Originally published in 1980, this title came about after many late night discussions between the authors during a 3-week workshop on Mathematical Approaches to Person Perception in 1974. In subsequent meetings a mutual interest emerged in the development of cognitive information processing metaphors for human thought and their application to problems of social perception, memory and judgment. Within the context of modern research on social cognition, the most distinctive aspects of the authors' work was its empirical focus on how people cognitively represent people in memory, and its theoretical emphasis on models of cognitive organization and process. They concluded that an adequate theory of social memory was the necessary foundation for solutions to many questions concerning social perception and judgment that had dominated the 1974 workshop. This volume summarizes work conducted between 1974 and 1979 on social memory by these authors. In addition to six chapters summarizing individual research programs, the volume includes a general introduction and a concluding theoretical integration.

Originally published in 1980, this title came about after many late night discussions between the authors during a 3-week workshop on Mathematical Approaches to Person Perception in 1974. In subsequent meetings a mutual interest emerged in the development of cognitive information processing metaphors for human thought and their application to problems of social perception, memory and judgment. Within the context of modern research on social cognition, the most distinctive aspects of the authors' work was its empirical focus on how people cognitively represent people in memory, and its theoretical emphasis on models of cognitive organization and process. They concluded that an adequate theory of social memory was the necessary foundation for solutions to many questions concerning social perception and judgment that had dominated the 1974 workshop. This volume summarizes work conducted between 1974 and 1979 on social memory by these authors. In addition to six chapters summarizing individual research programs, the volume includes a general introduction and a concluding theoretical integration.

How jurors come to a verdict in a trial is a fascinating topic with many unexpected aspects. Inside the Juror presents the most interesting and sophisticated work to date on juror decision making from several traditions--social psychology, behavioral decision theory, cognitive psychology, and behavioral modeling. The authors grapple with crucial questions, such as: Why jurors who hear the same evidence and arguments in the courtroom enter the jury room with disagreements about the proper verdict and how biases and prejudices affect jurors' decisions. And just how "rational" is the typical juror? As an introduction to the scientific study of juror decision making in criminal trials, Inside the Juror provides a comprehensive and understandable summary of the major theories of juror decision making and the research that has been conducted to evaluate their validity.

The authors are highly respected as leading figures in the field of judgment and decision making. There are many existing books on topics related to judgment and decision making, but this book makes a unique contribution to this field because of its systematic and scholarly approach, and its breadth of coverage. Robert Goldstone, Indiana University Reid Hastie and Robyn Dawes are two of the most eminent researchers in the field. I know these authors to be excellent writers and I have no doubt that their writing style will be suitable for my students. William Goldstein, University of Chicago In the new edition of this award-winning text, renowned authors Reid Hastie and Robyn Dawes compare and contrast the basic principles of rationality with actual behavior in making decisions. This book explores theories and research findings from the field of judgment and decision making in a non-technical manner, using anecdotes as a teaching device. Intended as an introductory textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, the material not only is of scholarly interest but is practical as well. New to This Edition Chapter introductions, conclusions, and cross-references between chapters make the text more student friendly An abundance of examples from areas such as finance, medicine, law, and engineering anchor concepts to the real world Increased consideration of descriptive, psychological models of decision making augment the original emphasis on normative, rational, Expected Utility Theory models, bring the book up to date Balance among the three major approaches to judgment and decision making: cognitive psychological analyses of mental processes and heuristics, descriptive algebraic models of judgment and decision processes, and rational models of decision making"

Why are group decisions so hard? Since the beginning of human history, people have made decisions in groups--first in families and villages, and now as part of companies, governments, school boards, religious organizations, or any one of countless other groups. And having more than one person to help decide is good because the group benefits from the collective knowledge of all of its members, and this results in better decisions. Right? Back to reality. We've all been involved in group decisions--and they're hard. And they often turn out badly. Why? Many blame bad decisions on "groupthink" without a clear idea of what that term really means. Now, Nudge coauthor Cass Sunstein and leading decision-making scholar Reid Hastie shed light on the specifics of why and how group decisions go wrong--and offer tactics and lessons to help leaders avoid the pitfalls and reach better outcomes. In the first part of the book, they explain in clear and fascinating detail the distinct problems groups run into: * They often amplify, rather than correct, individual errors in judgment * They fall victim to cascade effects, as members follow what others say or do * They become polarized, adopting more extreme positions than the ones they began with * They emphasize what everybody knows instead of focusing on critical information that only a few people know In the second part of the book, the authors turn to straightforward methods and advice for making groups smarter. These approaches include silencing the leader so that the views of other group members can surface, rethinking rewards and incentives to encourage people to reveal their own knowledge, thoughtfully assigning roles that are aligned with people's unique strengths, and more. With examples from a broad range of organizations--from Google to the CIA--and written in an engaging and witty style, Wiser will not only enlighten you; it will help your team and your organization make better decisions--decisions that lead to greater success.

An important statistical study of the dynamics of jury selection and deliberation that offers a realistic jury simulation model, a statistical analysis of the personal characteristics of jurors and a general assessment of jury performance based on research findings by reputed scholars in the behavioral sciences. "A landmark jury study." --Contemporary Sociology "The book will stand as the third great product of social research into jury operations, ranking with Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury and Van Dyke's Jury Selection Procedures." --American Bar Association Journal REID HASTIE has taught at Harvard University, Northwestern University and the University of Colorado (where he was Director of the Center for Research on Judgment and Policy). He is now a Professor of Behavioral Science on the faculty of the Chicago Booth Graduate School of Business and a member of the Center for Decision Research. He has published over 100 articles on topics including judgment and decision making, memory and cognition and social psychology. Hastie is widely recognized for his books on legal decision making: Social Psychology in Court (with Michael Saks, 1978), Inside the Juror (1993) and Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002). STEVEN D. PENROD was a legal officer in the Naval Judge Advocate General Corps from 1971-1973. He was a professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin, University of Minnesota and the University of Nebraska. He is currently a Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY. He is the author of Social Psychology (1983). NANCY PENNINGTON, professor of psychology at the University of Colorado, Boulder, is acknowledged for her many publications which include Causal Reasoning and Decision Making: The Case of Juror Decisions (1981).

Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against the cigarette manufacturers. More puzzling were two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights and the environment, multimillion dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy. But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors - specialists in psychology, economics and the law - present the results of controlled experiments with over 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. They find that although juries tended to agree in their moral judgements about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; showed "hindsight bias", believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages. With a wealth of new data and a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic bias in jury behaviour and should be valuable for anyone interested in punitive damages, jury behaviour, human psychology and the theory of punishment.

Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy.
But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking "severity shift" toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed "hindsight bias," believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting thatjudges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages.
Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment.