The application of the Political Question Doctrine is at a crucial crossroads as the Supreme Court continues to test new "War on Terrorism" initiatives. Historically, the political question doctrine has held the courts from resolving constitutional issues that are better left to other departments of government, as a way of maintaining the system of checks and balances. However, the doctrine's many ambiguities have allowed a roughly defined juxtaposition of the branches of government during previous years when the Republic was concerned with both international matters and those within its continental confines. The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court of the United States discusses the gradual changes in the parameters of the doctrine, including its current position dealing with increasingly extraterritorial concerns. Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain bring together critical essays that examine the broad issues of judicial involvement in politics and the future of the doctrine. With a wide range of historical and theoretical perspectives, this book will stimulate debate among those interested in political science and legal studies.

The application of the Political Question Doctrine is at a crucial crossroads as the Supreme Court continues to test new 'War on Terrorism' initiatives. Historically, the political question doctrine has held the courts from resolving constitutional issues that are better left to other departments of government, as a way of maintaining the system of checks and balances. However, the doctrine's many ambiguities have allowed a roughly defined juxtaposition of the branches of government during previous years when the Republic was concerned with both international matters and those within its continental confines. The Political Question Doctrine and the Supreme Court of the United States discusses the gradual changes in the parameters of the doctrine, including its current position dealing with increasingly extraterritorial concerns. Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain bring together critical essays that examine the broad issues of judicial involvement in politics and the future of the doctrine. With a wide range of historical and theoretical perspectives, this book will stimulate debate among those interested in political science and legal studies.

Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren't subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are.

"Prosecutors in the Boardroom" explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution.

Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna