By the end of 1780 the war for American independence appeared to be approaching a stalemate. After five years of war, Washington's armies remained in the field. Once France, and then Spain, joined the war, Lord Sandwich as First Lord of the Admiralty was faced with a constant struggle to balance the forces needed at home and overseas, while facing constant hostile pressure from the opposition. However, events were conspiring to bring about a showdown in North America, which would take place in the waters off Chesapeake Bay. This book describes how, step by step, the crisis was reached. After France had accepted the need for a major effort to support the Americans, Count de Grasse arrived in the West Indies in April 1781 with a large fleet, intending to arrive off the North American coast in July. Once he had opted to sail to Virginia, Washington began to move south. Meanwhile Lord Cornwallis, the British commander in the Carolinas, had chosen without authority to march to Virginia, where he arrived in May to link up with a force that had been sent to establish a naval base in the Chesapeake. De Grasse reached Chesapeake Bay with his whole fleet at the end of August, outnumbering the British fleet under Graves which arrived on 5 September. The battle that followed was indecisive, though the French had the best of it. Cornwallis was now besieged at Yorktown by Washington; a force intended to relieve him arrived too late and on 19 October he capitulated at Yorktown. The war for American independence was decisively lost; all that remained was a bitter debate as to who was to blame.

This book is a study of the Russo Japanese War of 1904-1905, as seen through the eyes of the British Naval Attache, Captain William Pakenham. The complicated set of international relations at the turn of the century is reviewed, as well as the balance of sea power in the Far East, which was a matter of considerable importance to the British government. The role of the naval attache was thus of considerable importance, particularly once war had broken out. Pakenham quickly became a trusted colleague of Admiral Togo, the Japanese commander-in-chief, and went to sea with the Japanese fleet during the great battles of the naval campaign. The war had already begun before Pakenham arrived in the Far East, commencing with a lightning strike by the Japanese at the Russian base of Port Arthur. Once there Pakenham sent a stream of comprehensive reports not only describing the naval actions but also dealing with crucial matters relating for instance to the design of warships, developments in gunnery and the use of torpedoes. These were closely studied at the British Admiralty, at a time when the revolutionary design of the new battleship Dreadnought was under consideration. Pakenham, who came from a well-known naval family, was one of those personalities around whom legends grew, and he was certainly well established as an eccentric. He was greatly admired by his Japanese hosts for the courage he displayed under fire.

When Helmuth von Moltke took over as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, the Prussian army had not fought for more than forty years. Yet within a decade and a half he had brought it to the point where it was the strongest in Europe. His successes on the battle field led to his methods being painstakingly analysed by commentators and slavishly imitated by Western armies. His success was not only due to far sighted strategic planning, the comprehensive reorganisation of the General Staff and his grasp of new technologies; it was also due to his leadership of a talented, if disparate, group of subordinates, even if some of them sometimes failed to grasp his overall intentions. This book examines these key relationships. Foremost among these was his collaboration with the able though choleric Karl Leonhard von Blumenthal; their correspondence reflected every aspect of their campaigns. He was also close to the Crown Prince, whose aide de camp he had been. Moltke was Chief of Staff to Prince Frederick Charles in Denmark in 1864; his admiration for the 'Red Prince' was perhaps not maintained when the latter's caution caused problems. Albrecht von Stosch, Intendant General in 1870-1871, proved brilliantly successful when he had the chance to demonstrate his talents in the field. Edwin von Manteuffel, on whose recommendation Moltke was appointed, was at the centre of Prussian politics for a decade and a half before becoming a successful army commander in 1866, and 1870-1871. Perhaps the most talented of Moltke's subordinates was August von Goeben, a successful commander in all three wars of German unification. August von Werder never enjoyed Moltke's confidence to the same extent, but was extremely reliable. On the other hand both Eduard Vogel von Falckenstein and Karl von Steinmetz caused Moltke considerable difficulty by their stubborn disobedience of his explicit orders. Behind these relationships there existed the vital rapport which Moltke had with their Chiefs of Staff and his own general staff officers. It was on his ability to rely on these men to execute his intentions that his success ultimately depended. Theophil von Podbielski, Julius Verdy du Vernois and Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf were some of the brilliant individuals who constituted one of the most powerful teams in military history.

It has often been said that, so slow was the process of change in naval warfare, Sir Francis Drake would if he was transported to the quarterdeck of the Victory not feel out of place. Half a century on from the end of the Napoleonic wars, a total transformation had taken place in every aspect of naval warfare. As a result of the Industrial Revolution the ships that fought the battle of Lissa would have been unrecognisable to Drake The principal changes had been the introduction of steam power, of shell guns and of armour plating. The use of steam engines to power warships was substantially assisted by the invention of the screw propeller which quickly made paddle steamers obsolete. And the effect of shell guns was hugely increased by the development of rifled ordnance. The Industrial Revolution came first to Britain, and it was here that the earliest experiments were made with steam engines as a vessel's motive power. The replacement wood by iron as a shipbuilding material also came slowly, and both innovations faced considerable resistance from conservative opinion. Once the Industrial Revolution spread through mainland Europe, it was often in France that important breakthroughs were made, though contrary to the opinion of earlier historians, the British Admiralty kept a close watch on technological progress. The outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861 powerfully accelerated developments in all aspects of warship design. As other navies adopted the latest technology it became apparent that the tactics of naval warfare must also change. In 1866 Italy, in alliance with Prussia, went to war against Austria, having built up a substantial fleet of ironclads. The Austrians, too, had also acquired a number of ironclads. The two fleets faced each other in a campaign in the Adriatic, in which the Italian fleet was led by Admiral Carlo Persano and that of Austria by Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. On July 20, 1866 they met in what was to be the first fleet action of the new age, and the encounter ended in a decisive victory for the Austrian fleet. Much of the blame for the Italian defeat was laid at Persano's door, while his opponent became a national hero. This book is the first comprehensive account of the campaign of Lissa in the English language for more than a century. It explores the progress of naval shipbuilding and tactics in the period leading up to 1866, together with the development of the Italian and Austrian navies.

"Barry's work stands alongside those of Howard and Wawro for anyone with a serious interest in the Franco-Prussian War..." NY Military Affairs Symposium Review In the second part of this comprehensive all-new two-volume military history of the Franco-Prussian War, the author continues his narrative from the fall of the Second Empire until the ending of the war, and the founding of a unified Germany. The war against the Government of National Defence presented quite different problems to von Moltke and his staff. Although the Siege of Paris loomed large during the second phase of the war, the author fully explores events in other parts of France, including the siege of Strasbourg, the activities of the Francs Tireurs, the investment of Metz, and the battle against the French armies of the Loire, the North, and the East. The author has made full use of an extensive number of German and French language sources. His detailed text is accompanied by a number of black and white illustrations and battle maps. Orders of battle are also provided. About the Author Quintin Barry is married and lives in Sussex. He is a solicitor, specialising in employment law. Throughout his professional career he has maintained his lifelong interest in military and naval history. He has made a special study of the period from 1848 to 1871, with particular reference to the Wars of German Unification.

In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over the future of Cuba. The American navy had, in the preceding decade, been revived after years of neglect, and was much stronger than anything that the Spanish could bring against it. In the Philippines, Admiral George Dewey easily destroyed a weak Spanish squadron. A military invasion of Cuba was supported by the rest of the US Navy, under the command of Admiral William T Sampson. An important part of this force was the Flying Squadron, led by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. Meanwhile a Spanish squadron under Admiral Pascual Cervera sailed from Europe to the Caribbean and, after disappearing for some days, reached the port of Santiago de Cuba. Schley was the first on the scene; his movements were later to be severely criticised. When Sampson arrived with the rest of the fleet, a blockade of the port was instituted. In the end, Cervera was obliged to make an attempt to break out, but his squadron of four cruisers was overwhelmed and destroyed. During the battle on Sunday July 3, Schley was in effective command, as Sampson had gone ashore to confer with the army commander. Although the Americans had won another easy victory, a bitter dispute arose between the respective supporters of Schley and Sampson as to who was entitled to the credit. Fanned by the popular press, the issue split the U S Navy to the point where its morale was seriously affected. Matters came to a head with the publication of a book violently attacking Schley's conduct. He demanded a Court of Inquiry; this sat for forty days at the Washington Navy Yard, presided over by Admiral Dewey. It was one of the great trials of American history, as the lawyers refought the campaign in minute detail. In the end, the verdict went against Schley, though this was offset by a minority opinion from Dewey that he had indeed been in command and deserved the credit for the victory. This book explores the rights and wrongs of the conduct of those principally involved in a battle that marked the dawn of the American empire, and closely examines the dramatic proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

When Helmuth von Moltke took over as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, the Prussian army had not fought for more than forty years. Yet within a decade and a half he had brought it to the point where it was the strongest in Europe. His successes on the battle field led to his methods being painstakingly analysed by commentators and slavishly imitated by Western armies. His success was not only due to far sighted strategic planning, the comprehensive reorganisation of the General Staff and his grasp of new technologies; it was also due to his leadership of a talented, if disparate, group of subordinates, even if some of them sometimes failed to grasp his overall intentions. This book examines these key relationships. Foremost among these was his collaboration with the able though choleric Karl Leonhard von Blumenthal; their correspondence reflected every aspect of their campaigns. He was also close to the Crown Prince, whose aide de camp he had been. Moltke was Chief of Staff to Prince Frederick Charles in Denmark in 1864; his admiration for the'Red Prince' was perhaps not maintained when the latter's caution caused problems. Albrecht von Stosch, Intendant General in 1870-1871, proved brilliantly successful when he had the chance to demonstrate his talents in the field. Edwin von Manteuffel, on whose recommendation Moltke was appointed, was at the centre of Prussian politics for a decade and a half before becoming a successful army commander in 1866, and 1870-1871. Perhaps the most talented of Moltke's subordinates was August von Goeben, a successful commander in all three wars of German unification. August von Werder never enjoyed Moltke's confidence to the same extent, but was extremely reliable. On the other hand both Eduard Vogel von Falckenstein and Karl von Steinmetz caused Moltke considerable difficulty by their stubborn disobedience of his explicit orders. Behind these relationships there existed the vital rapport which Moltke had with their Chiefs of Staff and his own general staff officers. It was on his ability to rely on these men to execute his intentions that his success ultimately depended. Theophil von Podbielski, Julius Verdy du Vernois and Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf were some of the brilliant individuals who constituted one of the most powerful teams in military history.

"Barry's work stands alongside those of Howard and Wawro for anyone with a serious interest in the Franco-Prussian War..." NY Military Affairs Symposium Review In the first part of this comprehensive all-new two-volume military history of the Franco-Prussian War, Quintin Barry presents a detailed account of the war against the French Imperial Army waged by the armies of the German Confederation, directed by that supreme military mind, Helmuth von Moltke. The author places Moltke and his strategic planning in the context of the European balance of power following the ending of the Austria Prussian War of 1866, before exploring the initial mobilisation and deployment of the armies in 1870. All of the battles of this opening round of the war are described in detail, including Weissenburg, Worth, Spicheren, Borny-Colombey, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, Beaumont and, of course, Sedan. The book ends as the Second Empire of Napoleon III lies defeated, crushed by the German armies directed by von Moltke. The author has made full use of an extensive number of German and French language sources. His detailed text is accompanied by a number of black and white illustrations and battle maps. Orders of battle are also provided. About the Author Quintin Barry is married and lives in Sussex. He is a solicitor, specialising in employment law. Throughout his professional career he has maintained his lifelong interest in military and naval history. He has made a special study of the period from 1848 to 1871, with particular reference to the Wars of German Unification.

After the battle of Sedan on September 1, 1870 and the collapse of the Second Empire, followed by the investment of Paris, the Government of National Defence set about raising fresh armies. These had as their first objective the relief of the capital. The German troops covering the investment were stretched extremely thin until the fall of Metz at the end of October 1870. This released the forces around the city to move north and west to deal with the newly-forming French armies. The German Campaign in the northeast of France was conducted by the First Army led by General Edwin von Manteuffel. Opposing him was the French Army of the North, initially commanded for a short time by General Charles Bourbaki. He was soon replaced by General Louis Faidherbe, who was sent far from Africa. The Campaign was fought to a large extent over the area of the Somme battlefields of the First World War, and the names of the towns and villages are grimly familiar with the resonance of what was to come. In 1914-1918 the direction of the fighting was on an east - west axis; in 1870 - 1871 it was north-south, with the line of the Somme being crucial to the outcome of the Campaign. The first major battle was the battle of Amiens on November 24; fought before Faidherbe's arrival, the Army of the North was led by the Chief of Staff, General Farre. It resulted in a German victory and the capture of Amiens. In December, Faidherbe advanced and took up a strong defensive position along the line of the River Hallue, where a fierce battle was fought on December 23. After the French retreat, Faidherbe regrouped, and advanced again, this time on Bapaume. Another fierce encounter followed on January 3, at the end of which each side believed itself to be defeated. Faidherbe was thwarted in his objective to lift the Siege of Peronne, which fell on January 9. By now the situation at Paris was desperate, and on January 15 Faidherbe began a march eastwards with a view to compelling the movement of part of the investing armies to meet his advance. This resulted in the crucial battle of Saint Quentin on January 19, in which the Germans were now led by the redoubtable General August von Goeben, who won a final and decisive victory. The Author draws on a wide range of rare contemporary sources to describe the Campaign, which was fought in appalling weather conditions. The book is copiously illustrated, with specially drawn colour battle maps to demonstrate the course of the Campaign, and also includes extensive orders of battle.

Before the War of 1866 the name of Helmuth von Moltke was scarcely known outside the Prussian army. His appointment as Chief of the General Staff was in many ways surprising, and he certainly did not himself expect it. He was thus put at the head of a military institution that was already to some extent superior to its counterparts elsewhere; he was to turn it into a formidable machine that became, in his hands, very nearly invincible. This was due to number of factors which coincided with his appointment. Among these were the many advances in military technology and logistics on the one hand, and on the other the emergence of Otto Von Bismarck as Minister-President of Prussia, with whom Moltke had a crucial, if occasionally uneasy, relationship. This book follows Moltke's part in the course of the campaign at the end of which his name had become a household word. It traces his rise to the position of Chief of the General Staff, against the background of the political situation of Prussia in the middle of the 19th Century, and the way in which he developed the functions of the General Staff. Moltke's contribution to the allied campaign of Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864 was an important part of his own development, before the inevitable war between the successful allies in 1866. As the book shows, for that war Moltke prepared his plans in the minutest detail. The triumphant success of his strategy in Bohemia was supplemented by the boldness of his campaign in western Germany, in which a small Prussian army overcame a huge numerical disadvantage. By the end of the Seven Weeks' War Moltke had made Prussia the strongest military power in Europe. The Campaign of 1866 in Bohemia is covered in great detail, including the most extensive coverage of the Battle of Koeniggratz yet published in English. The author has made full use of an extensive number of German language sources. His detailed text is accompanied by a number of black and white illustrations (a significant number of which are previously unpublished) and battle maps. Orders of battle are also provided.

England and the Dutch Republic fought three naval wars in the middle of the 17th century, arising principally from a clash of mercantile interests. In the first of these, under the Commonwealth, England had much the better, due largely to the outstanding leadership of Robert Blake. The second war was more even. By now Charles II had been restored to the throne. There were a number of fierce battles which went either way, but the war ended with the humiliation of the Dutch burning a large part of the English fleet in the Medway. After reviewing the earlier wars, this book goes on to describe the third Anglo Dutch war, fought between 1672 and 1674. This war of shameless aggression was provoked by England, or rather by King Charles and his court, mainly as a matter of commercial greed. It began, before any declaration of war, with an attack on a Dutch merchant convoy proceeding up-Channel. In this war, for the first time, England fought in alliance with France, and the French fleet was an important, if ultimately ineffective, part of the fleet which under the leadership first of the Earl of Sandwich, then by James, Duke of York, and finally by Prince Rupert, took on the Dutch fleet led by the brilliant Admiral Michiel de Ruyter. At Solebay on the Suffolk coast, de Ruyter surprised the English fleet on the morning of 28 May 1672; in the intense fighting Sandwich's flagship, the Royal James was blown up and he was killed. Overall, the Dutch could claim it as a victory. There later followed in 1673 two battles off Schooneveld and then the battle of the Texel. In this fight the French treacherously hung back. De Ruyter's tactical skill in these battles ensured that a planned attempt at invasion was prevented. The war ended with the Allies by no means in unison, and Charles II, obliged by lack of funds to make peace, had nothing to show for a war that should never have been fought.