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This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to
clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used
effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile
applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of
success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic
sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what
conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by
offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to
disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the
success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic
penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this
book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic
statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while
the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state
is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt
to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case
studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to
obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors
demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in
regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases,
such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to
students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and
international security in general.
The essays here address the relationship between economic
interdependence and international conflict, the political economy
of economic sanctions, and the role of economic incentives in
international statecraft.
This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to
clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used
effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile
applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of
success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic
sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what
conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by
offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to
disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the
success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic
penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this
book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic
statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while
the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state
is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt
to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case
studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to
obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors
demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in
regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases,
such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to
students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and
international security in general.
The essays here address the relationship between economic
interdependence and international conflict, the political economy
of economic sanctions, and the role of economic incentives in
international statecraft.
In Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below, Norrin M. Ripsman
explains how regional rivals make peace and how outside actors can
encourage regional peacemaking. Through a qualitative empirical
analysis of all the regional rivalries that terminated in peace
treaties in the twentieth century-including detailed case studies
of the Franco-German, Egyptian-Israeli, and Israeli-Jordanian peace
settlements-Ripsman concludes that efforts to encourage peacemaking
that focus on changing the attitudes of the rival societies or
democratizing the rival polities to enable societal input into
security policy are unlikely to achieve peace.Prior to a peace
treaty, he finds, peacemaking is driven by states, often against
intense societal opposition, for geostrategic reasons or to
preserve domestic power. After a formal treaty has been concluded,
the stability of peace depends on societal buy-in through
mechanisms such as bilateral economic interdependence,
democratization of former rivals, cooperative regional
institutions, and transfers of population or territory. Society is
largely irrelevant to the first stage but is critical to the
second. He draws from this analysis a lesson for contemporary
policy. Western governments and international organizations have
invested heavily in efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian and
Indo-Pakistani peace by promoting democratic values, economic
exchanges, and cultural contacts between the opponents. Such
attempts to foster peace are likely to waste resources until such
time as formal peace treaties are concluded between longtime
adversaries.
Since Gideon Rose's 1998 review article in the journal World
Politics and especially following the release of Lobell, Ripsman,
and Taliaferro's 2009 edited volume Neoclassical Realism, the
State, and Foreign Policy, neoclassical realism has emerged as
major theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy on both
sides of the Atlantic. Proponents of neoclassical realism claim
that it is the logical extension of the Kenneth Waltz's structural
realism into the realm of foreign policy. In Neoclassical Realist
Theory of International Relations, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell argue that neoclassical realism is
far more than an extension of Waltz's structural realism or an
effort to update the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, E.H.
Carr, and Henry Kissinger with the language of modern social
science. Rejecting the artificial distinction that Waltz draws
between theories of international politics and theories of foreign
policy, the authors contend neoclassical realism can explain and
predict phenomena ranging from short-term crisis-behavior, to
foreign policy, to patterns of grand strategic adjustment by
individual states up to long-term patterns of international
outcomes. It is, therefore, a more powerful theory of international
politics than structural realism. Yet it is also a more intuitively
satisfying approach than liberal Innenpolitik theories or
constructivism. The authors detail the variables and assumptions of
neoclassical realist theory, address various aspects of theory
construction and methodology, lay out the areas of convergence and
sharp disagreement with other leading theoretical approaches -
liberalism, constructivism, analytic eclecticism, and foreign
policy analysis (FPA) -- and demonstrate how neoclassical realist
theory can be used to resolve longstanding puzzles and debates in
international relations theory.
This book moves scholarly debates beyond the old question of
whether or not international institutions matter in order to
examine how they matter, even in a world of power politics. Power
politics and international institutions are often studied as two
separate domains, but this is in need of rethinking because today
most states strategically use institutions to further their
interests. Anders Wivel, T.V. Paul, and the international group of
contributing authors update our understanding of how institutions
are viewed among the major theoretical paradigms in international
relations, and they seek to bridge the divides. Empirical chapters
examine specific institutions in practice, including the United
Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European
Union. The book also points the way to future research.
International Institutions and Power Politics provides insights for
both international relations theory and practical matters of
foreign affairs, and it will be essential reading for all
international relations scholars and advanced students.
The years between the world wars represent an era of broken
balances: the retreat of the United States from global geopolitics,
the weakening of Great Britain and France, Russian isolation
following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the resurgence of German
power in Europe, and the rise of Japan in East Asia. All these
factors complicated great-power politics. This book brings together
historians and political scientists to revisit the conventional
wisdom on the grand strategies pursued between the world wars,
drawing on theoretical innovations and new primary sources. The
contributors suggest that all the great powers pursued policies
that, while in retrospect suboptimal, represented conscious,
rational attempts to secure their national interests under
conditions of extreme uncertainty and intense domestic and
international political, economic, and strategic constraints.
The years between the world wars represent an era of broken
balances: the retreat of the United States from global geopolitics,
the weakening of Great Britain and France, Russian isolation
following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the resurgence of German
power in Europe, and the rise of Japan in East Asia. All these
factors complicated great-power politics. This book brings together
historians and political scientists to revisit the conventional
wisdom on the grand strategies pursued between the world wars,
drawing on theoretical innovations and new primary sources. The
contributors suggest that all the great powers pursued policies
that, while in retrospect suboptimal, represented conscious,
rational attempts to secure their national interests under
conditions of extreme uncertainty and intense domestic and
international political, economic, and strategic constraints.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international
relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system
and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to
explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to
recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the
first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The
editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting
a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand
strategies. They examine the central role of the "state" and seek
to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal
characteristics of states intervene between their leaders'
assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the
actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those
leaders are likely to pursue.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international
relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system
and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to
explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to
recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the
first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The
editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting
a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand
strategies. They examine the central role of the "state" and seek
to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal
characteristics of states intervene between their leaders'
assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the
actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those
leaders are likely to pursue.
When theorists explain how democracies conduct foreign policy,
they tend to ignore or downplay differences and assume that
democratic governments all behave similarly. Challenging this
assumption, Norrin Ripsman breaks down the category of "democracy"
to argue that differences in structural autonomy among democratic
states have a lot to do with how foreign security policies are
chosen and international negotiations are carried out. Concluding
with an examination of the implications of these findings for
security policy in contemporary democracies, Peacemaking by
Democracies combines innovation in international relations theory
with careful primary research in historical archives.
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