To date, the world can lay claim to little more than 190 sovereign independent entities recognized as nation-states, while by some estimates there may be up to eight hundred more nation-state projects underway and seven to eight thousand potential projects. Why do a few such endeavors come to fruition while most fail? Standard explanations have pointed to national awakenings, nationalist mobilizations, economic efficiency, military prowess, or intervention by the great powers. "Where Nation-States Come From" provides a compelling alternative account, one that incorporates an in-depth examination of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and their successor states.

Philip Roeder argues that almost all successful nation-state projects have been associated with a particular political institution prior to independence: the segment-state, a jurisdiction defined by both human and territorial boundaries. Independence represents an administrative upgrade of a segment-state. Before independence, segmental institutions shape politics on the periphery of an existing sovereign state. Leaders of segment-states are thus better positioned than other proponents of nation-state endeavors to forge locally hegemonic national identities. Before independence, segmental institutions also shape the politics between the periphery and center of existing states. Leaders of segment-states are hence also more able to challenge the status quo and to induce the leaders of the existing state to concede independence. Roeder clarifies the mechanisms that link such institutions to outcomes, and demonstrates that these relationships have prevailed around the world through most of the age of nationalism.

Why did the Soviet system fail? How is it that a political order, born of revolution, perished from stagnation? What caused a seemingly stable polity to collapse? Philip Roeder finds the answer to these questions in the Bolshevik "constitution"--the fundamental rules of the Soviet system that evolved from revolutionary times into the post-Stalin era. These rules increasingly prevented the Communist party from responding to the immense social changes that it had itself set in motion: although the Soviet political system initially had vast resources for transforming society, its ability to transform itself became severely limited.

In Roeder's view, the problem was not that Soviet leaders did not attempt to change, but that their attempts were so often defeated by institutional resistance to reform. The leaders' successful efforts to stabilize the political system reduced its adaptability, and as the need for reform continued to mount, stability became a fatal flaw. Roeder's analysis of institutional constraints on political behavior represents a striking departure from the biographical approach common to other analyses of Soviet leadership, and provides a strong basis for comparison of the Soviet experience with constitutional transformation in other authoritarian polities.

Why did the wave of democracy that swept the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe starting more than a decade ago develop in ways unexpected by observers who relied on existing theories of democracy? In "Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy," four distinguished scholars conduct the first major assessment of democratization theory in light of the experience of postcommunist states. Richard Anderson, Steven Fish, Stephen Hanson, and Philip Roeder not only apply theory to practice, but using a wealth of empirical evidence, draw together the elements of existing theory into new syntheses.

The authors each highlight a development in postcommunist societies that reveals an anomaly or lacuna in existing theory. They explain why authoritarian leaders abandon authoritarianism, why democratization sometimes reverses course, how subjects become citizens by beginning to take sides in politics, how rulers become politicians by beginning to seek popular support, and not least, how democracy becomes consolidated. Rather than converging on a single approach, each author shows how either a rationalist, institutionalist, discursive, or Weberian approach sheds light on this transformation.

They conclude that the experience of postcommunist democracy demands a rethinking of existing theory. To that end, they offer rich new insights to scholars, advanced students, policymakers, and anyone interested in postcommunist states or in comparative democratization.

How do some national-secessionist campaigns get on the global agenda whereas others do not? Which projects for new nation-states, Philip Roeder asks, give rise to mayhem in the politics of existing states? National secession has been explained by reference to identities, grievances, greed, and opportunities. With the strategic constraints most national-secession campaigns face, the author argues, the essential element is the campaign's ability to coordinate expectations within a population on a common goal-so that independence looks like the only viable option. Roeder shows how in most well-known national-secession campaigns, this strategy of programmatic coordination has led breakaway leaders to assume the critical task of propagating an authentic and realistic nation-state project. Such campaigns are most likely to draw attention in the capitals of the great powers that control admission to the international community, to bring the campaigns' disputes with their central governments to deadlock, and to engage in protracted, intense struggles to convince the international community that independence is the only viable option. In National Secession, Roeder focuses on the goals of national-secession campaigns as a key determinant of strategy, operational objectives, and tactics. He shifts the focus in the study of secessionist civil wars from tactics (such as violence) to the larger substantive disputes within which these tactics are chosen, and he analyzes the consequences of programmatic coordination for getting on the global agenda. All of which, he argues, can give rise to intractable disputes and violent conflicts.

How can leaders craft political institutions that will sustain the peace and foster democracy in ethnically divided societies after conflicts as destructive as civil wars? Under turbulent conditions the leaders of ethnic groups, governments, and international organizations face the challenge of designing political arrangements that can simultaneously meet the tests of equal representation, democratic accountability, effective governance, and political stability. At critical junctures in the transition from intense (often violent) conflict, power-sharing arrangements may offer a compromise acceptable to most ethnic elites.

Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild find that these short-term accommodations come with high longer-term costs: the very institutions that provide a basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country may hinder the consolidation of peace and democracy over the longer term. The contributors to Sustainable Peace examine institutional settlements in Ethiopia, Lebanon, India, and South Africa as well as the Soviet successor states, south Asia, central Africa, west Africa, and the Balkans. Roeder, Rothchild, and most of the contributors conclude that power-dividing, rather than power-sharing, solutions are more likely to result in durable political compacts and peace.

Contributors: Amit Ahuja, University of Michigan; Eduardo Aleman, University of Houston; Valerie Bunce, Cornell University; Caroline Hartzell, Gettysburg College; Matthew Hoddie, Texas A&M University; Edmond J. Keller, UCLA; David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego; Benjamin Reilly, Australian National University; Philip G. Roeder, University of California, San Diego; Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis; Timothy D. Sisk, University of Denver; Lahra Smith, UCLA; Christoph Stefes, University of Colorado, Denver; Daniel Treisman, UCLA; Ashutosh Varshney, University of Michigan; Stephen Watts, Cornell University; Marie-Joelle Zahar, Universite de Montreal"