![]() |
![]() |
Your cart is empty |
||
Showing 1 - 25 of 36 matches in All Departments
It is a platitude that most people, as they say, 'work to live' rather than 'live to work.' And in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, work weeks have expanded and the divide between work time and personal time has significantly blurred due to innovations in such things as electronic communications. Concerns over the value of work in our lives, as well as with the balance or use of time between work and leisure, confront most people in contemporary society. Discussions over the values of time, leisure, and work are directly related to the time-honored question of what makes a life good. And this question is of particular interest to philosophers, especially ethicists. In this volume, leading scholars address a range of value considerations related to peoples' thoughts and practices around time utilization, leisure, and work with masterful insight. In addressing various practical issues, these scholars demonstrate the timeless relevance and practical import of Philosophy to human lived experience.
It is a platitude that most people, as they say, 'work to live' rather than 'live to work.' And in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, work weeks have expanded and the divide between work time and personal time has significantly blurred due to innovations in such things as electronic communications. Concerns over the value of work in our lives, as well as with the balance or use of time between work and leisure, confront most people in contemporary society. Discussions over the values of time, leisure, and work are directly related to the time-honored question of what makes a life good. And this question is of particular interest to philosophers, especially ethicists. In this volume, leading scholars address a range of value considerations related to peoples' thoughts and practices around time utilization, leisure, and work with masterful insight. In addressing various practical issues, these scholars demonstrate the timeless relevance and practical import of Philosophy to human lived experience.
What role does reason play in our actions? How do we know whether
what we do is right? Can practical reasoning guide ethical
judgment?
What role does reason play in our actions? How do we know whether
what we do is right? Can practical reasoning guide ethical
judgment?
Bernard Gert's moral theory is among the clearest and most comprehensive on the contemporary scene. It touches on elements of the dominant ethical orientations -utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractionism, and virtue ethics without fitting neatly into any of those categories. For that reason, Gert's moral theory appeals to many ethicists dissatisfied with each of the dominant formulations. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals presents Gert's Morality, the reactions by a number of prominent scholars, and Gert's response. All told, it is a remarkably wide-ranging study of ethical theory. The work is broken down into six parts, making Rationality, Rules, and Ideals perfect for a broad-ranging course on ethical theory, following Gert's critiques of utilitariansim, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. Both students and professionals will find much material to work with in this volume. The papers contribute not only to the understanding of Gert's wide-ranging theory but to a number of important topics in ethic theory, the theory of rationality, and applied ethics.
This vigorous debate between two distinguished philosophers presents two views on a topic of worldwide importance: the role of religion in politics. Audi argues that citizens in a free democracy should distinguish religious and secular considerations and give them separate though related roles. Wolterstorff argues that religious elements are both appropriate in politics and indispensable to the vitality of a pluralistic democracy. Each philosopher first states his position in detail, then responds to and criticizes the opposing viewpoint. Written with engaging clarity, Religion in the Public Square will spur discussion among scholars, students, and citizens.
Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged."
Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged."
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned with how we know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience. This comprehensive introduction to the field of epistemology explains the concepts and theories central to understanding knowledge. Along with covering the traditional topics of the discipline in detail, Epistemology explores emerging areas of research. The third edition features new sections on such topics as the nature of intuition, the skeptical challenge of rational disagreement, and the value problem the range of questions concerning why knowledge and justified true belief have value beyond that of merely true belief. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Special features of the third edition of Epistemology include:
Epistemology, or "the theory of knowledge," is concerned with how we know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience. This comprehensive introduction to the field of epistemology explains the concepts and theories central to understanding knowledge. Along with covering the traditional topics of the discipline in detail, Epistemology explores emerging areas of research. The third edition features new sections on such topics as the nature of intuition, the skeptical challenge of rational disagreement, and "the value problem" - the range of questions concerning why knowledge and justified true belief have value beyond that of merely true belief. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Special features of the third edition of Epistemology include:
"Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book. Far reaching in import, it develops a convincing alliance between an intuitionist approach to moral epistemology and a Kantian treatment of moral theory."--Hugh J. McCann, Texas A&M University "Among Audi's many mighty achievements in this rewarding book, two are especially illuminating to me: his brilliant analysis of the separable elements of classical intuitionism and his formulation of a moderate vision of intuitionism, which neatly avoids the problems afflicting its distinguished forebears."--Betsy Postow, University of Tennessee ""The Good in the Right" will end up being thought of as one of the most important books in moral philosophy published in this decade. In my view, the fate of Kantian ethics hangs on the force of Audi's arguments."--Brad Hooker, University of Reading, author of "Ideal Code, Real World" "This is a remarkable book--remarkably ambitious, remarkably successful. It is a work of extraordinary scope and depth. Audi offers an attractive account of moral epistemology that provides him with the means to mine a variety of normative ethical theories, extract what is most promising in them, and combine these elements into a new theory that is both coherent and novel and is readily applicable to a host of problems in practical ethics. The upshot is a highly original and powerful theory of morality that is both theoretically and practically appealing."--Michael J. Zimmerman, author of "The Nature of Intrinsic Value" and "The Concept ofMoral Obligation"
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also "moral perceptions"--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, "Moral Perception" advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
In this book Robert Audi presents an original ethics of conduct, spanning moral theory, practical ethics, and theories of obligation and value. Conduct is determined not just by what we do, but also by why and how we do it. To integrate these dimensions of conduct, Audi clarifies the relation between intention and obligation, explains the difference between moral rightness and moral worth, and describes myriad manners of human actions. He also clarifies major moral standards such as justice, fidelity, beneficence, and liberty, and explores ethics from the perspectives of the theory of action, the epistemology of moral principles, the metaphysics of normative properties, and the value of human experiences. His concluding chapters offer a theory of reasons and values and propose an original theory of value.
Business Ethics and Ethical Business is a brief yet remarkably
comprehensive introduction to the thought-provoking field of
business ethics. The text is organized into three parts that cover
the role of business in society, the ethics of internal management,
and the challenges of international business. It introduces the
standards essential in business ethics, explores a wide range of
issues using concrete examples, and provides analytical tools for
guiding ethical decisions in the real world.
No one wants to be treated merely as a means-"used," in a sense. But just what is this repugnant treatment? Audi's point of departure is Kant's famous principle that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Treatment of these kinds is conduct, a complex three-dimensional notion whose central elements are action, its motivation, and the manner of its performance. He shows how the notions of treating persons as ends and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they have much intuitive force. Audi constructs an account of treatment of persons-of what it is, how it differs from mere interpersonal action, and what ethical standards govern it. In accounting for such treatment, the book develops a wider conception of ethics than is commonly implicit in utilitarian, deontological, or virtue theories. These results contribute to ethical theory, but in its discussion of diverse narrative examples of moral and immoral conduct, the book also contributes to normative ethics. Audi's theory of conduct takes account of motivational elements that are not traits of character and of behavioral elements that are not manifestations of virtue or vice. Here it goes beyond the leading virtue approaches. The theory also advances rule ethics by framing wider conception of moral behavior-roughly, of acting morally. The results advance both normative ethics and ethical theory. For moral philosophy, the book frames conceptions, articulates distinctions, and formulates principles; and for practical ethics, it provides a multitude of cases that illustrate both the scope of moral responsibility and the normative standards for living up to it.
No one wants to be treated merely as a means-"used," in a sense. But just what is this repugnant treatment? Audi's point of departure is Kant's famous principle that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Treatment of these kinds is conduct, a complex three-dimensional notion whose central elements are action, its motivation, and the manner of its performance. He shows how the notions of treating persons as ends and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they have much intuitive force. Audi constructs an account of treatment of persons-of what it is, how it differs from mere interpersonal action, and what ethical standards govern it. In accounting for such treatment, the book develops a wider conception of ethics than is commonly implicit in utilitarian, deontological, or virtue theories. These results contribute to ethical theory, but in its discussion of diverse narrative examples of moral and immoral conduct, the book also contributes to normative ethics. Audi's theory of conduct takes account of motivational elements that are not traits of character and of behavioral elements that are not manifestations of virtue or vice. Here it goes beyond the leading virtue approaches. The theory also advances rule ethics by framing wider conception of moral behavior-roughly, of acting morally. The results advance both normative ethics and ethical theory. For moral philosophy, the book frames conceptions, articulates distinctions, and formulates principles; and for practical ethics, it provides a multitude of cases that illustrate both the scope of moral responsibility and the normative standards for living up to it.
Rational Belief provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology-which is centrally concerned with belief-as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part One centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part Two concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. The book also offers a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and shows how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal-for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private " aspects of mental life-is explored. The final section addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.
A central concern in recent ethical thinking is reasons for action and their relation to obligations, rights, and values. This collection of recent essays by Robert Audi presents an account of what reasons for action are, how they are related to obligation and rights, and how they figure in virtuous conduct. In addition, Audi reflects in his opening essay on his theory of reasons for action, his common-sense intuitionism, and his widely debated principles for balancing religion and politics. Reasons are shown to be basic elements in motivation, grounded in experience, and crucial for justifying actions and for understanding rights. Audi's clear and engaging essays make these advanced debates accessible to students as well as scholars, and this volume will be a valuable resource for readers interested in ethical theory, political theory, applied ethics, or philosophy of action.
A central concern in recent ethical thinking is reasons for action and their relation to obligations, rights, and values. This collection of recent essays by Robert Audi presents an account of what reasons for action are, how they are related to obligation and rights, and how they figure in virtuous conduct. In addition, Audi reflects in his opening essay on his theory of reasons for action, his common-sense intuitionism, and his widely debated principles for balancing religion and politics. Reasons are shown to be basic elements in motivation, grounded in experience, and crucial for justifying actions and for understanding rights. Audi's clear and engaging essays make these advanced debates accessible to students as well as scholars, and this volume will be a valuable resource for readers interested in ethical theory, political theory, applied ethics, or philosophy of action.
Democratic states must protect the liberty of citizens and must accommodate both religious liberty and cultural diversity. This democratic imperative is one reason for the increasing secularity of most modern democracies. Religious citizens, however, commonly see a secular state as unfriendly toward religion. This book articulates principles that enable secular governments to protect liberty in a way that judiciously separates church and state and fully respects religious citizens. After presenting a brief account of the relation between religion and ethics, the book shows how ethics can be independent of religion-evidentially autonomous in a way that makes moral knowledge possible for secular citizens-without denying religious sources a moral authority of their own. With this account in view, it portrays a church-state separation that requires governments not only to avoid religious establishment but also to maintain religious neutrality. The book shows how religious neutrality is related to such issues as teaching evolutionary biology in public schools, the legitimacy of vouchers to fund private schooling, and governmental support of "faith-based initiatives." The final chapter shows how the proposed theory of religion and politics incorporates toleration and forgiveness as elements in flourishing democracies. Tolerance and forgiveness are described; their role in democratic citizenship is clarified; and in this light a conception of civic virtue is proposed. Overall, the book advances the theory of liberal democracy, clarifies the relation between religion and ethics, provides distinctive principles governing religion in politics, and provides a theory of toleration for pluralistic societies. It frames institutional principles to guide governmental policy toward religion; it articulates citizenship standards for political conduct by individuals; it examines the case for affirming these two kinds of standards on the basis of what, historically, has been called natural reason; and it defends an account of toleration that enhances the practical application of the ethical framework both in individual nations and in the international realm.
Rationality and Religious Commitment shows how religious commitment
can be rational and describes the place of faith in the postmodern
world. It portrays religious commitment as far more than accepting
doctrines--it is viewed as a kind of life, not just as an embrace
of tenets. Faith is conceived as a unique attitude. It is
irreducible to belief but closely connected with both belief and
conduct, and intimately related to life's moral, political, and
aesthetic dimensions. |
![]() ![]() You may like...
|