In this wide-ranging and compelling set of essays, Nigel Tubbs illustrates how a philosophical notion of education lies at the heart of Hegelian philosophy and employs it to critique some of the stereotypes and misreadings from which Hegel often suffers. With chapters on philosophical education in relation to life and death, self and other, subject and substance, and to Derrida and Levinas in particular, Tubbs brings Hegelian education - read as recollection - to bear on modern social and political relations. He argues, in sum, that Hegelian philosophy comprehended in terms of education yields a theory of self and other that can inform and reform relations between rich and poor, West and East. Finally, the book addresses the most controversial aspect of any defence of Hegel, namely the comprehension of the absolute and its imperialist implications for Western history. The author argues passionately that through a notion of philosophical education Hegel teaches us not to avoid the dilemmas that are endemic to modern Western power and mastery when trying to comprehend some of our most pressing human concerns. >

Named by Rowan Williams as one of his Books of the Year (2021) in the New Statesman. Socrates On Trial tells of Socrates's return to a modern city that is plagued by prejudice, privilege and populism. On resuming his questioning in the agora he is arrested, interrogated by his prosecutors, questioned by his Judge, and confessed to by his inquisitor. On a Festival Day, he explores a new model for the just city --a city based not on mastery but on learning --before offering a new apology to the court that will, once again, decide his fate. This new/old Socrates offers the city a renewed vision of justice by reconceptualizing the meaning and significance of thinking and education. From the force of Socratic questioning, he unfolds a different logic of truth, freedom, and justice. His conversations exert a gravitational force that draws key cultural elements of the city -- property, wealth, money, family, essence, gendered and racialized identities, production, distribution and consumption -- into its educational orbit. At stake here is the vulnerability of modern democracy to authoritarian leaders and their sponsors. Influenced by sophisticated propaganda people's frustration with democracy is channeled into visceral anger on the one hand, and into disillusioned scepticism and cynicism on the other. Belief in truth and education collapses in exhaustion and fatigue, caught in the headlights of seemingly irresolvable and petrifying rational paradoxes that block all paths to social justice. Socrates On Trial, describing the return of Socrates to the modern city, heralds a new education for such a city.

At about the age of 13 I began to realise that my formal education was separating itself off from my philosophical education. Of course, at the time I did not know it in this way. I experienced it as a split between what I was being taught and my experience of what I was being taught. It was, I now know, the philosophical experience of formal schooling. It was not until beginning the study of sociology at 16 that I came across the idea of dualisms-pairs of opposites that always appeared together but were never reconciled. In sociology it was the dualism of the individual and society. The question most asked in our classes was always regarding which aspect of the dualism dominated the other. The answer we always leaned towards was that both were mutually affected by the other. The answer seemed to lie somewhere in the middle. It was only at university, first as an undergraduate and then as a postgraduate, that I came across the idea of the dialectic. Slowly I began to recognise that the dualisms which plagued social theory-I and we, self and other, good and evil, modernity and post-modernity, autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and nature, truth and relativism, and so many more-were not only dialectical in being thought about, but also that the thought of them being dialectical had an even stranger quality. It was the same experience as being at school.

Published in 1997, this books is an examination of the determination of the concept of enlightenment, and related notions, within modern social relations. The work opens up innovative areas of research into the relationship between philosophy, social relations, and education. It applies Gillian Rose's work on "the broken middle" of Hegelian philosophy to social and educational theorizing. It offers a critique of the idea of enlightenment, and of the identity of the teacher in social theory - Rousseau, Marx and Durkheim - in critical theory - Habermas and Adorno - in "postmodernism" - Foucalt and Nietzsche - and in a variety of educational and pedagogical theories. The book concludes with an original application of Hegelian speculative philosophy to the teacher/student relationship. This work challenges those working in social theory and in education to comprehend the contradictions on their theorising as a shared philosophical consciousness, a shared "broken middle".

The Western tradition has long held the view that while it is possible to know that God exists, it nevertheless remains impossible to know what God is. The ineffability of the monotheistic God extends to each of the Abrahamic faiths. In this volume, Tubbs considers Aristotle's logic of mastery and questions the assumptions upon which God's ineffability rests. Part I explores the tensions between the philosophical definition of the One as "thought thinking itself" (the Aristotelian concept of noesis noeseos) and the educational vocation of the individual as "know thyself" (gnothi seuton). Identifying vulnerabilities in the logic of mastery, Tubbs puts forth an original logic of education, which he calls modern metaphysics, or a logic of learning and education. Part II explores this new educational logic of the divine as a "logic of tears," as a "dreadful religious teacher," and as a way to cohere the three Abrahamic faiths in an educational concept of monotheism.

The Western tradition has long held the view that while it is possible to know that God exists, it nevertheless remains impossible to know what God is. The ineffability of the monotheistic God extends to each of the Abrahamic faiths. In this volume, Tubbs considers Aristotle's logic of mastery and questions the assumptions upon which God's ineffability rests. Part I explores the tensions between the philosophical definition of the One as "thought thinking itself" (the Aristotelian concept of noesis noeseos) and the educational vocation of the individual as "know thyself" (gnothi seuton). Identifying vulnerabilities in the logic of mastery, Tubbs puts forth an original logic of education, which he calls modern metaphysics, or a logic of learning and education. Part II explores this new educational logic of the divine as a "logic of tears," as a "dreadful religious teacher," and as a way to cohere the three Abrahamic faiths in an educational concept of monotheism.

Published in 1997, this books is an examination of the determination of the concept of enlightenment, and related notions, within modern social relations. The work opens up innovative areas of research into the relationship between philosophy, social relations, and education. It applies Gillian Rose's work on "the broken middle" of Hegelian philosophy to social and educational theorizing. It offers a critique of the idea of enlightenment, and of the identity of the teacher in social theory - Rousseau, Marx and Durkheim - in critical theory - Habermas and Adorno - in "postmodernism" - Foucalt and Nietzsche - and in a variety of educational and pedagogical theories. The book concludes with an original application of Hegelian speculative philosophy to the teacher/student relationship. This work challenges those working in social theory and in education to comprehend the contradictions on their theorising as a shared philosophical consciousness, a shared "broken middle".

At about the age of 13 I began to realise that my formal education was separating itself off from my philosophical education. Of course, at the time I did not know it in this way. I experienced it as a split between what I was being taught and my experience of what I was being taught. It was, I now know, the philosophical experience of formal schooling. It was not until beginning the study of sociology at 16 that I came across the idea of dualisms-pairs of opposites that always appeared together but were never reconciled. In sociology it was the dualism of the individual and society. The question most asked in our classes was always regarding which aspect of the dualism dominated the other. The answer we always leaned towards was that both were mutually affected by the other. The answer seemed to lie somewhere in the middle. It was only at university, first as an undergraduate and then as a postgraduate, that I came across the idea of the dialectic. Slowly I began to recognise that the dualisms which plagued social theory-I and we, self and other, good and evil, modernity and post-modernity, autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and nature, truth and relativism, and so many more-were not only dialectical in being thought about, but also that the thought of them being dialectical had an even stranger quality. It was the same experience as being at school.

Named by Rowan Williams as one of his Books of the Year (2021) in the New Statesman. Socrates On Trial tells of Socrates's return to a modern city that is plagued by prejudice, privilege and populism. On resuming his questioning in the agora he is arrested, interrogated by his prosecutors, questioned by his Judge, and confessed to by his inquisitor. On a Festival Day, he explores a new model for the just city --a city based not on mastery but on learning --before offering a new apology to the court that will, once again, decide his fate. This new/old Socrates offers the city a renewed vision of justice by reconceptualizing the meaning and significance of thinking and education. From the force of Socratic questioning, he unfolds a different logic of truth, freedom, and justice. His conversations exert a gravitational force that draws key cultural elements of the city -- property, wealth, money, family, essence, gendered and racialized identities, production, distribution and consumption -- into its educational orbit. At stake here is the vulnerability of modern democracy to authoritarian leaders and their sponsors. Influenced by sophisticated propaganda people's frustration with democracy is channeled into visceral anger on the one hand, and into disillusioned scepticism and cynicism on the other. Belief in truth and education collapses in exhaustion and fatigue, caught in the headlights of seemingly irresolvable and petrifying rational paradoxes that block all paths to social justice. Socrates On Trial, describing the return of Socrates to the modern city, heralds a new education for such a city.

In this wide-ranging and compelling set of essays, Nigel Tubbs illustrates how a philosophical notion of education lies at the heart of Hegelian philosophy and employs it to critique some of the stereotypes and misreadings from which Hegel often suffers. With chapters on philosophical education in relation to life and death, self and other, subject and substance, and to Derrida and Levinas in particular, Tubbs brings Hegelian education - read as recollection - to bear on modern social and political relations. He argues, in sum, that Hegelian philosophy comprehended in terms of education yields a theory of self and other that can inform and reform relations between rich and poor, West and East. Finally, the book addresses the most controversial aspect of any defence of Hegel, namely the comprehension of the absolute and its imperialist implications for Western history. The author argues passionately that through a notion of philosophical education Hegel teaches us not to avoid the dilemmas that are endemic to modern Western power and mastery when trying to comprehend some of our most pressing human concerns.