This paper focuses on a novel effect of active labor market policies: the effect of workfare on crime. First, the study examines how a series of Danish labor market reforms implemented between the late 1980s and the 1990s affected crime. The reforms introduced more rapid and extensive workfare requirements for unemployed without unemployment insurance, and are therefore useful for determining the effect of workfare on crime. Second, the paper investigates whether the crime-preventive impact of the reforms varies by individual labor market attachment. Third, the study examines whether the crime-reducing effect is weekday-specific, or also affects behavior during weekends when workfare programs are closed.

In parallel with the recent trend towards conducting ever more surveys, there has also been a decline in response rates, making it harder to obtain the desired number of completed interviews for these surveys. Incentives used in surveys, with the aim of increasing the response rates are manifold, varying from sending letters in advance and an increasing the number of reminder calls to pre-interview payments, cash incentives, charitable donations, and the chance to win lottery prizes. This book examines the impact of incentives and methods used to increase survey response rates.