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With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Communist Party
leaders in Central Asia were faced with the daunting task of
building states where they previously had not existed - Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Their task was
complicated by the institutional and ideological legacy of the
Soviet system as well as by a more actively engaged international
community. These nascent states inherited a set of institutions
that included bloated bureaucracies, centralized economic planning
and patronage networks. Some of these institutions survived, others
have mutated and new institutions have been created. actors and
social forces in the region. Through the prism of local
institutions, the authors reassess both our understanding of
Central Asia and of the state-building process more broadly. They
scrutinize a wide array of institutional actors, ranging from
regional governments and neighbourhood committees to transnational
and non-governmental organizations. With original empirical
research and theoretical insight, the volume's contributors
illuminate an obscure but resource-rich and strategically
significant region.
This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states
are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership
structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second,
that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states.
Each represents a significant departure from the conventional
resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as
a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich
countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong
institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the
five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their
respective developmental trajectories since independence
demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across
countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that
this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent
fiscal regimes.
This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states
are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership
structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second,
that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states.
Each represents a significant departure from the conventional
resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as
a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich
countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong
institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the
five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their
respective developmental trajectories since independence
demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across
countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that
this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent
fiscal regimes.
The establishment of electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan presents a complex set of empirical puzzles as well
as a theoretical challenge. Why did three states with similar
cultural, historical, and structural legacies establish such
different electoral systems? How did these distinct outcomes result
from strikingly similar institutional design processes? Explaining
these puzzles requires understanding not only the outcome of
institutional design but also the intricacies of the process that
led to this outcome. Moreover, the transitional context in which
the three states designed new electoral rules necessitates an
approach that explicitly links process and outcome in a dynamic
setting. This book provides such an approach. It depicts
institutional design as a transitional bargaining game in which the
dynamic interaction between the structural-historical and
immediate-strategic contexts directly shapes actors' perceptions of
shifts in their relative power, and hence, their bargaining
strategies. Thus, it both builds on the key insights of the
dominant approaches to explaining institutional origin and change
and transcends these approaches by moving beyond the structure
versus agency debate.
The Soviet dictatorship was a strong state, committed to dominating
and transforming society in the name of a utopian ideology. When
the communist regime crumbled and the post-Soviet countries
committed to democracy, most observers took for granted that their
state structures would be effective agents of the popular will.
Russia's experience demonstrates that this assumption was overly
optimistic. This book, based on a major collaborative research
project with American and Russian scholars, shows that state
capacity, strength, and coherence were highly problematic after
communism, which had major consequences for particular functions of
government and for the entire process of regime change. Eleven
respected contributors examine governance in post-Soviet Russia in
comparative context, investigating the roots, characteristics, and
consequences of the crisis as a whole and its manifestations in the
specific realms of tax collection, statistics, federalism, social
policy, regulation of the banks, currency exchange, energy policy,
and parliamentary oversight of the bureaucracy.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Communist Party
leaders in Central Asia were faced with the daunting task of
building states where they previously had not existed Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Their task
was complicated by the institutional and ideological legacy of the
Soviet system as well as by a more actively engaged international
community. These nascent states inherited a set of institutions
that included bloated bureaucracies, centralized economic planning,
and patronage networks. Some of these institutions survived, others
have mutated, and new institutions have been created. Experts on
Central Asia here examine the emerging relationship between state
actors and social forces in the region. Through the prism of local
institutions, the authors reassess both our understanding of
Central Asia and of the state-building process more broadly. They
scrutinize a wide array of institutional actors, ranging from
regional governments and neighborhood committees to transnational
and non-governmental organizations. With original empirical
research and theoretical insight, the volume's contributors
illuminate an obscure but resource-rich and strategically
significant region."
This timely study is the first to examine the relationship between
competition for energy resources and the propensity for conflict in
the Caspian region. Taking the discussion well beyond issues of
pipeline politics and the significance of Caspian oil and gas to
the global market, the book offers significant new findings
concerning the impact of energy wealth on the political life and
economies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The
contributors, a leading group of scholars and policymakers, explore
the differing interests of ruling elites, the political opposition,
and minority ethnic and religious groups region-wide. Placing
Caspian development in the broader international relations context,
the book assesses the ways in which Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey
are fighting to protect their interests in the newly independent
states and how competition for production contracts and pipeline
routes influences regional security. Specific chapters also link
regional issues to central questions of international politics and
to theoretical debates over the role of energy wealth in political
and economic development worldwide. Woven throughout the
implications for U.S. policy, giving the book wide appeal to
policymakers, corporate executives, energy analysts, and scholars
alike.
The establishment of electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan presents a complex set of empirical puzzles as well as a theoretical challenge. Why did three states with similar cultural, historical, and structural legacies establish such different electoral systems? How did these distinct outcomes result from strikingly similar institutional design processes? Explaining these puzzles requires understanding not only the outcome of institutional design but also the intricacies of the process that led to this outcome. Moreover, the transitional context in which the three states designed new electoral rules necessitates an approach that explicitly links process and outcome in a dynamic setting. This book provides such an approach. It depicts institutional design as a transitional bargaining game in which the dynamic interaction between the structural-historical and immediate-strategic contexts directly shapes actors' perceptions of shifts in their relative power, and hence, their bargaining strategies. Thus, it both builds on the key insights of the dominant approaches to explaining institutional origin and change and transcends these approaches by moving beyond the structure versus agency debate.
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