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Consciousness - Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective (Paperback, New)
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Consciousness - Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective (Paperback, New)
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Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have
had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now
collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is
devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against
competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of
phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as
'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of
experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a
scientific world view, and many have claimed that it is an
irredeemable mystery. But Carruthers here claims to have explained
it. He argues that phenomenally conscious states are ones that
possess both an 'analog' (fine-grained) intentional content and a
corresponding higher-order analog content, representing the
first-order content of the experience. It is the higher-order
analog content that enables our phenomenally conscious experiences
to present themselves to us, and that constitutes their distinctive
subjective aspect, or feel. The next two chapters explore some of
the differences between conscious experience and conscious thought,
and argue for the plausibility of some kind of eliminativism about
conscious thinking (while retaining realism about phenomenal
consciousness). Then the final four chapters focus on the minds of
non-human animals. Carruthers argues that even if the experiences
of animals aren't phenomenally conscious (as his account probably
implies), this needn't prevent the frustrations and sufferings of
animals from being appropriate objects of sympathy and concern. Nor
need it mean that there is any sort of radical 'Cartesian divide'
between our minds and theirs of deep significance for comparative
psychology. In the final chapter, he argues provocatively that even
insects have minds that include a belief/desire/perception
psychology much like our own. So mindedness and phenomenal
consciousness couldn't be further apart. Carruthers's writing
throughout is distinctively clear and direct. The collection will
be of great interest to anyone working in philosophy of mind or
cognitive science.
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