Derivatives, or financial instruments whose value is based on an underlying asset, played a key role in the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Congress directly addressed the governance of the derivatives markets through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203; July 21, 2010). This Act, in Title VII, sought to bring the largely unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets under greater regulatory control and scrutiny. Pillars of this approach included mandating that certain OTC derivatives be subject to central clearing, such as through a clearinghouse, which involves posting margin to cover potential losses; greater transparency through trading on exchanges or exchange-like facilities; and reporting trades to a repository, among other reforms. In the debates over Dodd-Frank and in subsequent years, many in Congress have raised the following important questions: If the United States takes stronger regulatory action than other countries, will business in these OTC derivatives markets shift overseas? Since OTC derivatives markets are global in nature, could derivatives trading across borders, or business for U.S. financial firms that engage in these trades, be disrupted if other countries do not adopt similar regulatory frameworks? The first step in addressing these congressional concerns is to examine the degree to which other major countries have adopted similar legislation and regulation as the United States, particularly in light of commitments from the Group of Twenty nations (G-20) to adopt certain derivatives reforms. Following the financial crisis, G-20 leaders (generally political heads of state) established a reform agenda and priorities within that agenda for regulating and overseeing OTC derivatives. The G-20 as an organization has no enforcement capabilities, but relies on the members themselves to implement reforms. According to recent surveys, most members are making progress in meeting the self-imposed goal of implementing major reforms in derivatives markets. Only the United States appears to have met all the reforms endorsed by the G-20 members within the desired timeframe of year-end 2012. The European Union (EU), Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States have each taken significant steps towards implementing legislation requiring central clearing. However, in most of these jurisdictions legislation has not yet been followed up with technical implementing regulations for the requirements to become effective, according to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which conducts the surveys. Most authorities surveyed estimated that a significant proportion of interest rate derivatives would be centrally cleared by year-end 2012, but they were less confident of progress for other asset classes. The EU appeared to be making progress in its G-20 derivatives regulatory commitments, particularly in central clearing and trade repository-reporting requirements, but at a slower pace than the United States, according to the FSB. This may be due in part to the need for legislation to be passed by individual national legislatures even when agreed broadly by the EU. As of October 2012, however, only the United States had adopted legislation requiring standardized derivatives to be traded on exchanges and electronic platforms. This report examines the G-20 recommendations for reforming OTC derivatives markets and presents the result of self-assessment surveys measuring the performance of G-20 members and some FSB members to date in meeting their commitments. The Appendix to the report presents more detailed information on the status of individual jurisdictions in implementing the G-20- endorsed reforms. The Glossary defines key international bodies and related financial terms and concepts.

The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a major source of systemic risk. A number of firms used derivatives to construct highly leveraged speculative positions, which generated enormous losses that threatened to bankrupt not only the firms themselves but also their creditors and trading partners. Hundreds of billions of dollars in government credit were needed to prevent such losses from cascading throughout the system. AIG was the best-known example, but by no means the only one. Equally troublesome was the fact that the OTC market depended on the financial stability of a dozen or so major dealers. Failure of a dealer would have resulted in the nullification of trillions of dollars' worth of contracts and would have exposed derivatives counterparties to sudden risk and loss, exacerbating the cycle of deleveraging and withholding of credit that characterized the crisis. During the crisis, all the major dealers came under stress, and even though derivatives dealing was not generally the direct source of financial weakness, a collapse of the $600 trillion OTC derivatives market was imminent absent federal intervention. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Crucial reforms include a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a central counterparty regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to eliminate the possibility that any firm can build up an uncapitalized exposure so large that default would have systemic consequences (again, the AIG situation). The size of a cleared position is limited by the firm's ability to post capital to cover its losses. That capital protects its trading partners and the system as a whole. Swap dealers and major swap participants-firms with substantial derivatives positions-will be subject to margin and capital requirements above and beyond what the clearinghouses mandate. Swaps that are cleared will also be subject to trading on an exchange, or an exchange-like "swap execution facility," regulated by either the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in the case of security-based swaps. All trades will be reported to data repositories, so that regulators will have complete information about all derivatives positions. Data on swap prices and trading volumes will be made public. The Dodd-Frank Act provides exceptions to the clearing and trading requirements for commercial end-users, or firms that use derivatives to hedge the risks of their nonfinancial business operations. Regulators may also provide exemptions for smaller financial institutions. Even trades that are exempt from the clearing and exchange-trading requirements, however, will have to be reported to data repositories or directly to regulators.

On May 10, 2012, JP Morgan disclosed that it had lost more than $2 billion by trading financial derivatives. Jamie Dimon, CEO and chairman of JP Morgan, reported that the bank's Chief Investment Office (CIO) executed the trades to hedge the firm's overall credit exposure as part of the bank's asset liability management program (ALM). The CIO operated within the depository subsidiary of JP Morgan, although its offices were in London. The funding for the trades came from what JP Morgan characterized as excess deposits, which are the difference between deposits held by the bank and its commercial loans. The trading losses resulted from an attempt to unwind a previous hedge investment, although the precise details remain unconfirmed. The losses occurred in part because the CIO chose to place a new counter-hedge position, rather than simply unwind the original position. In 2007 and 2008, JP Morgan had bought an index tied to credit default swaps on a broad index of high-grade corporate bonds. In general, this index would tend to protect JP Morgan if general economic conditions worsened (or systemic risk increased) because the perceived health of highgrade firms would tend to deteriorate with the economy. In 2011, the CIO decided to change the firm's position by implementing a new counter trade. Because this new trade was not identical to the earlier trades, it introduced basis risk and market risk, among other potential problems. It is this second "hedge on a hedge" that is responsible for the losses in 2012. Several financial regulators are responsible for overseeing elements of the JP Morgan trading losses. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the primary prudential regulator of federally chartered depository banks and their ALM activities, including the CIO of JP Morgan, even though it is located in London. The Federal Reserve is the prudential regulator of JP Morgan's holding company, although it would tend to defer to the primary prudential regulators of the firm's subsidiaries for significant regulation of those entities. The Federal Reserve also regulates systemic risk aspects of large financial firms such as JP Morgan. The CIO must comply with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulations because it is part of the insured depository. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees JP Morgan's required disclosures to the firm's stockholders regarding material risks and losses such as the trades. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates trading in swaps and financial derivatives. The heads of these agencies coordinate through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is chaired by the Secretary of Treasury. The trading losses may have implications for a number of financial regulatory issues. For example, should the exemption to the Volcker Rule for hedging be interpreted broadly enough to encompass general portfolio hedges like the JP Morgan trades, or should hedging be limited to more specific risks? Are current regulations of large financial firms the appropriate balance to address perceptions that some firms are too-big-to-fail? The trading losses raise concerns about the calculation and reporting of risk by large financial firms. JP Morgan changed its value at risk (VaR) model during the time of the trading losses. Some are concerned that VaR models may not adequately address potential risks. Some are concerned that the change in reporting of the VaR at JP Morgan's CIO may not have provided adequate disclosures of the potential risks that JP Morgan faced. Such disclosures are governed by securities laws.