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Based on interviews and a broad array of sources from Russian and
Austrian archives, this collection provides a comprehensive
analysis of the Soviet occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955. The
contributors cover a wide range of topics, including the Soviet
Secret Services, the military kommandaturas, Soviet occupation
policies and the withdrawal of troops in 1955, everyday life, the
image of "the Russians," violence against women, arrests,
deportations, and Soviet aid provisions.
This book compares the various aspects - political, military
economic - of Soviet occupation in Austria, Hungary and Romania.
Using documents found in Austrian, Hungarian, Romanian and Russian
archives the authors argue that the nature of Soviet foreign policy
has been misunderstood. Existing literature has focused on the
Soviet foreign policy from a political perspective; when and why
Stalin made the decision to introduce Bolshevik political systems
in the Soviet sphere of influence. This book will show that the
Soviet conquest of East-Central Europe had an imperial dimension as
well and allowed the Soviet Union to use the territory it occupied
as military and economic space. The final dimension of the book
details the tragically human experiences of Soviet occupation:
atrocities, rape, plundering and deportations.
The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe
examines how the neutral European countries and the Soviet Union
interacted after World War II. Amid the Cold War division of Europe
into Western and Eastern blocs, several long-time neutral countries
abandoned neutrality and joined NATO. Other countries remained
neutral but were still perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union's
sphere of influence. Based on extensive archival research, this
volume offers state-of-the-art essays about relations between
Europe's neutral states and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
and how these relations were perceived by other powers.
The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe
examines neutral countries in Europe at a time when most
contemporaries had little faith in neutrality. During the split
between Western and Eastern blocs, several long-time neutral
countries abandoned the policy of neutrality and joined NATO. Other
countries which remained neutral were perceived as a threat to the
Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Based on extensive archival
research, this volume offers state-of-the-art research about the
relations between Europe's neutral states and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and how these relations were perceived by other
powers.
Drawing on recently declassified Soviet archival sources, this book
sheds new light on how the division of Europe came about in the
aftermath of World War II. The book contravenes the notion that a
neutral zone of states, including Germany, could have been set up
between East and West. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was
determined to preserve control over its own sphere of German
territory. By tracing Stalin's attitude toward neutrality in
international politics, the book provides important insights into
the origins of the Cold War.
This book compares the various aspects - political, military
economic - of Soviet occupation in Austria, Hungary and Romania.
Using documents found in Austrian, Hungarian, Romanian and Russian
archives the authors argue that the nature of Soviet foreign policy
has been misunderstood. Existing literature has focused on the
Soviet foreign policy from a political perspective; when and why
Stalin made the decision to introduce Bolshevik political systems
in the Soviet sphere of influence. This book will show that the
Soviet conquest of East-Central Europe had an imperial dimension as
well and allowed the Soviet Union to use the territory it occupied
as military and economic space. The final dimension of the book
details the tragically human experiences of Soviet occupation:
atrocities, rape, plundering and deportations.
Drawing on recently declassified Soviet archival sources, this book
sheds new light on how the division of Europe came about in the
aftermath of World War II. The book contravenes the notion that a
neutral zone of states, including Germany, could have been set up
between East and West. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was
determined to preserve control over its own sphere of German
territory. By tracing Stalin's attitude toward neutrality in
international politics, the book provides important insights into
the origins of the Cold War.
On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European
ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the
country in an attempt to end the 'Prague Spring' reforms and
restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet
Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use
military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in
Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the
summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the
Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only
option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian,
and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into
Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete
military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for
'socialism with a human face.' Dubcek and most of the other
Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but
their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse
many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek
was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the
Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by claiming that 'the fate of any socialist country
is the common affair of all socialist countries' and that the
Soviet Union had both a 'right' and a 'sacred duty' to 'defend
socialism' in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions
within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale
force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The
United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from
direct military action and covert operations to counter the
Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen
leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this
turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence
from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened
behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the
United States and consider whether Washington might have given a
'green light, ' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to
the invasion.
On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European
ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the
country in an attempt to end the "Prague Spring" reforms and
restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet
Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use
military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in
Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the
summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the
Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only
option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian,
and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into
Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete
military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for
"socialism with a human face." Dubcek and most of the other
Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but
their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse
many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek
was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the
Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by claiming that "the fate of any socialist country
is the common affair of all socialist countries" and that the
Soviet Union had both a "right" and a "sacred duty" to "defend
socialism" in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions
within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale
force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The
United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from
direct military action and covert operations to counter the
Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen
leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this
turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence
from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened
behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the
United S
Viele Zeitgenossen hielten die seit 1949 bestehenden zwei deutschen
Staaten fur kurzfristige Provisorien. Das Jahr 1952 schien eine
Chance der Wiedervereinigung zu bieten, doch am Ende stand die
Vertiefung der Spaltung. Seit mehr als funf Jahrzehnten wird
daruber debattiert, ob der in der Stalin-Note vom 10. Marz 1952
enthaltene Vorschlag eines vereinten und neutralisierten
Deutschland eine realistische Alternative war. Die Akten der
sowjetischen Fuhrungsspitze, die Peter Ruggenthaler zu dieser Frage
erstmals ausgewertet hat, geben eine eindeutige Antwort: Stalins
Einigungsangebot war nicht ernst gemeint, sondern ein Stormanover
gegen die Wiederbewaffnung Westdeutschlands. Selbst gegenuber
Osterreich war die Sowjetunion bis zum Ende der "Notenschlacht"
nicht zu einer Neutralisierungspolitik bereit. Stalin und der SED
ging es von Anfang an um die Konsolidierung der DDR. Der
jahrzehntelange Streit um die Stalin-Note ist mit der vorliegenden
Dokumentation entschieden."
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