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The Nature of the Mind is a comprehensive and lucid introduction to major themes in the philosophy of mind. It carefully explores the conflicting positions that have arisen within the debate and locates the arguments within their context. It is designed for newcomers to the subject and assumes no previous knowledge of the philosophy of mind. Clearly written and rigorously presented, this book is ideal for use in undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Main topics covered include: * the problem of other minds * the dualist/physicalist debate * the nature of personal identity and survival * mental-state concepts The book closes with a number of pointers towards more advanced work in the subject. Study questions and suggestions for further reading are provided at the end of each chapter. The Nature of the Mind is based on Peter Carruthers' book, Introducing Persons, also published by Routledge (1986).
Contents: List of figures Preface Introduction 1. The problem of other minds 1. The problem 2. Attempted solutions to the problem 3. The uniqueness of consciousness 4. Certainty and meaning Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 2. Strong dualism: body and soul 1. Developing an argument for dualism 2. Difficulties for strong dualism 3. Hume'n bundles 4. Against the bundle theory Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 3. Identity and the soul 1. The concept of identity 2. Soul identity over time 3. Soul identification at a time 4. The argument for dualism reconsidered Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 4. Rationalism, empiricism, and the soul 1. Rationalism versus Empiricism 2. Should we be Empiricists? 3. The empirical evidence for the soul 4. Alternative explanations Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 5. The case for physicalism 1. Arguments for mind-brain identity 2. Ramifications: types, tokens and other minds 3. Difficulties for mind-brain identity 4. The necessity of identity Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 6. After-life for physicalists 1. Resurrection 2. Reincarnation 3. Double difficulties or secondary survival? 4. Limits of individual survival Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 7. The case for theory-theory 1. From Cartesian conception to philosophical functionalism 2. Theory-theory and its opponents 3. Developing the theory: theorizing versus innateness 4. The problem of other minds revisited Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading 8. Problems and prospects 1. Artificial minds 2. Free will 3. Intentionality 4. Consciousness Conclusion Questions for discussion Further reading Index
Stimulating introduction to the most central and interesting issues
in the philosophy of mind. Topics covered include dualism versus
the various forms of materialism, personal identity and survival,
and the problem of other minds.
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Laura Lindsay, Peter Carruthers
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The continuities between human and animal minds are increasingly
well understood. This has led many people to make claims about
consciousness in animals, which has often been taken to be crucial
for their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues compellingly that
there is no fact of the matter to be discovered, and that the
question of animal consciousness is of no scientific or ethical
significance. Carruthers offers solutions to two related puzzles.
The first is about the place of phenomenal-or felt-consciousness in
the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained
nonconceptual contents that are "globally broadcast" to a wide
range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision-making, and
verbal report. Moreover, the so-called "hard" problem of
consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person
concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special
non-physical properties-no so-called "qualia"-are involved. The
second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness
across the animal kingdom. Carruthers shows that there is actually
no fact of the matter, because thoughts about consciousness in
other creatures require us to project our first-person concepts
into their minds; but such projections fail to result in
determinate truth-conditions when those minds are significantly
unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn't matter. It doesn't
matter for science, because no additional property enters the world
as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of
phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely,
ourselves). And on many views it doesn't matter for ethics, either,
since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which
requires only third-person understanding of the desires and
emotions of the animals in question, rather than in first-person
empathy.
The continuities between human and animal minds are increasingly
well understood. This has led many people to make claims about
consciousness in animals, which has often been taken to be crucial
for their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues compellingly that
there is no fact of the matter to be discovered, and that the
question of animal consciousness is of no scientific or ethical
significance. Carruthers offers solutions to two related puzzles.
The first is about the place of phenomenal-or felt-consciousness in
the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained
nonconceptual contents that are "globally broadcast" to a wide
range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision-making, and
verbal report. Moreover, the so-called "hard" problem of
consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person
concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special
non-physical properties-no so-called "qualia"-are involved. The
second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness
across the animal kingdom. Carruthers shows that there is actually
no fact of the matter, because thoughts about consciousness in
other creatures require us to project our first-person concepts
into their minds; but such projections fail to result in
determinate truth-conditions when those minds are significantly
unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn't matter. It doesn't
matter for science, because no additional property enters the world
as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of
phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely,
ourselves). And on many views it doesn't matter for ethics, either,
since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which
requires only third-person understanding of the desires and
emotions of the animals in question, rather than in first-person
empathy.
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolor phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Peter Carruthers argues that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms, and draws on interdisciplinary resources to develop and defend a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. Phenomenal Consciousness is essential reading for all those in philosophy and the cognitive sciences who are interested in the problem of consciousness.
It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative
access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed
to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the
consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical
scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the
findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate
"explanatory space." The book argues that our access to our own
thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual
awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our
own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to
our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to
the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and
inferential resources of the same "mindreading" faculty, and
relying on many of the same sources of evidence. Peter Carruthers
proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory
of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive
examination of many different types of evidence from across
cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a
single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are
hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no
such thing as conscious agency.
Written with Carruthers' usual clarity and directness, this book
will be essential reading for philosophers interested in
self-knowledge, consciousness, and related areas of philosophy. It
will also be of vital interest to cognitive scientists, since it
casts the existing data in a new theoretical light. Moreover, the
ISA theory makes many new predictions while also suggesting
constraints and controls that should be placed on future
experimental investigations of self-knowledge.
In this remarkably clear and original study of the Tractatus Peter
Carruthers has two principal aims. He seeks to make sense of
Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrines, showing how powerful
arguments may be deployed in their support. He also aims to locate
the crux of the conflict between Wittgenstein's early and late
philosophies. This is shown to arise from his earlier commitment to
the objectivity of logic and logical relations, which is the true
target of attack of his later discussion of rule-following. Within
this general framework Dr Carruthers explores a number of themes,
including the early Wittgenstein's doctrine of the priority of
logic over metaphysics, the nature and purpose of his programme of
analysis for ordinary language and the various possible arguments
supporting the existence of Simples. He offers many original
interpretations and defends them with considerable attention to
textual detail, yet the book's clarity and directness will make it
accessible to anyone acquainted with the Tractatus. It will be
required reading for all serious students of Wittgenstein's
philosophy.
This is the second volume of a projected three-volume set on the
subject of innateness. The volume is highly interdisciplinary, and
addresses such question as: To what extent are mature cognitive
capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent
are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements
interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How
do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by
minds? The volume will be of great importance to anyone interested
in the interplay between culture and the innate mind.
This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the
guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind
is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The
Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for
massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?'
challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out
the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines
how the thesis should best be developed, and articulates the notion
of 'module' that is in question. Then the second part of the book
takes up the challenge of explaining how the sorts of flexibility
and creativity that are distinctive of the human mind could
possibly be grounded in the operations of a massive number of
modules. Peter Carruthers's third aim is to show how the various
components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with
one another - indeed, this is crucial to demonstrating how the
human mind, together with its familiar capacities, can be
underpinned by a massively modular set of mechanisms. He outlines
and defends the basic framework of a perception / belief / desire /
planning / motor-control architecture, as well as detailing the
likely components and their modes of connectivity. Many specific
claims about the place within this architecture of natural
language, of a mind-reading system, and others are explained and
motivated. A number of novel proposals are made in the course of
these discussions, one of which is that creative human thought
depends upon a prior kind of creativity of action. Written with
unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of
research in cognitive science, this book will be essential reading
for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the
mind.
What makes science possible? Specifically, what features of the human mind, of human cognitive development, and of human social arrangements permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists.
What makes science possible? Specifically, what features of the human mind, of human cognitive development, and of human social arrangements permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists.
How did our minds evolve? Can evolutionary considerations illuminate the question of the basic architecture of the human mind? These are two of the main questions addressed in Evolution and the Human Mind by a distinguished interdisciplinary team of philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and archaeologists. The volume will be of great interest to all researchers and students interested in the evolution and nature of the mind.
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolor phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Peter Carruthers argues that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms, and draws on interdisciplinary resources to develop and defend a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. Phenomenal Consciousness is essential reading for all those in philosophy and the cognitive sciences who are interested in the problem of consciousness.
This book presents an original and accessible analysis of the relationship between commonsense, or "folk," psychology and contemporary scientific psychology, focusing on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our commonsense self-image. It is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning postgraduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas.
This book presents an original and accessible analysis of the relationship between commonsense, or "folk," psychology and contemporary scientific psychology, focusing on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our commonsense self-image. It is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning postgraduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas.
What is the place of language in human cognition? Do we sometimes think in natural language? Or is language for purposes of interpersonal communication only? Although these questions have been much debated in the past, in recent decades they have almost dropped from sight among those interested in the cognitive sciences. Language and Thought is intended to persuade such people to think again. It brings together essays by a distinguished interdisciplinary team of philosophers and psychologists, who discuss various ways in which language may be implicated in human cognition.
Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, this ethical exploration claims that they do not, from the perspective of "contractualism".
It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative
access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed
to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the
consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical
scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the
findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate
'explanatory space'. The book argues that our access to our own
thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual
awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our
own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to
our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to
the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and
inferential resources of the same 'mindreading' faculty, and
relying on many of the same sources of evidence. Peter Carruthers
proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory
of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive
examination of many different types of evidence from across
cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a
single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are
hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no
such thing as conscious agency. Written with Carruthers' usual
clarity and directness, this book will be essential reading for
philosophers interested in self-knowledge, consciousness, and
related areas of philosophy. It will also be of vital interest to
cognitive scientists, since it casts the existing data in a new
theoretical light. Moreover, the ISA theory makes many new
predictions while also suggesting constraints and controls that
should be placed on future experimental investigations of
self-knowledge.
This is the third volume of a three-volume set on The Innate Mind.
The extent to which cognitive structures, processes, and contents
are innate is one of the central questions concerning the nature of
the mind, with important implications for debates throughout the
human sciences. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in
philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes
provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a
definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate
Mind: Volume 3: Foundations and the Future, concerns a variety of
foundational issues as well as questions about the direction of
future nativist research. It addresses such questions as: What is
innateness? Is it a confused notion? What is at stake in debates
between nativists and empiricists? What is the relationship between
genes and innateness? How do innate structures and learned
information interact to produce adult forms of cognition, e.g.
about number, and how does such learning take place? What innate
abilities underlie the creative aspect of language, and of creative
cognition generally? What are the innate foundations of human
motivation, and of human moral cognition? In the course of their
discussions, many of the contributors pose the question (whether
explicitly or implicitly): Where next for nativist research?
Together, these three volumes provide the most intensive and
richly cross-disciplinary investigation of nativism ever
undertaken. They point the way toward a synthesis of nativist work
that promises to provide a powerful picture of our minds and their
place in the natural order.
This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the
guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind
is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The
Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for
massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?'
challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out
the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines
how the thesis should best be developed, and articulates the notion
of 'module' that is in question. Then the second part of the book
takes up the challenge of explaining how the sorts of flexibility
and creativity that are distinctive of the human mind could
possibly be grounded in the operations of a massive number of
modules. Peter Carruthers's third aim is to show how the various
components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with
one another - indeed, this is crucial to demonstrating how the
human mind, together with its familiar capacities, can be
underpinned by a massively modular set of mechanisms. He outlines
and defends the basic framework of a perception / belief / desire /
planning / motor-control architecture, as well as detailing the
likely components and their modes of connectivity. Many specific
claims about the place within this architecture of natural
language, of a mind-reading system, and others are explained and
motivated. A number of novel proposals are made in the course of
these discussions, one of which is that creative human thought
depends upon a prior kind of creativity of action. Written with
unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of
research in cognitive science, this book will be essential reading
for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the
mind.
This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the
subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is
one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important
implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the
top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied
disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of
nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future
nativist inquiry.
The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental
architecture of the mind, addressing such question as: What
capacities, processes, representations, biases, and connections are
innate? How do these innate elements feed into a story about the
development of our mature cognitive capacities, and which of them
are shared with other members of the animal kingdom? The editors
have provided an introduction giving some of the background to
debates about innateness and introducing each of the subsequent
essays, as well as a consolidated bibliography that will be a
valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area.
The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and
students interested in the fundamental nature and powers of the
human mind.
Together, the three volumes in the series will provide the most
intensive and richly cross-disciplinary investigation of nativism
ever undertaken. They point the way toward a synthesis of nativist
work that promises to provide a new understanding of our minds and
their place in the natural order.
Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have
had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now
collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is
devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against
competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of
phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as
'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of
experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a
scientific world view, and many have claimed that it is an
irredeemable mystery. But Carruthers here claims to have explained
it. He argues that phenomenally conscious states are ones that
possess both an 'analog' (fine-grained) intentional content and a
corresponding higher-order analog content, representing the
first-order content of the experience. It is the higher-order
analog content that enables our phenomenally conscious experiences
to present themselves to us, and that constitutes their distinctive
subjective aspect, or feel. The next two chapters explore some of
the differences between conscious experience and conscious thought,
and argue for the plausibility of some kind of eliminativism about
conscious thinking (while retaining realism about phenomenal
consciousness). Then the final four chapters focus on the minds of
non-human animals. Carruthers argues that even if the experiences
of animals aren't phenomenally conscious (as his account probably
implies), this needn't prevent the frustrations and sufferings of
animals from being appropriate objects of sympathy and concern. Nor
need it mean that there is any sort of radical 'Cartesian divide'
between our minds and theirs of deep significance for comparative
psychology. In the final chapter, he argues provocatively that even
insects have minds that include a belief/desire/perception
psychology much like our own. So mindedness and phenomenal
consciousness couldn't be further apart. Carruthers's writing
throughout is distinctively clear and direct. The collection will
be of great interest to anyone working in philosophy of mind or
cognitive science.
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