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Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems Rational
Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic
aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores
the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as
customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a
noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues
and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses
other types of information in queueing systems and compares
observable and unobservable variations and incentives for
information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant
models for the maximization of individual utilities, social
welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple
parallel servers to general network structures, the author
describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such
as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how
agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit
when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows
bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational
agents.
The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in
queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey
of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity
and leaves many issues uncovered. One of the main goals of this
book is to review the existing literature under one cover. Other
goals are to edit the known results in a unified manner, classify
them and identify where and how they relate to each other, and fill
in some gaps with new results. In some areas we explicitly mention
open problems. We hope that this survey will motivate further
research and enable researchers to identify important open
problems. The models described in this book have numerous
applications. Many examples can be found in the cited papers, but
we have chosen not to include applications in the book. Many of the
ideas described in this book are special cases of general
principles in Economics and Game Theory. We often cite references
that contain more general treatment of a subject, but we do not go
into the details. we have highlighted the results For each topic
covered in the book, that, in our opinion, are the most important.
We also present a brief discussion of related results. The content
of each chapter is briefly de scribed below. Chapter 1 is an
introduction. It contains basic definitions, models and solution
concepts which will be used frequently throughout the book."
The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in
queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey
of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity
and leaves many issues uncovered. One of the main goals of this
book is to review the existing literature under one cover. Other
goals are to edit the known results in a unified manner, classify
them and identify where and how they relate to each other, and fill
in some gaps with new results. In some areas we explicitly mention
open problems. We hope that this survey will motivate further
research and enable researchers to identify important open
problems. The models described in this book have numerous
applications. Many examples can be found in the cited papers, but
we have chosen not to include applications in the book. Many of the
ideas described in this book are special cases of general
principles in Economics and Game Theory. We often cite references
that contain more general treatment of a subject, but we do not go
into the details. we have highlighted the results For each topic
covered in the book, that, in our opinion, are the most important.
We also present a brief discussion of related results. The content
of each chapter is briefly de scribed below. Chapter 1 is an
introduction. It contains basic definitions, models and solution
concepts which will be used frequently throughout the book.
Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems Rational
Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic
aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores
the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as
customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a
noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues
and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses
other types of information in queueing systems and compares
observable and unobservable variations and incentives for
information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant
models for the maximization of individual utilities, social
welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple
parallel servers to general network structures, the author
describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such
as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how
agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit
when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows
bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational
agents.
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