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Randolph Clarke examines free will in the context of determinism on the one hand, and the notion that this choice may in fact be random and arbitrary on the other. In the first half of the book, he provides a careful, 'conceptual' assessment of the various libertarian theories that do not appeal to agent causation, and contends that they fail to provide an adequate account of the control required by free will. The second half is a development of his own theory of causation, where he suggests that a satisfactory account of this type of control is possible and necessary, constituting a significant advance in our understanding of free will and the moral responsibility that follows from it.
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent
philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the
question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several
varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that
must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or
another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on
disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one
is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these
include "reactive attitudes " such as resentment and gratitude, but
theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They
dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and
the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it
that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to
an agent's "quality of will, " but there is no consensus on what
this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of
her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what
she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays
from participants in these debates. The contributors include
prominent established figures as well as influential younger
philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys
recent debates and situates the contributions within it.
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent
philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the
question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several
varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that
must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or
another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on
disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one
is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these
include "reactive attitudes" such as resentment and gratitude, but
theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They
dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and
the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it
that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to
an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what
this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of
her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what
she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays
from participants in these debates. The contributors include
prominent established figures as well as influential younger
philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys
recent debates and situates the contributions within it.
Philosophical theories of agency and responsibility have focused
primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often
omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. Omitting or
refraining, like acting, can have consequences, good and bad. And
we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for omitting or refraining.
However, omitting and refraining are not simply special cases of
action; they require their own distinctive treatment. In Omissions,
Randolph Clarke offers the first comprehensive account of these
phenomena, addressing three main questions: What is an omission?
What is it to intentionally not do a certain thing? And what does
it take to be morally responsible for omitting or refraining?
Clarke examines the connection between negligence and omission, the
distinction between doing and allowing, and the distinction in law
between act and omission. With its attention to a previously
neglected topic, Omissions broadens our understanding of human
agency.
Philosophical theories of agency and responsibility have focused
primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often
omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. Omitting or
refraining, like acting, can have consequences, good and bad. And
we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for omitting or refraining.
However, omitting and refraining are not simply special cases of
action; they require their own distinctive treatment. In Omissions,
Randolph Clarke offers the first comprehensive account of these
phenomena, addressing three main questions: What is an omission?
What is it to intentionally not do a certain thing? And what does
it take to be morally responsible for omitting or refraining?
Clarke examines the connection between negligence and omission, the
distinction between doing and allowing, and the distinction in law
between act and omission. With its attention to a previously
neglected topic, Omissions broadens our understanding of human
agency.
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of
libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on
action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of
event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality
and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which
event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which
we value free will, judging their success here to be limited.
Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one
that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event
causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but
argues that we should find the substance causation required by any
agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a
broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free
will and moral responsibility are incompatible with
determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
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