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This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want
and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in
which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views
that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is
not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of
the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but
also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work
in social and developmental psychology. The investigation is
carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending
respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a
basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound
states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The
analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of
Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival
theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as
well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment
approach, two views popular in moral psychology. In the second part
of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is
developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on
which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been
conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the
requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting,
intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our
life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible. The
book will be of particular interest to philosophers and
psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention,
deliberation, decision and practical rationality.
This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want
and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in
which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views
that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is
not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of
the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but
also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work
in social and developmental psychology. The investigation is
carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending
respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a
basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound
states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The
analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of
Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival
theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as
well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment
approach, two views popular in moral psychology. In the second part
of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is
developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on
which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been
conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the
requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting,
intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our
life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible. The
book will be of particular interest to philosophers and
psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention,
deliberation, decision and practical rationality.
Kant claimed that the principal topics of philosophy all converge
on one question: "Was ist der Mensch?" Starting with the main claim
that conceptions of the human play a significant structuring role
in theory construction, the contributors in this volume investigate
the roles that conceptions of the human play both in philosophy and
in other human and social sciences. Renowned scholars from various
disciplines - philosophy, anthropology, psychology, literary
studies - discuss not only the relations between philosophicy and
empirical knowledge of the human being. In a rare dialogue between
Anglo-Saxon and German humananities, the contributors refer to each
other and take up questions of their co-contributors. Thus,
controversial, cross-disciplinary debates develop, arise providing
new arguments and insights to a question which is methodologically
prior to that posed by Kant: How can conceptions of the human be
justified?
What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a
question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical
debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and
sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human
capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if
so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how
fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and
empirical conditions. Also discussed are the exact roles that
relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy
and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in
bringing together the key participants in the various discussions
of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts
and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and
empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will
appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and
cultural studies.
What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a
question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical
debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and
sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human
capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if
so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how
fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and
empirical conditions. Also discussed are the exact roles that
relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy
and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in
bringing together the key participants in the various discussions
of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts
and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and
empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will
appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and
cultural studies.
It is often claimed that humans are rational, linguistic, cultural,
or moral creatures. What these characterizations may all have in
common is the more fundamental claim that humans are normative
animals, in the sense that they are creatures whose lives are
structured at a fundamental level by their relationships to norms.
The various capacities singled out by discussion of rational,
linguistic, cultural, or moral animals might then all essentially
involve an orientation to obligations, permissions and
prohibitions. And, if this is so, then perhaps it is a basic
susceptibility, or proclivity to normative or deontic regulation of
thought and behaviour that enables humans to develop the various
specific features of their life form. This volume of new essays
investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative
animals in this sense. The contributors do so by looking at the
nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative
norms-social, moral, and linguistic-and asking whether they might
all be different expressions of one basic structure unique to
humankind. These questions are posed by philosophers,
primatologists, behavioural biologists, psychologists, linguists,
and cultural anthropologists, who have collaborated on this topic
for many years. The contributors are committed to the idea that
understanding normativity is a two-way process, involving a close
interaction between conceptual clarification and empirical
research.
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