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Presents a study in philosophical methodology aimed at providing a
view of the scope and limits of philosophical inquiry.
The future obviously matters to us. It is, after all, where we'll
be spending the rest of our lives. We need some degree of foresight
if we are to make effective plans for managing our affairs. Much
that we would like to know in advance cannot be predicted. But a
vast amount of successful prediction is nonetheless possible,
especially in the context of applied sciences such as medicine,
meteorology, and engineering. This book examines our prospects for
finding out about the future in advance. It addresses questions
such as why prediction is possible in some areas and not others;
what sorts of methods and resources make successful prediction
possible; and what obstacles limit the predictive venture.
Nicholas Rescher develops a general theory of prediction that
encompasses its fundamental principles, methodology, and practice
and gives an overview of its promises and problems. Predicting the
future considers the anthropological and historical background of
the predictive enterprise. It also examines the conceptual,
epistemic, and ontological principles that set the stage for
predictive efforts. In short, Rescher explores the basic features
of the predictive situation and considers their broader
implications in science, in philosophy, and in the management of
our daily affairs.
A comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge. Guided by
the founding ideas of American pragmatism, Epistemology provides a
clear example of the basic concepts involved in knowledge
acquisition and explains the principles at work in the development
of rational inquiry. It examines how these principles analyze the
course of scientific progress and how the development of scientific
inquiry inevitably encounters certain natural disasters. At the
center of the book's deliberations there lies not only the
potential for scientific progress but also the limit of science as
well. This comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge
addresses a myriad of topics, including the critique of skepticism,
the nature of rationality, the possibility of science for
extraterrestrial intelligences, and the prospect of insoluble
issues in science.
Originally published in 1966. Professor Rescher's aim is to develop
a "logic of commands" in exactly the same general way which
standard logic has already developed a "logic of truth-functional
statement compounds" or a "logic of quantifiers". The object is to
present a tolerably accurate and precise account of the logically
relevant facets of a command, to study the nature of "inference" in
reasonings involving commands, and above all to establish a viable
concept of validity in command inference, so that the logical
relationships among commands can be studied with something of the
rigour to which one is accustomed in other branches of logic.
In a world of information technologies, genetic engineering,
controversies about established science, and the mysteries of
quantum physics, it is at once seemingly impossible and absolutely
vital to find ways to make sense of how science, technology, and
society connect. In Feedback Loops: Pragmatism about Science &
Technology, editors Andrew Wells Garnar and Ashley Shew bring
together original writing from philosophers and science and
technology studies scholars to provide novel ways of rethinking the
relationships between science, technology, education, and society.
Through critiquing and exploring the work of philosopher of science
and technology Joseph C. Pitt, the authors featured in this volume
explore the complexities of contemporary technoscience, writing on
topics ranging from super-computing to pedagogy, engineering to
biotechnology patents, and scientific instruments to disability
studies. Taken together, these chapters develop an argument about
the necessity of using pragmatism to foster a more productive
relationship between science, technology and society.
Since C. S. Pierce advocated a pragmatic approach to truth and
knowledge, it has been one of the characteristic themes of American
philosophy. This book examines how pragmatism's central ideas can
be applied and implemented across the entire domain of
philosophical deliberations, ranging from theory of knowledge and
the value theory to providing explanations for human actions, and
even to matters of ethics and religion. While there are various
ways in which to weigh the merit of a philosophical idea or theory,
this book makes the case that an assessment of that theory s
applicative utility is of the essence. The intersection of the
theoretical and the practical is where meaningful philosophizing
finds its legs, and Rescher s unique pragmatically oriented
analyses of traditional philosophical us to regard some
historically prominent philosophical ideas in a new and revealing
light."
Concept auditing is based on an innovative premise for
philosophers: when they address an everyday life conception on the
order of knowledge, truth, justice, fairness, beauty, or the like
and purport to be dealing with what it involves, then they must
honor the existing meanings of these terms. And insofar as the
prevailing meaning is being contravened, they must explain how and
justify why this is being done. They must, in sum, explain how
their treatment of a topic relates to our established
pre-systematic understanding of the issues involved and relate
their deliberations to the prevailing conception of the matter they
are proposing to discuss. The aim of a concept audit is to consider
to what extent a given philosophical discussion honors this
communicative obligation. Concept Audits sets out not only to
explain and defend this procedure, but also to consider a host of
applications and exemplifications of these ideas. Nicholas Rescher
shows how this method of conceptual auditing can function to
elucidate and evaluate philosophical theses and doctrine across a
wide spectrum of issues, ranging from logic to ethics and
metaphysics. Accordingly, he explains and illustrates an
instructive innovation in philosophical method. This new study of
philosophical methodology presents its method in a clear and
convincing way and shows the method at work with respect to a wide
spectrum of important philosophical issues.
In theory and practice, the notion of fairness is far from simple.
The principle is often elusive and subject to confusion, even in
institutions of law, usage, and custom. In Fairness, Nicholas
Rescher aims to liberate this concept from misunderstandings by
showing how its definitive characteristics prevent it from being
absorbed by such related conceptions as paternalistic benevolence,
radical egalitarianism, and social harmonization. Rescher
demonstrates that equality before the state is an instrument of
justice, not of social utility or public welfare, and argues that
the notion of fairness stops well short of a literal
egalitarianism. Rescher disposes of the confusions arising from
economists' penchant to focus on individual preferences, from
decision theorists' concern for averting envy, and from political
theorists' sympathy for egalitarianism. In their place he shows how
the idea of distributive equity forms the core of the concept of
fairness in matters of distributive justice. The coordination of
shares with valid claims is the crux of the concept of fairness. In
Rescher's view, this means that the pursuit of fairness requires
objective rather than subjective evaluation of the goods being
shared. This is something quite different from subjective equity
based on the personal evaluation of goods by those laying claim to
them. Insofar as subjective equity is a concern, the appropriate
procedure for its realization is a process of maximum value
distribution. Further, Rescher demonstrates that in matters of
distributive justice, the distinction between new ownership and
preexisting ownership is pivotal and calls for proceeding on very
different principles depending on the case. How one should proceed
depends on context, and what is adjudged fair is pragmatic, in that
there are different requirements for effectiveness in achieving the
aims and purposes of the sort of distribution that is intended.
Rescher concludes that fairness is a fundamentally ethical concept.
Its distinctive modus operandi contrasts sharply with the aims of
paternalism, preference-maximizing, or economic advantage. Fairness
will be of interest to philosophers, economists, and political
scientists.
Epistemology is more than the theory of knowledge. Its range of
concern includes not only knowledge proper but also rational
belief, probability, plausibility, evidentiation, and not least,
erotetics, the business of raising and resolving questions.
Aristotle indicated that human inquiry is grounded in wonder; when
matters are so out of the ordinary we puzzle about the reason why
and seek for an explanation. With increasing sophistication, the
ordinary as well as the extraordinary excites the intellect, so
that questions gain an increasing prominence within epistemology.
Inquiry Dynamics focuses on the phenomena and theory of rational
inquiry, focusing on its concern for questions and their
management. An introductory chapter lays the groundwork of the
book's deliberations, followed by chapter 2, explaining the basic
concepts involved in the abstract logic of questions and answers
and sets out the generic fundamentals of the domain. Chapters 3 and
4 expound the theoretical principles that characterize the field of
question epistemology in general, clarifying the fundamental themes
and theses of the subject. Chapters 5 through 9 then explore the
landscape of question epistemology within science. Rescher seeks to
show that there are limits-restrictions of basic principle-to our
ability to resolve scientific questions. The concluding chapter
argues in particular that the grand goal of an ultimate theory, one
resolving all explanatory questions, has to be approached with
great caution. Throughout Rescher emphasizes that a
question-oriented approach to the process of inquiry serves to
highlight the inherent limitations of the cognitive project.
Rescher's question-oriented treatment of epistemology proceeds in
the tradition of Kant and stands in decided contrast to the
dominant knowledge-oriented approach originating with Descartes. He
demonstrates that a concern for the issue of plausible question
resolution is a necessary component of the epistemological
enterprise. Inquiry Dynamics will be of interest to philosophers,
scientists, and social scientists.
This book presents a nonstandard approach to epistemology. Where
standard epistemology generally focuses on the certain knowledge
the Greeks called episteme, the present focus is on some less
assured modes of information. Its deliberations will focus on such
cognitively suboptimal processes as conjecture, guesswork, and
plausible supposition. This shift of focus has implications for
virtually every sector of information management, and the book's
instigations presented here will explore some of them. Throughout
the rule of pragmatic considerations stand in the foreground.As the
book's deliberations set out in detail, the nature of our knowledge
of reality is inherently conditioned by the fact of its beings the
product of what is, at best and at most, a matter of rational
guesswork. And so as regards our knowledge, we had best adopt the
pragmatic optimism of expecting-and hoping-that our best is good
enough.
Thought experimentation has been a staple of philosophical
methodology since classical antiquity, when Xenophanes of Colophon
speculated that if horses had gods, they would be equine in form.
Nicholas Rescher's What If? undertakes a systematic survey of the
role and utility of thought experiments in philosophy. After
surveying the historical issues, Rescher examines the principles
involved, and explains the conditions under which thought
experimentation can validly yield instructive results in
philosophy. The reader gains understanding of the differences
between scientific and philosophical experiments. What If? begins
by examining the nature of thought experiments. It presents an
overview of how thought experiments have figured in natural science
and in historical studies, before moving on to examine how they
function as an instrument of philosophical inquiry. After examining
thought experiments from the pre-Socratics to the present day,
Rescher turns from history to analysis, and examines the modes of
reasoning involved in the use of speculative hypotheses in
philosophical problem solving. He shows the limitations of
speculative ontology, showing that thought experimentation can lead
readily to paradox in a way that increasingly diminishes its
usefulness. The book concludes by arguing and illustrating how and
when it becomes pointless to push speculation, or thought
experimentation beyond the limits of intelligibility and cogent
sense. Among the principal features of Rescher's book is its
elaborate analysis of the appropriate conditions for philosophical
thought experimentation. Its cardinal thesis is that there indeed
are limits to the appropriateness of this important methodological
resource and that transgressing these limits destroys the prospect
of drawing any valid lessons for the philosophical enterprise. What
If? will be of interest to philosophers, students of philosophy,
and theorists of logic and reasoning.
Concept auditing is based on an innovative premise for
philosophers: when they address an everyday life conception on the
order of knowledge, truth, justice, fairness, beauty, or the like
and purport to be dealing with what it involves, then they must
honor the existing meanings of these terms. And insofar as the
prevailing meaning is being contravened, they must explain how and
justify why this is being done. They must, in sum, explain how
their treatment of a topic relates to our established
pre-systematic understanding of the issues involved and relate
their deliberations to the prevailing conception of the matter they
are proposing to discuss. The aim of a concept audit is to consider
to what extent a given philosophical discussion honors this
communicative obligation. Concept Audits sets out not only to
explain and defend this procedure, but also to consider a host of
applications and exemplifications of these ideas. Nicholas Rescher
shows how this method of conceptual auditing can function to
elucidate and evaluate philosophical theses and doctrine across a
wide spectrum of issues, ranging from logic to ethics and
metaphysics. Accordingly, he explains and illustrates an
instructive innovation in philosophical method. This new study of
philosophical methodology presents its method in a clear and
convincing way and shows the method at work with respect to a wide
spectrum of important philosophical issues.
Paradoxes--sets of propositions that are individually plausible but
collectively inconsistent--range from transparent tricks of
word-play to more puzzling issues. For example, if the barber, an
adult male in the village, shaves all adult males who do not shave
themselves, then he both shaves himself and does not shave himself.
In this fresh and uncluttered approach, Nicholas Rescher introduces
the subject, surveys the entire range of types of paradoxes, and
introduces an integrated theory of paradoxes. He explains and
analyzes over 130 paradoxes, showing how they can all be handled by
one approach.
The prime intent of Cognitive Complications is one of innovation.
Rescher addresses issues that are under-examined in the present
state of discussion, their inherent interest notwithstanding. The
linking thread of these investigations is their pragmatic
dimension, inherent in the idea that rational inquiry is itself a
practice-albeit one that functions in the ideationally cognitive
rather than physically manipulative realm. And as a practice it has
its aims and functions which in their turn provide for the
standards of adequacy and efficacy that establish the
criteriological norms of our cognitive proceedings.
First published in 1992. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor &
Francis, an informa company.
This second edition of Free Will presents a complete treatment of
the history of the debate over whether humans have free will. It
analyses the conditions under which actions must be characterized
as unfree, and explores whether recent findings in brain physiology
counter-indicate free will. Nicholas Rescher leads the reader
through a conceptual web of distinctions that, taken together,
provide a satisfying contribution to philosophical thought on free
will. To determine if humans have free will, Rescher first examines
exactly what free will is and how it should function. He examines
the role of nature, nurture, and free choice, and he concludes that
it is possible to validate the compatibility between freedom of the
will and a certain special mode of determinism. Rescher sharpens
his highly conceptual assessment by making distinctions between
productive (or metaphysical) and moral (or motivational) freedom.
He also distinguishes between free decision and free action, and
motivational and causal determination of choices. In addition, he
considers the distinction between durational events and the
instantaneous outcomes that mark their commencements and
completions, as well as between pre-determination and determination
based on precedence. New in paperback and completely revised, this
edition of Free Will represents a leading contemporary philosopher
in top form.
The definitive mission of metaphilosophy is to facilitate an
understanding of how philosophy works-the aim of the enterprise,
the instrumental and procedural resources for its work, and the
prospect of its success. Nicholas Rescher unites two facets of
metaphilosophy to show that historical perspective and
forward-thinking normative, or systematic, metaphilosophy cannot be
independent of one another. The descriptive, or historical,
metaphilosophy provides an account of what has been thought
regarding the conduct of philosophical inquiry, and the
prescriptive, or normative, metaphilosophy which deliberates about
what is to be thought regarding the conduct of philosophizing.
Rescher argues that metaphilosophy forms a part of philosophy
itself. This is a unique feature of the discipline since the
philosophy of biology is not a part of biology and the philosophy
of mathematics is not a part of mathematics. Ultimately, the
salient features of philosophizing in general-including the
inherently controversial and discordant nature of philosophical
doctrines-are also bound to afflict metaphilosophy. Thus, only by a
careful analysis of the central issues can a plausible view of the
enterprise be developed. Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in
Philosophical Perspective challenges the static, compartmentalized
view of metaphilosophy, providing insight for scholars and students
of all areas of philosophy.
Our world is enormously sophisticated and nature's complexity is
literally inexhaustible. As a result, projects to describe and
explain natural science can never be completed. This volume
explores the nature of complexity and considers its bearing on our
world and how we manage our affairs within it. Rescher's overall
lesson is that the management of our affairs within a socially,
technologically, and cognitively complex environment is plagued
with vast management problems and risks of mishap. In primitive
societies, failure to understand how things work can endanger a
family or, at worst, a clan or tribe. In the modern world, man-made
catastrophes on the model of Chernobyl can endanger millions,
possibly even risking the totality of human life on our planet.
Rescher explains "technological escalation" as a sort of arms race
against nature in which scientific progress requires more powerful
technology for observation and experimentation, and, conversely,
scientific progress requires the continual enhancement of
technology. The increasing complexity of science and technology
(and, in consequence, of social systems) along with problems
growing faster than solutions confront us with major management and
decision problems. This study is the first of its kind. There have
been many specialized studies of complexity in physics and
computation theory, but no overall analysis of the phenomenon.
Although Rescher offers a sobering outlook, he also believes that
complexity entails mixed blessings: our imperfect knowledge
provides a rationale for putting forth our best efforts. Rescher
urges us to gear the conduct of life's practical affairs to the
demands of a complex world. This highly readable and accessible
volume will be of interest to those interested in philosophy, the
philosophy of science, science policy studies, and future studies.
The realities of mankind's cognitive situation are such that our
knowledge of the world's ways is bound to be imperfect. None the
less, the theory of unknowability agnoseology as some have called
it is a rather underdeveloped branch of philosophy. In this
philosophically rich and groundbreaking work, Nicholas Rescher aims
to remedy this. As the heart of the discussion is an examination of
what Rescher identifies as the four prime reasons for the
impracticability of cognitive access to certain facts about the
world: developmental inpredictability, verificational surdity,
ontological detail, and predicative vagrancy. Rescher provides a
detailed and illuminating account of the role of each of these
factors in limiting human knowledge, giving us an overall picture
of the practical and theoretical limits to our capacity to know our
world.
Nicholas Rescher's book Axiogenesis: An Essay in Metaphysical
Optimalism is a detailed exposition of axiogenerts: the
philosophical theory seeking to explain the world's facts on the
basis of evaluative considerations. In classical antiquity, this
theory was espoused by Plato (in the Timaeus) and neo-Platonic
tradition; in early modern times, it was revived by Leibniz and
continued to find favor in the development of rational mechanics
from Maupertuis to William Hamilton. However, since then the
principles behind axiogenesis and similar theories have fallen out
of fashion. This book is therefore unique in that it argues in
detail that this metaphysical approach still has traction and
endeavors to formulate the theory in a manner that makes it
available as a live option for contemporary thinkers. Advanced
students of philosophy and professionals in this field, as well as
anyone interested in the issue of speculative metaphysics, will
find Rescher's contemporary refashioning of axiogenesis a
distinctly compelling read.
The realities of mankind's cognitive situation are such that our
knowledge of the world's ways is bound to be imperfect. None the
less, the theory of unknowability--agnoseology as some have called
it--is a rather underdeveloped branch of philosophy. In this
philosophically rich and groundbreaking work, Nicholas Rescher aims
to remedy this. As the heart of the discussion is an examination of
what Rescher identifies as the four prime reasons for the
impracticability of cognitive access to certain facts about the
world: developmental inpredictability, verificational surdity,
ontological detail, and predicative vagrancy. Rescher provides a
detailed and illuminating account of the role of each of these
factors in limiting human knowledge, giving us an overall picture
of the practical and theoretical limits to our capacity to know our
world.
Originally published in 1966. Professor Rescher's aim is to develop
a "logic of commands" in exactly the same general way which
standard logic has already developed a "logic of truth-functional
statement compounds" or a "logic of quantifiers". The object is to
present a tolerably accurate and precise account of the logically
relevant facets of a command, to study the nature of "inference" in
reasonings involving commands, and above all to establish a viable
concept of validity in command inference, so that the logical
relationships among commands can be studied with something of the
rigour to which one is accustomed in other branches of logic.
Thought experimentation has been a staple of philosophical
methodology since classical antiquity, when Xenophanes of Colophon
speculated that if horses had gods, they would be equine in form.
Nicholas Rescher's "What If?" undertakes a systematic survey of the
role and utility of thought experiments in philosophy. After
surveying the historical issues, Rescher examines the principles
involved, and explains the conditions under which thought
experimentation can validly yield instructive results in
philosophy. The reader gains understanding of the differences
between scientific and philosophical experiments. "What If?" begins
by examining the nature of thought experiments. It presents an
overview of how thought experiments have figured in natural science
and in historical studies, before moving on to examine how they
function as an instrument of philosophical inquiry. After examining
thought experiments from the pre-Socratics to the present day,
Rescher turns from history to analysis, and examines the modes of
reasoning involved in the use of speculative hypotheses in
philosophical problem solving. He shows the limitations of
speculative ontology, showing that thought experimentation can lead
readily to paradox in a way that increasingly diminishes its
usefulness. The book concludes by arguing and illustrating how and
when it becomes pointless to push speculation, or thought
experimentation beyond the limits of intelligibility and cogent
sense. Among the principal features of Rescher's book is its
elaborate analysis of the appropriate conditions for philosophical
thought experimentation. Its cardinal thesis is that there indeed
are limits to the appropriateness of this important methodological
resource and that transgressing these limits destroys the prospect
of drawing any valid lessons for the philosophical enterprise.
"What If?" will be of interest to philosophers, students of
philosophy, and theorists of logic and reasoning.
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Blu-ray disc
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Discovery Miles 450
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