There has been much publicity about gender inequities in classrooms, but the research literature on this subject had not been systematically analyzed or reviewed - until now. This book is the first to summarize and critically review the observational research and findings on gender literacies. The authors present five genres of studies - gender and reading, writing, discussion, electronic or posttypographical text, and literacy autobiography - and use the perspective of feminist sociology to analyze what was revealed, as well as what was omitted, from these studies. Their synthesis will be of value in breaking down gender barriers in the classroom by raising awareness of gender issues in literacy learning and practice; publicizing successful interventions and recommendations for instructional practice; and giving direction to further research on the topic.

In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.

"Peyton Young's study puts the evolution of institutions on the basis of individual choices in an adaptive and adapting environment. It puts a firm foundation under the vague idea of 'spontaneous order.' The exposition is extraordinarily clear; Young introduces and explains the mathematical tools he uses in his brilliant synthesis and development, which combines ideas from evolutionary theory and the study of learning. The book is accessible to the beginner in the field and yet no one, no matter how expert, will fail to learn something."--Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, 1972 Nobel Laureate in Economics

""Individual Strategy and Social Structure" makes a convincing case for an adaptive, low-rationality, probabilistic approach to game theory and to economics and social science in general."--Alvin E. Roth, Harvard University

"In this well written and elegant volume, Peyton Young takes a large step in redirecting the theory and the problems that game theorists deal with. Rather than asking what is the proper equilibrium notion for a game played by fully rational agents capable of making all necessary calculations, he asks what types of conventions of behavior or social institutions will intelligent but not omniscient agents create for themselves when they repeatedly face the same problem that needs to be solved. Clearly this is what the real world looks like and Young brings us closer to it."--Andrew Schotter, New York University

Governments and institutions, perhaps even more than markets, determine who gets what in our society. They make the crucial choices about who pays the taxes, who gets into college, who gets medical care, who gets drafted, where the hazardous waste dump is sited, and how much we pay for public services. Debate about these issues inevitably centers on the question of whether the solution is "fair." In this book, H. Peyton Young offers a systematic explanation of what we mean by fairness in distributing public resources and burdens, and applies the theory to actual cases.

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providingan updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publicationof Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s.
Focuses on innovation in games and economic behaviorPresents coherent summaries of subjects in game theoryMakes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics"

The issue of fair representation will take center stage as U.S. congressional districts are reapportioned based on the 2000 Census. Using U.S. history as a guide, the authors develop a theory of fair representation that establishes various principles for translating state populations -or vote totals of parties -into a fair allocation of congressional seats. They conclude that the current apportionment formula cheats the larger states in favor of the smaller, contrary to the intentions of the founding fathers and compromising the Supreme Court's ""one man, one vote"" rulings. Balinski and Young interweave the theoretical development with a rich historical account of controversies over representation, and show how many of these principles grew out of political contests in the course of United States history. The result is a work that is at once history, politics, and popular science. The book -updated with data from the 1980 and 1990 Census counts -vividly demonstrates that apportionment deals with the very substance of political power.