic knowledge gained from research, to the needs of practitioners in aviation. It comprises six chapters: the fundamentals, background and justification for an organizational accident causation model to the flight deck, maintenance and air traffic control environments. The last chapter suggest different ways to apply the model as a prevention tool which furthermore enhances organizational effectiveness. The value of the organizational framework pioneered by Professor Reason in analyzing safety in high-technology production systems is felt by his co-authors to have an enduring role to play, both now and in coming decades. Applied now in this book, it has been adopted by ICAO, IFATCA, IMO, the US National Transportation Safety Board, the Transportation Safety B