Whether Europe will ever have anything resembling the ?common foreign and security policy? described in the Maastricht Treaty will depend most of all on whether France and Germany are able to align their foreign policy goals and means. This thoughtful and original study examines the Franco-German security partnership in its post?Cold War context an

Since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and policies towards the Middle East have diverged. In the Middle East peace process, Europeans have grown frustrated with the lack of progress and with Washington's near-monopoly on diplomatic action, and have begun to demand a greater role. On Iraq, the US insists on strong military and economic containment of Saddam Hussein, while some Europeans have started to press for a more rapid reintegration of Iraq into the international community and are reluctant to use or threaten force. The issue of how to deal with Iran has been most divisive of all, with the US and Europe deeply divided over whether they should contain, or engage, Tehran. Transatlantic tensions over the Middle East are damaging for three main reasons. They reduce the effectiveness of allied policies; undermine NATO's cohesion when its future is no longer guaranteed by a common threat; and threaten to spill over into the economic domain. This paper examines the reasons for these potentially damaging differences, assesses the prospects for improving transatlantic cooperation in the region and suggests approaches that may help to bring this about. Its main policy conclusions are:On the Arab Israeli conflict, as long as the peace process is moving forward, or has reasonable prospects of doing so, the US is probably right that Europe's formal involvement in direct peace talks would not be helpful, particularly if such a role aimed to promote policies different from those of the US. If the peace process stalls completely, however, it will be difficult for Washington to justify opposing a more active European role. On Iraq, the US-led policy of containment is correct, and economic sanctions should remain in place until Baghdad complies fully with UN Security Council disarmament resolutions. However, in exchange for Europe's agreement to contribute to Iraq's military containment, the US, like Europe, should abide by the letter and spirit

Turkey has always been a crossroads: the point where East meets West, Europe meets Asia, and Christianity meets Islam. Turkey has also been a close and important American ally, but a series of converging political and strategic factors have now endangered its longstanding Western and democratic orientation. In Winning Turkey, two leading analysts explain this worrisome situation and present a plan for improving it. The stakes are clear. Turkey is the most advanced democracy in the Islamic world, bordering a number of the world's hotspots, including Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus. It occupies the corridor between Western markets and Caspian Sea energy reserves. A stable, Western-oriented Turkey moving toward EU membership would provide a growing market for exports, a source of needed labor, a positive influence on the Middle East, and an ally in the war on terror. The picture has darkened, however, as rising anti-Americanism, deflated hopes for EU accession, civil-military tensions, and terrorist threats have destabilized an already volatile Turkish political system. Wi "nning Turkey d"esigns a plan to ease tensions in this critical part of the world. In addition to proposing a "grand bargain" between Turkey and the Kurds, it advocates greater support for increased liberalism and democracy, a renewed commitment by both Europe and Turkey to promote EU membership, a historic compromise with Armenia, and greater Western engagement with Turkish Cypriots.

Since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and policies towards the Middle East have diverged. In the Middle East peace process, Europeans have grown frustrated with the lack of progress and with Washington's near-monopoly on diplomatic action, and have begun to demand a greater role. On Iraq, the US insists on strong military and economic containment of Saddam Hussein, while some Europeans have started to press for a more rapid reintegration of Iraq into the international community and are reluctant to use or threaten force. The issue of how to deal with Iran has been most divisive of all, with the US and Europe deeply divided over whether they should contain, or engage, Tehran. Transatlantic tensions over the Middle East are damaging for three main reasons. They reduce the effectiveness of allied policies; undermine NATO's cohesion when its future is no longer guaranteed by a common threat; and threaten to spill over into the economic domain. This paper examines the reasons for these potentially damaging differences, assesses the prospects for improving transatlantic cooperation in the region and suggests approaches that may help to bring this about. Its main policy conclusions are: On the Arab-Israeli conflict, as long as the peace process is moving forward, or has reasonable prospects of doing so, the US is probably right that Europe's formal involvement in direct peace talks would not be helpful, particularly if such a role aimed to promote policies different from those of the US. If the peace process stalls completely, however, it will be difficult for Washington to justify opposing a more active European role. On Iraq, the US-led policy of containment is correct, and economic sanctions should remain in place until Baghdad complies fully with UN Security Council disarmament resolutions. However, in exchange for Europe's agreement to contribute to Iraq's military containment, the US, like Europe, should abide by the letter and spirit of these resolutions, even if this means agreeing to lift restrictions on oil exports if Iraq complies in full. Failing to do so could undermine global support for the integrity of the UN system, ultimately leaving the US, and perhaps the UK, isolated in maintaining a policy that might not be sustainable in the long term. On Iran, a transatlantic compromise would need to include an agreement by the US not to impose sanctions against European companies doing business with Iran, as long as Europe offered unstinting support in combating terrorism and helping to contain the development of weapons of mass destruction. The US should also seek agreement with the European Union on which Iranian actions would justify sanctions or other punitive measures. The paper concludes by examining institutional changes that might help to promote transatlantic cooperation on the Middle East.

Tracing the transformation of NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War, this volume assesses NATO's current accomplishments, continuing challenges and political pitfalls. International scholars and policy-makers explore three key themes influencing NATO's future: transatlantic relations, the debate over enlargement and the organization's new functions. Weighing the fate of an alliance poised for renewal or decline, the contributors offer analysis and discussion of an organization that has changed profoundly over the past five years and continues to evolve in the face of an uncertain global environment.

Whether Europe will ever have anything resembling the "common foreign and security policy" described in the Maastricht Treaty will depend most of all on whether France and Germany are able to align their foreign policy goals and means. This thoughtful and original study examines the Franco-German security partnership in its post-Cold War context and analyzes the implications of that partnership for both Europe and the United States. Utilizing French and German sources and extensive interviews in Paris, Bonn, and Washington, Philip Gordon traces the evolution of Franco-German security cooperation since World War II, focusing especially on post-1989 developments. The book's historical and conceptual approach provides a framework for assessing the foundations of the Euro-optimism and -pessimism at odds with each other today.Gordon argues that Franco-German cooperation in the post-Cold War era will be more challenging than it was during a time when the Soviet threat united the two countries in a U.S.-led alliance. The book demonstrates how the end of the Cold War, German unification, a declining U.S. role in Europe, and emerging instabilities to Europe's east and south will test the strength of the Franco-German partnership, and it examines how French and German leaders have stood up to the new challenges so far. Detailed case studies of the Persian Gulf War, the debates over the "Eurocorps," policies toward Eastern Europe, and the war in Yugoslavia make an invaluable contribution to our understanding of French, German, and Alliance policies in the post-Cold War world. Gordon also identifies new trends in French and German security policies since 1989 and analyzes their effects on the potential for Western and European cohesion.The book concludes that the general commitment in Paris and Berlin to continued cooperation is not in doubt but that a truly common and effective Franco-German or European security policy is unlikely; the national interests of the two countries and their Western partners not only remain different, but they are probably more divergent today than during the Cold War. Consequently, Gordon also argues that U.S. and European fears of Franco-German bilateralism are exaggerated and indeed that the allies have more to gain than to lose from Franco-German cooperation. The problem for the West is not so much that France and Germany have formed a cohesive political-military force within Europe but that they have failed to do so.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of around once per decade. It has done so in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria - to count only the instances where regime change was effectively U.S. policy and where Washington led the effort. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, including countering communism, geopolitical competition, preventing the development of weapons of mass destruction, combatting terrorism, saving civilian lives, and promoting democracy. And the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have also been highly varied: sponsoring a military coup, providing covert or overt military assistance to opposition groups, invading and occupying, invading and not occupying, providing air power to opposition forces, or relying on diplomacy, rhetoric, and sanctions. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.

The greater Middle East region is beset by a crescent of crises, stretching from Pakistan through Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Together, these five crises pose the most pressing security challenges faced by the United States and its European allies -ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to the rise of fundamentalism and the lack of democracy. Until now, Europe and the United States have approached these issues (indeed, the Middle East as a whole) in differing ways, with little effective coordination of policy. In fact, how best to deal with the greater Middle East has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-European relations. The need for a common approach to the region is more evident than ever. This book brings together some of Europe and America's leading scholars and practitioners in an effort to develop a common approach to resolving the five major crises in the region. European and American authors provide succinct and fact-filled overviews of the different crises, describe U.S. and European perspectives on the way forward, and suggest ways in which the United States and Europe can better cooperate. In the conclusion, the editors synthesize the different suggestions into a roadmap for U.S.-European cooperation for addressing the challenges of the Greater Middle East in the years ahead. Contributors include Stephen Cohen (Brookings Institution), James Dobbins (RAND), Toby Dodge (University of London), Martin Indyk (Saban Center at Brookings), Kenneth Pollack (Saban Center at Brookings), Jean-Luc Racine (Center for the Study of India and South Asia), Barnett Rubin (New York University), Yezid Sayigh (University of Cambridge), and Bruno Tertrais (Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique).

Colorectal cancer is the second-leading cause of cancer-related death in the Western World. This Second Edition analyzes the genetics, mechanisms, and development of colorectal carcinoma and supplies the latest research and recommendations on the detection, treatment, and prevention of malignancies of the colon, rectum, and anus.